MERABISHVILI ON WHAT'S NEXT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001605

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA & EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: MERABISHVILI ON WHAT'S NEXT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

REF: TBILISI 1562

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d).

Summary
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1. (C) Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Vano
Merabishvili told the Ambassador July 5 that while he thought
tensions would continue in South Ossetia, he did not expect a
major escalation. He said the Georgians hoped to be able to
recruit a number of prominent de facto officials at the
"deputy minister" level to jump ship and join the temporary
administrative unit of Dmitry Sanakoyev. He said de facto
leader Eduard Kokoity was aware that his position was
eroding, but Merabishvili expressed doubt that Kokoity had
the ability to carry out a major provocation, both because of
the controlling presence of Russian FSB officers in his
administration, and because South Ossetian militia would be
reluctant to get into an overly bloody fight with the
Georgians. The Ambassador stressed the importance of giving
Sanakoyev real autonomy and sufficient time to build his
local base of support. Merabishvili expressed disappointment
that Sochi had won the 2014 Winter Olympics, predicting this
would lead to a greater Russian financial stake in Abkhazia.
End Summary.

South Ossetia Simmering, Not Boiling Over
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2. (C) Merabishvili told the Ambassador in a lunch meeting
that tensions were likely to continue in South Ossetia,
stoked by such things as a recent Russian shipment to the de
facto authorities of mobile artillery and other equipment,
including one additional GRAD missile. Merabishvili said he
was highly skeptical of efforts to cut a Russian-Georgian
deal to resolve the conflict, because he did not believe the
Russians wanted to change the status quo. While
acknowledging that a number of points of tension had arisen
recently in South Ossetia, Merabishvili said he did not
believe the situation would escalate out of control, in part
because the Russian FSB ran things in South Ossetia through
its officers in high positions in Tskhinvali. He added that
Kokoity's first preference might be an all-out war, even one
that the Georgians won, because that would assure him a
comfortable future in Russia. But Merabishvili did not think
Kokoity was strong enough to carry out a major escalation,
such as the killing of a large number of Georgians. He said
South Ossetian forces were averse to fatalities, and it would
be hard to convince them to carry out extreme orders.


3. (C) Merabishvili said Sanakoyev's position was
strengthening daily, and he pointed to Sanakoyev's recent
speech in Brussels (reftel) as an important step -- something
the de facto authorities implicitly acknowledged when they
shut off power in Tskhinvali in a laughable attempt to
suppress news of the speech. He said Sanakoyev and the
Georgians were appealing to influential figures in the de
facto administration -- mostly deputy ministers since the
ministers are Russians -- to join Sanakoyev's team. He said
that many were interested, despite intense pressure from the
FSB to prevent them from switching. Merabishvili said that
there was a good chance -- although he could "not say a 50-50
chance" -- that a sizable number of officials would switch
sides soon. He said that if given a free choice, the
majority of South Ossetians would go with Sanakoyev.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked how plans were going for
consultations between the Georgians and Sanakoyev on the
details of autonomy, and Merabishvili said the plans remained
unchanged but there was currently some dispute within the
Georgian government about which ministry -- Merabishvili's
and/or others -- should have the lead on consultations.
Merabishvili said that unfortunately the Ministry of Internal
Affairs was still serving as the intermediary between
Sanakoyev and others both in and out of the government, but
he hoped to encourage the development of direct relationships
between Sanakoyev and other ministries. Merabishvili added
that Jemal Karkusov, Minister of Internal Affairs of
Sanakoyev's administrative unit, had gone along on
Merabishvili's recent trip to Lithuania. He said Karkusov
had been overwhelmed by the welcome he had received from the
Lithuanian government, far better than the humiliating
treatment Karkusov had received in Moscow during his time as
de facto minister of internal affairs in Tskhinvali. The
Ambassador stressed that Sanakoyev would benefit politically
from a specific identification of the powers held by his
administrative unit, and from sufficient time to build his
support with the population.

From Russia with Cash
--------------

5. (C) Turning to Abkhazia, Merabishvili said he personally

TBILISI 00001605 002 OF 002


did not believe Russia would recognize the independence of
Abkhazia, explaining that Russia's interests are best served
by the status quo. He said that the awarding of the 2014
Winter Olympics to Sochi -- announced less than a day before
-- was unwelcome news to the Georgians. Merabishvili said he
understood Russia had spent into the billions of dollars in
various countries to win support for Sochi's bid. He
predicted that the Olympics would drive up property values
around Sochi, leading more Russians to buy land and to invest
in neighboring Abkhazia. He said this would have negative
consequences for Georgia over time, because such financial
interests often played a key role in determining Russian
policies. (Note: Merabishvili's private comments contrast
with public statements by Saakashvili, made both before and
after the Olympic decision, expressing Georgian support for
Sochi's bid. End Note.)

Comment
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6. (C) As in previous conversations, Merabishvili gave an
upbeat assessment of the growth of Sanakoyev's popularity in
South Ossetia. We have heard markedly different assessments
on this subject from others with connections in South
Ossetia, and it is difficult to determine the truth in the
rigidly controlled environment in Tskhinvali. Some (but not
all) OSCE Mission members are convinced that most South
Ossetians see Sanakoyev as a traitor, and that this
perception has been reinforced by the recent tensions over
water, roads, and sniper fire between the two sides. Former
Georgian Defense Minister Okruashvili, an old rival of
Merabishvili's with little use for the Sanakoyev project,
recently told the Ambassador that the Georgians had "failed"
in their efforts to bring prominent members of the de facto
government over to Sanakoyev's side. Merabishvili clearly
remains hopeful that key de facto officials will defect, and
the outcome of this recruitment process may be a useful
measure of which way the tide is turning.

TEFFT