Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TBILISI2062
2007-08-15 13:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 15

Tags:  PREL PGOV GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7327
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002062 

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DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 15

REF: TBILISI 2025

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b&d).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002062

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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 15

REF: TBILISI 2025

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b&d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) International experts have completed a preliminary
report on the August 6 missile incident. Key conclusions
are: the aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Russia, and
the Georgian Air Force does not possess aircraft capable of
firing this type of missile or of flying the profile flown by
the intruding aircraft. The expert team and Georgian
officials briefed the diplomatic community on the report
August 15. Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Batu Kutelia
said Georgia continues to encourage countries to send experts
to review the report and the evidence. He announced that
Estonian and British experts would arrive soon. Kutelia said
Georgia would meet with Russian investigators, but would not
agree to a bilateral Russian-Georgian investigation. End
Summary.

The Plane Came from Russia
--------------

2. (SBU) Following three days of work investigating the
incident, the international group of experts (reftel),led by
a Swede and consisting of members from Sweden, Latvia,
Lithuania, and the U.S., presented an initial report to the
Georgian Ministry of Defense. The report contained the
following key findings:

-- On three occasions August 6, one unidentified aircraft
from Russia flew into Georgian airspace, making one short and
then two deeper incursions, the latter lasting approximately
eleven minutes each.

-- The missile that impacted near Tsitelubani -- which did
not explode but which had burn marks on the rocket motor
nozzle -- was a Russian-designed Kh-58 (or AS-11 Kilter)
anti-radiation missile.

-- Several eyewitnesses saw an aircraft in the area of
impact, and some saw an object leaving the aircraft with a
trail of smoke. Radar information of the third pass into
Georgian territory indicates an object separating from the
aircraft.

-- The Georgian Air Force does not possess aircraft equipped
with or able to launch Kh-58 missiles, nor does it have
aircraft able to fly the profile flown by the intruding
aircraft.

-- The expert group was not able to identify the aircraft

type or origin, or to verify reports of a second impact or a
MANPAD being fired at the aircraft.

Getting the Facts Out
--------------

3. (C) The Georgian government distributed the report to
diplomatic representatives at a briefing August 15. Kutelia
explained that the purpose of the briefing was to share the
report with diplomats who could then share it with their
capitals, to answer questions and to get comments and
suggestions. In the absence of the Swedish chair of the
group (who had already left Tbilisi) the U.S. team leader led
the presentation, inviting comments from other group members.
He focused on the facts established in the report, avoiding
conjecture, and the audience appeared to accept the report as
professional and credible.


4. (C) Kutelia said the Georgian government had not decided
when to make the report public, but noted it would be soon.
He said the report sufficiently answers the important
questions, and the Georgian public and the international
community are eager to receive the information. He said
Georgia continues to encourage countries to send experts to
review the report, evaluate the evidence, and either sign or
adjust the report as they believe appropriate. Kutelia
announced that an Estonian expert would arrive August 15 and
an expert from the U.K. would arrive August 17. Asked
whether the report should be seen as an interim report or
not, Kutelia responded that the Georgian government sees this
as the expert group's official report, but the document

TBILISI 00002062 002 OF 002


remains open for others to review and sign.

Russian Machinations
--------------

5. (C) Kutelia said Russia had requested permission for a
flight of Russian experts to come to Georgia for a joint
investigation. He said the Georgians would let them come and
welcome the bilateral consultations, but clarified that this
would not be a bilateral investigation. He stressed that
Georgia has already sent all of its evidence to the Russians
but has received no response to Georgia's request for Russia
to share its evidence.


6. (C) Following the briefing, Charge asked Kutelia why the
Georgian government had decided to release the report so
quickly, causing ambiguity about whether the international
group would continue to meet and whether there would be
another, final report. Kutelia said the Georgians felt
compelled to release the report now for two reasons: because
the Swedes had already sent it to EU capitals, and because
the Georgians are worried about Russian machinations and
wanted to get the report out as quickly as they could. He
emphasized that the Georgians' strategy is to keep the report
open and active while welcoming other experts, governments,
or international organizations to review it and lend their
weight to it.


7. (C) Georgian concerns about Russian efforts to conduct a
separate investigation and to promote alternative alleged
conclusions are nothing new. According to a letter from
Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution to the U.S.
Ambassador, on August 8 "high-level military circles in
Russia...parachuted a special team of the Military
Prosecutor's Office," headed by Eduard Grikorov, into
Tskhinvali to pressure the Russian commander of the Joint

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Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) to collect and disseminate false
information to undermine the conclusions (which the Georgians
consider "professional") of the August 7 JPKF investigation.
Georgian officials are also aware of the many reports in
Russian media pitching theories that Georgia is behind the
incident, often based on specific but false details, such as
that the Georgians destroyed the missile (they in fact
detonated only the warhead for safety reasons) or on alleged
witnesses whom the JPKF found August 8 to dispute the August
7 accounts that the aircraft came from the north.

PERRY