Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TBILISI1604
2007-07-06 11:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

ABKHAZIA: GENEVA-STYLE MEETING IN BONN: SMALL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS KPKO UNSC GG RU 
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VZCZCXRO4976
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1604/01 1871136
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061136Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6899
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TBILISI 001604 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KPKO UNSC GG RU
SUBJECT: ABKHAZIA: GENEVA-STYLE MEETING IN BONN: SMALL
STEPS FORWARD

REF: TBILISI 459

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TBILISI 001604

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KPKO UNSC GG RU
SUBJECT: ABKHAZIA: GENEVA-STYLE MEETING IN BONN: SMALL
STEPS FORWARD

REF: TBILISI 459

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 27 and 28, representatives of the
Friends of the UN Secretary General (FSG),together with the
UN, met the Georgian and Abkhaz sides for a Geneva-style
meeting in Bonn. Most significantly, the sides agreed to
resume Quadripartite meetings on law enforcement cooperation
in July and agreed to a Joint Fact Finding Group (JFFG)
investigation of the disappearance of David Sigua, an ethnic
Georgian official from the Abkhaz de facto administration.
Both sides agreed to explore confidence building measures
endorsed by UNSCR 1752, including establishing maritime
communication between Sukhumi and Trabzon, Turkey, with
appropriate custom controls. They also agreed to a Steering
Committee meeting for the EC-funded rehabilitation program in
Abkhazia during the week of July 2. Additionally, they
agreed to continued people-to-people contacts and to continue
cooperation on threats such as African Swine Fever. Although
the Georgians repeated an unconditional offer for a meeting
between President Saakashvili and de facto "president"
Bagapsh, the Abkhaz, supported by Russia, insisted such a
meeting needed advance coordination on a guaranteed outcome
such as the lifting of CIS economic sanctions or an agreement
on non-use of force. The Friends expressed concern about the
security situation, particularly in Gali, and urged the
Georgian side to move a Patriotic Youth Camp in the village
of Gunmukhuri away from the ceasefire line to avoid potential
mishaps. To follow-up on these commitments, the UN will work
to coordinate monthly meetings of the sides in Tbilisi or
Sukhumi to monitor implementation. After meetings between
FSG coordinator Hans-Dieter Lucas with both sides in the
region during the week of July 2, the UN may consider a
high-level letter to the sides from New York urging progress

on the agreed cooperation mechanisms. End summary.


2. (C) On June 27 and 28, the UN hosted representatives of
the FSG (U.S., UK, Germany, France, and Russia) in Bonn for a
Geneva-style meeting with the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under Secretary
Jean-Marie Guehenno chaired the discussion. Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Jean Arnault,
together with members of his staff and a representative of
the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA),were also
present. Representing the Georgians were State Minister for
Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze and Deputy Minister of
Internal Affairs Eka Zguladze, together with Dimitri
Manjavidze (one of Antadze,s deputies) and Alexander
Nalbandov (a representative from the MFA). Representing the
Abkhaz were de facto "foreign minister" Sergey Shamba and
Martin Targyl from his staff as well as two German-based
members of the Abkhaz diaspora, Khibla Amichba and Zeki Kap.
The FSG were represented by EUR DAS Matthew Bryza, Sir Brian
Fall (UK),Hans-Dieter Lucas (Germany),Veronique Bujon-Barre
(France),and Vladislav Chernov (Russian Federation),as well
as their delegations.

--------------
UN EMPHASIZES SECURITY, DIALOGUE AND CBMS
--------------


3. (C) The meetings began with an introduction by Guehenno
followed by separate presentations from each of the sides.
Following a dinner consultation the previous evening with the
Friends, Guehenno emphasized three main points in his
introduction: one, that the Friends are concerned about the
security situation in Abkhazia and would like a commitment
from both sides to refrain from provocations that would lead
to an escalation of violence; two, that the Friends urge a
resumption of dialogue between the sides, especially the
resumption of regular Quadripartite meetings to discuss law
enforcement cooperation; and three, that the Friends urge the
sides to review confidence building measures presented at the
Geneva meeting in February (reftel) and endorsed by the UN
Security Council in April, with a view to implementing them
in order to build trust and move toward a settlement.

