SOUTH OSSETIA TENSIONS HIGH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001563

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA & EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE GG
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA TENSIONS HIGH

REF: A. TBILISI 1368


B. TBILISI 1120

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d).

Summary
--------------

1. (SBU) A number of dangerous eruptions in tension have
recently occurred in South Ossetia, suggesting that we may be
in for a long, hot summer in the conflict zone. Georgian
villagers have squared off with Russian peacekeepers over
Georgian efforts to improve a road connecting two Georgian
villages, the South Ossetian de facto authorities are
continuing to block irrigation canals that normally supply
Georgian farmers, and the two sides are regularly exchanging
fire north of Tskhinvali near Tamarasheni. Fortunately, thus
far none of the incidents has spiraled into a major
confrontation, but in this heavily armed environment the
danger is real. End Summary.

Flashpoint One: Roads
--------------

2. (SBU) Following the South Ossetian-initiated violence of
May 12-13 (ref B),much of which occurred west of Tskhinvali
around Avnevi, both sides have attempted to build or improve
roads that would make it possible to reach villages in that
area without having to go through the other side's territory.
First the South Ossetians tried to build a north-south road
from Khetagurovo to Muguti on May 24. Armed Georgian forces
stepped in to stop them, and a tense standoff ensued that
eventually ended peacefully when the South Ossetians
withdrew. Then the Georgians made attempts in June to
improve the west-east road from Avnevi to Zemo Nikozi, on
June 12-15 and again on June 27-28. The Joint Peacekeeping
Force (JPKF),whose commander argued that the construction
was a source of tension, deployed to stop both efforts. The
JPKF was initially successful, but on June 28, a large number
of Georgian civilians surrounded JPKF positions, pouring cans
of paint on the armored vehicles and their occupants, in
scenes that were subsequently shown on Georgian television.
According to OSCE, it appears the JPKF decided to withdraw at
this point, leaving the Georgians in control of the area.


3. (C) OSCE Political Advisor Gantcho Gantchev told us June
28 that, according to the 1992 dividing line in the conflict,
the Georgians have the right to undertake road construction
in the area, while the South Ossetians do not. (Note: It is
not clear if this is an official OSCE position; recent OSCE
written reports on the issue have not made this argument.
End Note.) Gantchev noted that unlike the South Ossetians'
planned road, the Georgian road already exists, but it needs
improvements in order to be passable in all weather
conditions. In fact, the planned paths of the two roads
cross, meaning there would be no way for both sides to build
their roads without encountering each other.

Flashpoint Two: Water
--------------

4. (C) The South Ossetians continue to block irrigation
canals that transport water to Georgian fields and orchards
both inside and out of the conflict zone. Prime Minister
Noghaideli has twice called the Ambassador and other
representatives of the international community to argue for
help, especially to urge the Russians to pressure the de
facto authorities to re-open the canals. In a June 25
conversation, Noghaideli told the Ambassador that the
governor of Georgia's Shida Kartli region was threatening to
cut off the drinking water pipeline to Tskhinvali if the
South Ossetians did not relent on the canals. The Ambassador
strongly warned Noghaideli that the Georgians should not do
this because it would hurt their credibility internationally
and with the South Ossetian population. According to OSCE
officials, on June 29 a group of Georgian civilians blocked
the Transcaucasian Highway at the JPKF post in Megvrekisi,
south of Tskhinvali, to protest the closure of the canals.


5. (SBU) The canal closure is a legacy of the May-June water
crisis in South Ossetia, which left Tskhinvali without
drinking water for two weeks (ref A). At the time, the
Georgians refused to permit South Ossetian repair crews to
enter the Georgian enclave, and eventually repaired on their
own the most serious damage to the drinking water pipeline, a
place where storms had dislodged it from a concrete support
above the Didi Liakhvi River in Kheiti. In the meantime the
South Ossetians turned off the pipeline in Java, above the
Georgian enclave, as well as the irrigation canals near
Tskhinvali that flowed south to Georgian-controlled areas.

