GEORGIA BOMBING UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001958

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA & EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA BOMBING UPDATE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b&d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Georgian officials report that SU-type airplanes from
Russia crossed into Georgian airspace on the evening of
August 6, and that one of the planes dropped a
"precision-guided Russian missile" -- estimated to weigh
700-1,000 kilograms -- that impacted near the Georgian
village Tsitelubani, close to the city of Gori. The bomb did
not explode, and the bulk of it is currently lodged in the
ground at the impact site. Georgian officials have made a
concerted effort to be transparent with us and the rest of
the international community -- even inviting the diplomatic
corps to visit the scene August 7. They argue that the lack
of international condemnation against Russia for previous
incidents -- including the March 11 bombing in the Upper
Kodori Gorge -- has encouraged Russian adventurism, and they
are pushing for a more forceful international response this
time. End Summary.

Collecting Evidence, and Identifying Motive
--------------

2. (C) Georgian officials informed Embassy the night of the
attack, and Embassy officers have seen the impact site and
missile remains with Russian markings. First Deputy Foreign
Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze briefed the diplomatic corps
August 7, saying that eyewitnesses, radar records, and the
missile itself confirm that the planes crossed from Russia a
bit before 1830 local time and released the missile near the
end of a 20-30 minute operation. He noted that the impact
site was about 80 kilometers south of the Russian-Georgian
border, and about 60 kilometers west of Tbilisi. Commenting
on the likely motive for the attack, Vashakidze suggested two
explanations: first, he noted that the Georgian initiative
aimed at "peaceful settlement of the South Ossetia conflict"
via the creation of a temporary autonomous unit and a
commission to define the entity's autonomous status, was
going well, and that Russia "perhaps does not appreciate"
this process and was attempting to stop it. Second, he
stressed that the international community had not
sufficiently addressed the March 11 attack in the Upper
Kodori Gorge, and this had encouraged the Russians to
"repeat" such an attack, this time at an even "more dangerous
level." He said the bombing was in some sense a "testing" of
Georgia and the international community, and that it would be
important to react strongly enough to prevent other such
dangerous situations in the future.


3. (C) According to radar records that the Georgians shared
with Embassy DAO, there were three penetrations of Georgian
airspace near Kazbegi. The first was a shallow incursion.
The second and third incursions followed similar tracks from
Kazbegi into the separatist region of South Ossetia and back.
The data on the third incursion reveals two aircraft during
the turn. It is possible that all three incursions were by
two aircraft, and possibly by the same two aircraft. The
speed and maneuverability of the aircraft indicate that they
were most likely SU 24s, although it is possible they were SU
27s or 29s. Ministry of Internal Affairs officials have told
us that the South Ossetians fired a Strela missile at the
departing aircraft, but Vashakidze did not mention this in
his briefing. South Ossetian officials have been quoted
claiming the incident was a Georgian attack.


4. (C) The impact site is in a Georgian-controlled area just
south of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, and
just north of the main highway from Tbilisi to western
Georgia. OSCE officials confirmed to us that the site is
inside the area generally called the "zone of conflict" (more
precisely called the Area of Responsibility of the Joint
Peacekeeping Force, or JPKF) and because of this OSCE
monitors and JPKF forces had been able to visit the scene.
The OSCE Mission is currently awaiting the monitors' report.
According to OSCE, this area has generally not been known for
ethnic tensions or the kind of shooting incidents that have
regularly occurred closer to Tskhinvali. The Georgians
believe that the intended target might have been a mobile
radar station located 125 meters away from the impact site.

A Measured Georgian Response
--------------

5. (C) President Saakashvili was returning from Europe when
the incident occurred and he convened a cabinet meeting upon
arrival to coordinate the Georgian reaction. In the hours
after the attack Charge urged Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili
and other Georgian officials to continue the moderate tone
and measured responses they have taken thus far, in order to
allow the incident to speak for itself. Bezhuashvili assured
Charge that Georgia was planning no retaliatory or aggressive
responses but would ensure that the incident received the

TBILISI 00001958 002 OF 002


public and international attention it deserved. He said
there was growing frustration and concern in the Georgian
leadership about Russian intentions following the March 11
attack by Russian helicopters in Kodori, and the Georgians
believe the weak international response to such incidents in
the past has encouraged the Russians to launch further
incidents.

Comment
--------------

6. (C) The Georgians have assured us they understand the need
to respond calmly to this incident, and they have quickly
mobilized to get information out to the international
community. They clearly hope that an investigation of this
incident will assign blame more squarely on Russia than did
the investigation of the March 11 attack, so that it might
serve as a deterrent to future such incidents which could
(especially if they produce fatalities) cause strong domestic
political pressure for a more vigorous Georgian response.
Georgian officials have told us in the past that they believe
Russia provokes periodic confrontations in order to make
Georgia seem less stable, and therefore make western European
countries less inclined to support Georgia's NATO
aspirations. Because Russia is a larger and more influential
country, the Georgians argue, Russia can provoke an incident
with Georgia and -- even when Russian responsibility is
clear, as with March 11 -- the European reaction is to call
on Georgia to make more concessions. In responding to this
incident, our approach should be aimed at preventing this
dynamic from repeating itself; attacking Georgia militarily
should not be allowed to slow or block Georgia's NATO
integration.

PERRY