--------------
GEORGIANS SUPPORT RE-ESTABLISHING DIALOGUE
--------------


4. (C) Antadze expressed Georgian concern about the lack of
dialogue and hoped that the Friends would help to
re-establish dialogue in existing formats as well as in other
formats. Stressing the importance of the return of
internally displaced persons (IDP)s, Antadze said that the
Abkhaz were undertaking measures, including legislative
measures, which were preventing their return. To address
these concerns, he suggested resuming the Special Commission

TBILISI 00001604 002 OF 006


on IDPs called for in the April 4, 1994 quadripartite
agreement. Antadze welcomed the creation of a UN human
rights office in Gali as a first step. He argued that its
implementation was important for the return of IDPs. He
noted the importance of UN Civilian Police and expressed a
need for a clear, transparent program with clarity on their
role and mandate. Antadze said the Georgians have ideas in
the economic field that could also increase trust and
confidence among various strata of the population.


5. (C) Antadze said the Abkhaz were blocking direct dialogue.
On Georgian presence in the Upper Kodori (or "Upper
Abkhazia" as they call it),Antadze said that the Georgians
honored the commitments with regards to transparency that
they made in Geneva in February, as verified by monitoring
missions by the UN and CIS Peacekeeping Force. He said the
Abkhaz refused to participate in the security dialogue that
was supposed to follow the Geneva meeting. He said the
Abkhaz had also canceled talks planned between Prime Minister
Noghaideli and the Abkhaz "prime minister" as well as
discussions planned for energy experts from both sides to
discuss the Enguri power plant situation. On the
disappearance of Sigua, Antadze proposed a JFFG
investigation. On the Patriotic Camp near the ceasefire
line, he proposed that the UN and FSG visit the camp to
dispel international concerns of its function and purpose,
which he said was to bring together young people from Georgia
to participate in sports activities and entertainment
programs.


6. (C) The Western Friends welcomed the Georgian commitment
to dialogue and expressed continuing concern over getting to
the bottom of the Sigua case and about the location of the
patriot youth camp - not for its activities but for the
potential of youth to undertake an action that could lead to
an escalation of conflict. Bryza urged the Georgians to
consider relocating the camp to a less sensitive area. Bryza
and the other Friends urged the Georgians to review the CBMs
endorsed by the Security Council and to resume Quadripartite
meetings. Striking a different tone, Chernov said the
Georgian side is continuing to hinder progress toward a
settlement, despite expressing willingness to move forward.
He alleged ongoing violations of the Moscow Agreement,
including overflights; deployment of over 600 police in the
Security Zone; illegal movements into the Upper Kodori; and
the illegal presence of armed groups, including two new
alleged observation points established in Abkhaz-controlled
areas that Moscow had informed him about that very morning.
Chernov noted dourly that such actions could lead to the
activation of military activity in the region and that the
Georgians could not expect flexibility from the Abkhaz on
refugee returns in the face of them. Chernov also attacked a
recent Georgian MFA statement that the separatist conflicts
were of a territorial and not an ethnic nature. He said it
belied an attitude toward ethnic minorities that was
counterproductive to the conflict resolution process.