SIPDIS
The Georgians completed repairs in Kheiti June 5, and a joint
team including South Ossetian representatives viewed the
repairs the same day. After a delay, the South Ossetians
re-started the water in Java June 7, and it began flowing

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south through the Georgian enclave to Tskhinvali. While the
water flow was sufficient to fill the underground reservoirs
above Tbilisi -- OSCE officials tell us there is now ample
running water in Tskhinvali -- it was only 20-30 percent of
the expected volume.


6. (C) Since June 7 the sides have been unable to agree on
additional inspections of the pipeline, and the South
Ossetians have not re-opened the irrigation canals. The
South Ossetians are insisting on a repeat inspection of the
Georgian repairs at Kheiti, while the Georgians are calling
for an inspection of the whole pipeline. The Georgians have
told us that in a June 19 meeting in Tskhinvali, State
Minister for Conflict Resolution Antadze proposed to the
South Ossetians that two joint teams simultaneously check the
water flow above and below the Georgian enclaves; if the
tests showed that water was being lost in the Georgian area,
the teams could then inspect the whole pipe in the Georgian
area to find the problem. The Georgians believe that in fact
the water is being lost in the separatist area north of the
Georgian enclave, due to the poor design and maintenance of
the pipe. OSCE Deputy Head of Mission Veselin Nikolaev has
told us that the current stand-off appears to serve the South
Ossetians' political interest well; if the Georgians use
their leverage -- by turning off the drinking water -- the
Georgians will look bad internationally and the de facto
authorities can tell Tskhinvali residents that
Georgian-backed leader Dmitry Sanakoyev is to blame for the
lack of drinking water.

Flashpoint Three: Shootings
--------------

7. (C) There has been a series of shootings between the two
sides north of Tskhinvali over the past week, near the
Georgian village of Tamarasheni. At least six people have
been wounded, four Ossetians and two Georgians. According to
press reports mortars and rocket-propelled grenades were used
(in addition to small arms) but OSCE officials were unable to
confirm this as of June 29. Gantchev told us June 29 that
OSCE was picking up troubling reports of "snipers." While
firing across the lines is not uncommon in the conflict zone,
Gantchev noted that in the past shots were typically unaimed,
intended more to frighten than to hit targets.

Other Incidents
--------------

8. (C) The South Ossetians have continued to block the road
north of Tskhinvali into and out of the Georgian enclave at
Tamarasheni, denying freedom of movement to the local
population. The South Ossetians have also reportedly stopped
Georgian buses in Kukhati, harassing the passengers.
Gantchev told us that it was in response to this that the
Georgians set up a new police checkpoint in Prisi (in fact in
between two villages called Prisi, one controlled by each
side) and have apparently begun digging trenches and building
other fortifications to protect the post. Gantchev said the
JPKF and the South Ossetians have argued this violates
existing agreements, but Gantchev added that because this is
a police post, it could be considered not an "armed
formation" to which agreements apply.

Comment
--------------

9. (C) The situation in South Ossetia is volatile and it
could get out of control -- either due to a conscious
decision (as happened with the South Ossetian-precipitated
violence May 12-13) or by accident. We are urging the
Georgians to show restraint, and not to be provoked into a
more serious confrontation. While the two sides walk along
the brink of a major clash, they are also trying to insulate
themselves from the other side's leverage for the longer term
by building bypass roads, digging wells to obtain independent
access to water, and thinking about new gas and electric
lines that would not be vulnerable to interruption. Of
course, once either side has an invulnerable road or supply
of utilities, it no longer has any disincentive to cutting
off the other side's roads or utilities. If it is not lost,
the interconnectedness of these networks is a real incentive
for the two sides to interact and to build confidence. The
water pipeline is a good example; if it could be renovated as
envisioned in the donors' economic rehabilitation program,
the result would help people on both sides and tie them
closer together. We hope that the two sides will show some
interest in realizing these opportunities, perhaps at the
Steering Committee meeting for the donors' program scheduled
for July 2.


10. (C) A key factor in determining the international
community's ability to manage crises in South Ossetia is the
role of the OSCE. As we go through the process of choosing a
new Head of Mission, it is post's view that OSCE needs a

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leader who is active and who interprets his/her mandate as
granting authority to get in the middle of such issues and
hammer out a solution between the sides.

TEFFT