Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TBILISI2089
2007-08-21 11:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 21

Tags:  PREL PGOV OSCE GG 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7374
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002089 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 21

REF: TBILISI 2075

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b&d).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002089

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 21

REF: TBILISI 2075

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b&d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) A second round of the International Group of Experts
(IGE) has completed a report on the August 6 missile impact,
endorsing the conclusions made by earlier experts while
providing additional detail and more specific information to
confirm that Georgian aircraft could not have fired the
missile. In a candid meeting with Charge halfway through his
visit to Tbilisi, visiting OSCE representative Miomir Zuzul
indicated it was clear to him that the August 6 missile came
from a Russian plane that crossed into Georgia. He said the
Russian Ambassador had hotly disputed this charge, leading
Zuzul to believe the Russians will not change their story,
regardless of the evidence. While saying the general picture
of the incident was clear, Zuzul noted there was some
difference of opinion on the motive: Georgian investigators
tend to believe the missile was released as part of evasive
maneuvers, while members of the current installment of the
International Group of Experts (IGE) have spelled out in
their report a "possible scenario" of an intentional attack.
End Summary.

New International Report Builds the Record
--------------

2. (SBU) On August 21 post obtained (and e-mailed to EUR/CARC
and elsewhere) the report produced by the second version of
the IEG, consisting of two experts from Estonia, two from
Poland, and one from the U.K. The report endorsed the
conclusions of the earlier IGE report, and added further
technical details about the firing of the missile and the
reaction of Georgian personnel manning a nearby radar
installation, who turned off the radar when they spotted the
missile. The experts reported examining all Georgian SU-25
aircraft and confirming that none of them could have fired
the missile. According to the report, the missile was made
in Russia in 1992, and "within the region Russia is the only
feasible nation capable of using the weapon correctly."
While noting that the IGE is not claiming that the radar was
deliberately attacked, the reports lays out a "possible

scenario" in which the missile was launched intentionally,
but then missed the target because it was unable to home in
on the radar after it was deactivated.


3. (SBU) The report makes a number of recommendations for
further investigation, including seeking information from the
Russian manufacturer, from pilots who fly this type of
aircraft and use this missile, and radar tracks from
neighboring countries. In particular, the IGE argued that
"more information about the incident could be determined if
Russia supplied the military (primary) radar tracks in
addition to the secondary tracks already received."

Zuzul Sees a Clear Picture
--------------

4. (C) Accompanied by Spain's Charge to OSCE Perez and Acting
OSCE Head of Mission in Georgia Nikolaev, Zuzul, a former
Croatian Foreign Minister acting as a Personal Representative
of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, told Charge August 20 that
there was a "clear general picture" of the August 6 incident,
with compelling evidence that Russia was responsible. He
noted that there remained some disagreement about why the
incident happened: members of the second wave of the IGE were
inclined to the view that it was a planned Russian attack,
while Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA)
investigators believed the missile was dropped as the plane
tried to evade an attack by the South Ossetians, who
apparently believed the plane was Georgian. While
acknowledging he was a layman and the IEG experts were
impressive, Zuzul said he personally found the MOIA
explanation more convincing, adding that it was notable that
the Georgians favored an interpretation that cast Russian
intentions in a less negative light.


5. (C) Zuzul said his Georgian interlocutors had taken a
constructive approach to the investigation, in contrast to
Russian Ambassador Kovalenko. Zuzul said Kovalenko had been
highly agitated in their meeting, pitching a story that the
Georgians fabricated the attack and showing no readiness to
listen to other arguments. Zuzul was not impressed with
Kovalenko's "evidence," saying the Russian's arguments defied

TBILISI 00002089 002 OF 002


logic and contradicted themselves in a number of ways. When
Kovalenko criticized the IGE investigation, Zuzul told him
the IGE was willing to meet with Russian experts, but
Kovalenko did not respond to the offer. Zuzul said that,
despite the strong evidence, he thought it highly unlikely
the Russians would "change their story" and admit
responsibility.


6. (C) Zuzul agreed with Charge on the importance of
responding to this incident in a way that will deter future
such incidents, recognizing that another missile attack could
produce fatalities and lead to even greater problems. Zuzul
said that, in order to produce an even more credible and
clear report of what happened, he was close to deciding to
recommend that OSCE or the UN invite a higher-level group of
experts for a more official report. He said he envisioned
Russia and Georgia being invited to participate, but he took
Charge's point that it would be problematic to include the
accused parties in the investigation. He also expressed
interest in the idea of OSCE providing a radar expert to work
with the Georgians, in order to provide an independent
confirmation of airspace incursions, at least until Georgia
is linked up to NATO radar this fall.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) We are somewhat skeptical of supporting another
higher-level investigation by the OSCE or the UN. We wonder
how Zuzul, as a representative of the OSCE, can argue
effectively at the OSCE for a higher-level investigation that
excludes the Georgians and the Russians. If the Russians and
Georgians are included in the investigation, we would expect
an outcome similar to the UN-led report on the March 11
Kodori attack, which took months to generate and did not
explicitly point out responsibility for the attack.


PERRY