7. (C) Antadze responded that every time there is a meeting
planned between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, there is a
provocation from the Russian side which makes dialogue
difficult. Zguladze said that the Georgians had appointed a
Coordinator for the Quadripartite meetings last fall. She
said that only two security incidents had taken place in
Upper Kodori since the Georgians regained control: a
military attack against the Minister of Internal Affairs and
another on March 11 against the government building.
Zguladze said that UN investigations into both attacks had
shown that Georgia is not instigating provocations in the
Upper Kodori. She expressed disappointment that the final
report of the JFFG investigation into the March 11 attack had
not yet been made public and expressed hope that it would in
the near future. (Note: To the FSG, Arnault said that the
report was in the process of being translated into Russian;
he hoped that the JFFG members might agree to its findings as
soon as June 29. End note.) She pushed back against
sensitivities concerning the location of the patriot camp,
nothing that there was no possible way it could be considered
a threat to the security situation. Zguladze continued that
Georgia exploded all weapons recovered from warlord Emzar
Kvitsiani and had reduced the number of police to 270 and
that this was confirmed by CIS PKF and UN monitoring
missions. She cautioned that Georgia may have to reassess
its position on reduction of police based on the results of
the report on the March 11 attack. Zguladze acknowledged
that logistical problems contributed to continuing Georgian
violations on movements in the Security Zone, but she said
the violations had decreased and that the notification
mechanism had improved. Nalbandov countered Chernov,s
allegation about the ethnic prejudice in Georgian society by
reiterating Georgia,s position that the conflicts are

TBILISI 00001604 003 OF 006


territorial and drawing on his own Armenian heritage to
legitimize his claim that Georgia,s constitution and
international commitments protect minority rights.

--------------
ABKHAZ START TOUGH BUT THEN SOFTEN
--------------


8. (C) Shamba opened with a plea to allow the Abkhaz to
address the UN Security Council as they are "equal parties in
the conflict." He claimed that UN documents describing the
conflict had changed over time to call it the "conflict in
Abkhazia, Georgia" and that the UN should go back to the
original formulation ("Georgia/Abkhazia conflict") which he
believed gave equal weight to the Abkhaz position. Shamba
claimed that the Georgians were conducting ongoing
provocations that violated UNSCR 1716, the Moscow Agreement,
and a certain "Gagra Agreement" of 1998 that contained clear
formulations on the Kodori Valley. He claimed there were
more than 1300 police in the Security Zone, whereas only 600
are allowed. He also cited the possibility that the patriot
camp near the ceasefire line could be used as a military camp
by the Georgians. Finally, he pointed to what he called the
kidnapping of Abkhaz officials, including Chakaberia and
Sigua. He claimed that witnesses knew that Sigua was killed
and even where he was buried. After this became public, he
said the body was exhumed and taken somewhere else. He
claimed that Georgia was in violation of the Moscow Agreement
with an expansion of its presence in Upper Kodori and the
establishment of two new observation points (in
Abkhaz-controlled territory.) He agreed on the need to
return to dialogue and called for the Georgians to consider
Abkhaz suggestions in Kodori, including training local police
to perform the police functions there. The Abkhaz, he said,
are ready to discuss establishing relations with the diaspora
but he cautioned that the Abkhaz could not resume
negotiations with Georgians until difficult issues were
resolved. Nonetheless, he said open lines of communication
benefited both sides.


9. (C) In response, Bryza focused on the goal of the meeting:
to move beyond recriminations and re-start dialogue. He said
the U.S. speaks bilaterally to Georgia and as part of the FSG
on the importance of avoiding provocative actions in
Abkhazia, including on the patriot camp. He said the U.S.
also raises the Sigua case with Georgian officials. Bryza
suggested that the Abkhaz share their information on Sigua
with the Georgians to try to get to the bottom of the case.
He asked for clarification from the UN on the number of
police in the Upper Kodori and the Security Zone. He
stressed the importance of implementing CBMs, not just
talking about them. On the question of appearing at the UN
Security Council, Bryza said that such an appearance would be
symbolic only, as the UNSC members with the exception of
China, are all represented by the FSG. He said the U.S.
could support such a trip after there is something important
to report, such as direct dialogue with Tbilisi at the
highest level. The other Friends supported Bryza's call for
dialogue, underscored the importance of avoiding
provocations, and pushed for progress on CBMs. Softening,
Shamba responded that the Abkhaz are ready to continue
dialogue, including resuming the Quadripartite meetings and
participating in a joint investigation of Sigua. He said
that the Abkhaz are ready to discuss CBMs, including the
opening of maritime communications with UNOMIG and CIS PKF
controlling the arrival of ships at the port of Sukhumi. (He
noted that ships from Georgia arrive regularly in Sukhumi,
but that they are all, of course, illegal.)

