Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TBILISI1504
2007-06-21 13:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

UN DOWNBEAT ON INCREASING ASSISTANCE TO ABKHAZIA

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON PHUM PREF EAID GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 211317Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6759
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001504 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM PREF EAID GG
SUBJECT: UN DOWNBEAT ON INCREASING ASSISTANCE TO ABKHAZIA


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001504

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM PREF EAID GG
SUBJECT: UN DOWNBEAT ON INCREASING ASSISTANCE TO ABKHAZIA


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 11 meeting with USAID
representatives, UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG) for Georgia Jean Arnault was downbeat on the
prospect of increasing assistance to Abkhazia. He said that
the current atmosphere is as bad as it has been since he
arrived some eight months ago. Arnault congratulated USAID
for being able to implement programs "under the radar" which
neither side views as threatening. He encouraged the U.S. to
continue programming which brings Abkhaz and Georgians
together but did not think that a needs assessment study was
necessary in order to move ahead with is a wealth of needs,
especially in Gali. In a separate meeting with Poloff on
June 8, Saakashvili insider Giga Bokeria was deeply skeptical
of increasing assistance to the Abkhaz as a way to promote
conflict resolution. End summary.


2. (C) On June 11, USAID Mission Director Bob Wilson,
accompanied by Deputy Director Andrea Yates, Program Officer
Craig Hart and Poloff, met SRSG Jean Arnault to discuss ideas
for increasing assistance to Abkhazia. Wilson said that the
USG has two million USD to program on confidence building
measures in Abkhazia. The U.S. would like to use it to
increase the interdependency between the Abkhaz and Georgians
but avoid anything that supports the de facto authorities.
He cited ideas including enhancing contact between Abkhaz and
Georgians, improving the information flow about Georgia in
Abkhazia, opening American Corners, and increasing trade
between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia.


3. (C) Arnault responded that the current atmosphere in
Abkhazia is as bad as it has been since he arrived some eight
months ago. Some staff were even telling him that the
situation has not been this bad since conflict broke out in

1998. He congratulated USAID for being successful in

conducting programs "under the radar" which neither sides
views as threatening. Still, areas in which the Georgians
and Abkhaz used to be open are now closed. For example, the
Georgians refused to allow UN to train police in Abkhazia
unless the training is joint with Georgians. Similarly, the
Georgians now believe the EC program for infrastructure
development undermines their political agenda. Even
Conciliation Resources, he said, had run into trouble with
the Georgians for a perceived bias toward the Abkhaz. He did
not believe there was much flexibility left to do more than
what is being done currently.


4. (C) He said the UN would continue trying to do things that
do not set off alarm bells including continuing humanitarian
work as well as police and human rights work with a focus on
the ethnically Georgian Gali region. Specifically, Arnault
said the UN hoped to see what could be done with the
newly-established Human Rights Center in Gali. He hoped the
U.S. might also provide assistance there. Despite some
concern from Georgians that non-governmental organizations in
Abkhazia are not neutral, he believed that the Center could
help to bring human rights abuses under control. He stressed
the importance of informal contacts between Georgians and
Abkhaz as an area of potential continued U.S. assistance
focus, especially in the current environment where formal
contact is not taking place. He thought that increasing
access to outside sources of information, such as the opening
of American corners, would be welcome.


5. (C) When asked whether the assistance example of the South
Ossetia Economic Rehabilitation Program -- undertaking a
needs assessment followed by international pledges of support
and supervised implementation -- could apply to Abkhazia,
Arnault said he is doubtful that a joint needs assessment,
which would require cooperation from the sides, could take
place now. He said that the Abkhaz were approaching
assistance as a zero-sum game and the Georgians were not
seeing assistance in their political interests. Assistance
has become politicized, in part by the way that the
international community has chosen to sell it: as a way to
move forward with the political process. The EC program, he
said, has been in place for over two years and the political
process remains stalled. As a result, the Georgians are
reconsidering their support for such programs.


6. (C) Still, Arnault thought that attempting to continue,
and increase assistance if possible, remains a good idea from
an humanitarian and a political perspective. He concluded
that donors do not have to undertake the political risk (or
the time) to conduct a needs assessment to know what to do.
There is a wealth of needs in the Gali region especially. A
2004 needs assessment concluded that there would be an
humanitarian crisis if nothing is done immediately to fix the
infrastructure there. Nothing has been done since that time.
He said the trick is trying to undertake programs that are

TBILISI 00001504 002 OF 002


perceived to be in the interests of both sides. He noted
that the U.S. perhaps more than any other country has been
able to stay clear of problems with one of the sides, which
every other donor has seemed to encounter.


7. (C) When asked by Poloff about increasing assistance to
Abkhazia in a separate meeting on June 8, key Parliamentarian
(and Saakashvili insider) Giga Bokeria responded emotionally
with a question: what about assistance for the more than
200,000 internally displaced persons driven out of Abkhazia?
When asked about reported concerns of the Georgian Government
with the EC assistance program, Bokeria said simply that the
program is reinforcing the de facto regime. He added that
other programs, including Conciliation Resources, simply
bring together the same people with immovable views and is
not helping resolve the conflict. He suggested continuing
programs which bring together Abkhaz and Georgian
opinion-makers, such as teachers and youth. He was deeply
skeptical about the overall usefulness of economic assistance
to Abkhazia as a way to promote conflict resolution.


8. (C) COMMENT: These meetings reflect the challenge of
assistance to Abkhazia. Unlike South Ossetia, where the
communities are interdependent because of their proximity,
the ethnic Georgians of Gali and the ethnic Abkhaz (and
Armenians) in the north live essentially independent lives.
Arnault's analysis is correct: part of the reason the
Georgians have lost confidence in assistance programs in
Abkhazia is that they have not seen the programs advance the
political process as they claim to do. If anything,
positions are more rigid than they were in 2005, when the EC
launched its four million Euro program with such fanfare.
The EC's ham-handed approach in dealing with the Georgians on
assistance to Abkhazia has not helped the situation. In
addition, the international aid workers, who are concentrated
in the Abkhaz areas of Abkhazia, tend to view the situation
as a humanitarian one for the Abkhaz, while the Georgian
IDPs, spread across Georgia, remain invisible. As a result,
these international workers may tend to adopt a view more
sympathetic to Abkhaz positions. We believe that any
successful assistance program in Abkhazia requires careful
coordination with the Georgian Government, key members of
whom remain skeptical that such programs are helping to
resolve the conflict within Georgia's internationally
recognized borders -- their primary goal. End comment.
TEFFT