--------------
GETTING SIDES TO COMMIT TO SPECIFIC STEPS
--------------


10. (C) During a consultative meeting among the FSG and the
UN, Arnault reported that UNOMIG and the CIS PKF were
currently undertaking joint verification of armed personnel
in the Security Zone. He agreed with Shamba that the
Georgians likely have more than the 600 police allowed in the
Security Zone, which encompasses the Gali and Zugdidi
regions. Arnault estimated the number to be around 1000.
However, he said that Georgian law enforcement personnel in
Upper Kodori numbered 283 police and 100 Svan border guards.
Arnault agreed with the Abkhaz that the number of police
should be rationalized but noted that the March 11 attack had
&muddied the waters8 and made this more difficult. The UN
passed out a map of Abkhaz and UN sightings of unidentified
personnel in Abkhaz-controlled areas, along with pictures of
a group of seven unidentified personnel sighted by the UN in
an Abkhaz-controlled area north of Upper Kodori. Arnault
later said it was impossible to know who these people were

TBILISI 00001604 004 OF 006


after Bryza pointed out that it was unfounded to assume they
were Georgians (as was presupposed by some of the captions on
the map). Led by Guehenno, the FSG representatives agreed on
the need to press for concrete mechanisms and commitments by
the two sides. They drafted a page of written questions for
each side to respond to at their meetings later in the day.

--------------
GEORGIANS AGREE TO SPECIFIC STEPS
--------------


11. (C) In a follow-on meeting, the Georgian delegation went
through the list provided to them point by point, starting
with security issues and moving to CBMS:

--------------
SECURITY
--------------

-- On the question of the presence of reportedly Georgian
personnel in the lower Kodori, Zguladze said categorically
that there are no Georgian movements or deployments in lower
Kodori. She said she had just checked this information again
today and that the official response from the Ministry is
that Georgia is also worried about these elements which are
in an area controlled by the Abkhaz and patrolled by the UN
and CIS Peacekeeping Force. She offered Georgian cooperation
to help the UN identify these groups.

-- On the number of personnel in the Security Zone, Zguladze
said there are 600 personnel in the Security Zone and offered
that the UN could verify this claim.

-- On the reQeployment of the patriotic camp, Zguladze
suggested that the FSG visit the cap and assess whether it is
a security risk.

-- On the appointment of a Coordinator for the Quadripartite
meetings, Zguladze confirmed that a Coordinator had been
appointed and is the Head of Division of the Department of
Constitutional Security. His name is Zurab Logua.

-- On agreement to hold a Quadripartite meeting in July,
Zguladze said the Georgian side is ready to participate.

-- On rationalizing forces in Upper Kodori, Zguladze said
that the Georgians had already reduced the presence in Upper
Kodori from 800 to 270 and that although further decreases
could be considered the threat assessment following the March
11 attack indicates that this is the number needed to keep
the population safe. She said that about 35 percent of the
police in Upper Kodori are locals.

--------------
CBMS
--------------

-- On allowing contacts between the Abkhaz and diaspora in
Turkey, Antadze contended that this was not an issue raised
in the last Geneva meeting and that there are contacts which
are informal and ongoing.

-- On opening maritime communications between Sukhumi and
Trabzon, Turkey, Antadze said that Georgia supports this
provided that there is a process developed with Georgia to
resolve issues regarding customs procedures.

-- On encouraging contacts between Georgians and Abkhaz,
George Mangivadze said that there were no cases where the
Georgian side prevented such contacts. He said Georgia had
no conditions on such contacts.

-- On combating African Swine Fever, Antadze said that
Georgia is already cooperating with the Abkhaz in this and
other areas but it is not public at the request of the Abkhaz
side. All agreed for the UN to give each side a list of
concrete steps it could take and ask for a response.

To follow-up on these commitments, Antadze proposed that the
UN convene monthly meetings with the sides and the FSG in
Tbilisi and Sukhumi in order to monitor their implementation.

--------------
ABKHAZ AGREE TO SPECIFIC STEPS
--------------


12. (C) In a separate meeting with the Abkhaz, Shamba also
responded to the UN paper (tailored for the Abkhaz) point by
point:


TBILISI 00001604 005 OF 006


--------------
DIALOGUE
--------------

-- On resuming Quadripartite meetings, he said the Abkhaz are
ready to start the work in July.

-- On allowing a JFFG investigation into Sigua, he said the
Abkhaz are ready to participate and start immediately,
perhaps even re-starting the Quadripartite meetings with the
Sigua case.

-- On participating in a meeting of the EC-funded Steering
Committee, Shamba said the Abkhaz are ready to participate in
a meeting scheduled to take place in a few days.

-- On a meeting at the leadership level, Shamba reiterated
that a meeting without an outcome would have a negative
impact and that the Abkhaz would be prepared to participate
in a carefully prepared meeting which has the outcome of a
signed document on the non-use of force or the lifting of CIS
economic sanctions.

--------------
CBMS
--------------

-- On supporting contacts between Georgians and Abkhaz,
Shamba said that the Abkhaz support contacts and pointed to a
recently convened meeting on NATO in Istanbul by the Heinrich
Boell Foundation. He noted that this included some Abkhaz
officials. (Note: When asked privately whether this might
mean the Abkhaz would now support a joint trip to NATO with
Abkhaz and Georgian officials, Shamba clarified that the
Abkhaz could support contacts between non-officials but not
between officials. End note.)

-- On cooperation on combating African Swine Fever, Shamba
said the Georgians and Abkhaz already cooperative on both
Avian Flu and African Swine Fever.

-- On supporting the ICRC initiative on missing persons,
Shamba said that the Abkhaz are ready to cooperate.


13. (C) In a final consultative meeting of the FSG and the
UN, all agreed that the German coordinator, who would be
traveling to Georgia the week of July 2 would reinforce the
points of the meeting to Tbilisi and Sukhumi. The FSG also
agreed that the UN may consider following-up with a
high-level letter to the sides from New York urging progress
on the agreed cooperative mechanisms. Finally, the FSG
agreed on a press statement to be released following a final
meeting of the sides together to review the draft. In
response to a request by EU Special Representative for the
South Caucasus Peter Semneby, conveyed by Germany, to include
the EU in future Geneva meetings, the FSG decided the
question bore further consideration by capitals, but that it
did not rise to the level of a formal request. Guehenno
warned against changing an effective format. Chernov noted
that such a decision would require a decision at a very high
level in Moscow. Bujon-Barre said she had not discussed the
issue with Semneby in Paris, as Semneby had apparently
suggested to Lucas. In a private sidebar, Fall approached
the U.S. team with even more words of warning: he said
Semneby,s request was just one exploratory "tentacle" of an
EU that wanted to supplant member states in such formats,
noting that -- taken to its logical conclusion -- the EU
would want to replace its member states at the UNSC. He
further warned that, contrary to the most predictable
analysis, Russia might actually accept the EU as a member of
the FSG, if only to use that development in the months that
followed to weaken its effectiveness.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) More came out of this Geneva meeting than could have
been expected, considering the heightened tensions in
Abkhazia which are partly due to the fact that all Abkhaz
eyes remain on Kosovo. The resumption of the Quadripartite
meetings is a significant and important step. These meetings
between law enforcement officials have not taken place since
last October. Although they will not stop potential
incidents, they can diffuse them by creating a forum in which
to discuss them. The trick will be implementing the
commitments made by each side. We believe that Antadze's
idea to hold monthly meetings to oversee implementation is a
good one and it will help to keep the sides' feet to the
fire. End comment.

TBILISI 00001604 006 OF 006




15. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this message.
TEFFT