DEMARCHE BY FRIENDS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001418

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC, IO/UNP, AND IO/PSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KPKO UNSC RU GG
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE BY FRIENDS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
TBILISI AND SUKHUMI

REF: TBILISI 459

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (a),(b) & (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Friends of the Secretary General (FSG)
delivered a demarche, as agreed in capitals, to the Georgian
Government on June 4 and to the Abkhaz de facto authorities
in Sukhumi on June 8. The demarche pressed both sides to
calm tensions, re-engage in dialog, implement confidence
building measures, and participate in a Geneva format meeting
to discuss further steps. The Georgian side responded that
they are open to all forms of dialog without pre-conditions.
However, the Georgians would not participate in a Geneva
format meeting in New York and offered no indication that
they would close or move the Patriot Camp located near the
conflict zone. The Abkhaz side responded that they will not
participate in any meetings until the Georgians remove the
Government-in-Exile from the Upper Kodori Gorge (UKG) and
convert the police there to local hire. End Summary.

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The Georgians Want to Meet Without Preconditions
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2. (C) The Friends of the Secretary General (FSG),
represented by the German, French and U.S. DCMs and the
Russian Ambassador, delivered the demarche as agreed to in
FSG capitals to the Georgian Government on June 4,
represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Manjgaladze and Deputy
State Minister for Conflict Resolution Abashidze.
Manjgaladze reiterated the Georgian position that they are
ready to meet with the Abkhaz at any time and at any level
without pre-condition, including a meeting between President
Saakashvili and de facto president Bagapsh, and that the
Georgians remain committed to the confidence building steps
agreed to at the Geneva meeting in February (reftel). But
Manjgaladze said that the Abkhaz have shut down all dialog,
adopting a new strategy of total non-engagement. He
mentioned as a latest example the Abkhaz refusal to attend a
meeting with the EC even though the time and place had been
agreed. He pressed the FSG to encourage the Abkhaz to return
to talks without pre-conditions. Regarding the UKG based
Government in Exile, Manjgaladze said it is not in exile any
more and would not be removed. He restated that Georgia has
a responsibility to provide civil administration in the UKG
and any Abkhaz concerns about treaty violations should be
properly applied to the UN.


3. (C) Regarding the disappearance in February of local
Abkhaz election official David Sigua, Manjgaladze said the
Georgians had nothing to do with it and are just as
interested to learn what happened. He said that the Georgian
side proposed to the Abkhaz to conduct a joint investigation
but the Abkhaz have not responded. The FSG pressed
Manjgaladze on the need to name a coordinator for law
enforcement cooperation, as agreed in Geneva, and Abashidze
replied that they were waiting for UNOMIG to provide a
document defining the framework and rules under which this
cooperation would work. (Comment: The FSG position is that
cooperation on law enforcement does not require a UNOMIG
document. In a separate meeting on 6/11, Special
Representative to the Secretary General Arnault said he hoped
that he could convince both sides to restart the
Quadrapartite Meetings on law enforcement cooperation by the
expected June meeting in Geneva. End Comment.) The FSG
pointed out that the Patriot Camp opened near the conflict
zone can be perceived as a provocation and encouraged the
Georgians to move the camp. Manjgaladze responded that it is
a children's camp and he cannot understand how the Abkhaz can
claim it is some kind of threat. He said the camp was opened
there as an effort to provide attention and normalcy to a
neglected area. He offered no indication that the Georgians
would move or close the camp.


4. (C) Manjgaladze said that the Georgian side supports a
Geneva format meeting with the Abkhaz but would not agree to
participate in a meeting in New York. He said the Abkhaz
would use a NY meeting for propaganda reasons and to take
another step on the path to legitimacy, but would not engage
in any substantive discussions. He asked why we would want
to hold the meeting in NY: what benefit does that offer over
Geneva? Manjgaladze said that Shamba had a central role in
the ethnic cleansing that took place in Abkhazia in 1994 and
it would be immoral to give him a bigger stage in NY. He
pointed to a disturbing law recently passed by the de facto
parliament as an attempt to legalize the ethnic cleansing and
deprive the IDPs of any property rights in Abkhazia.
Manjgaladze concluded by stating that the Georgian side is
still expecting a final report on the Joint Fact Finding
Group investigation into the March 11 attack on the UKG.

TBILISI 00001418 002 OF 003



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Abkhaz Heels Are Dug In
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5. (C) The Friends of the Secretary General (FSG),
represented by the German and Russian Ambassadors and the
French and U.S. DCMs, delivered the demarche the Abkhaz on
June 8, represented by de facto president Bagapsh and de
facto foreign minister Shamba. Bagapsh appeared angry and
belligerent as he railed against President Saakashvili and
Georgian duplicity, citing the disappearance of Sigua, the
Patriot Camp near the conflict zone and Saakashvili,s media
hype over the Abkhaz release of 3 Georgian students last
month. He said the Abkhaz will not meet with the Georgians
again until the UKG issue is resolved. He wanted to see the
Government-in-Exile removed, an agreement reached on the
number of police, the police converted to local hire, and
UNOMIG and the PKF given a permanent presence in the UKG. He
saw no value in meetings because the Georgians won,t deal
with Abkhaz concerns such as ending the economic embargo or
non-use of force guarantees and there is no one sensible in
Tbilisi with whom to talk.


6. (C) Bagapsh was clearly angry that Saakashvili responded
to the release of the Georgian students in May with a media
spectacle, pinning medals on their chests on national TV,
rather than by calling Bagapsh to thank him for the release.
He said he released the students because of a direct appeal
from the Russian MFA, but he wouldn,t have agreed if he knew
how the Georgians would respond.


7. (C) Bagapsh said that locating a Patriot Camp near the
conflict zone is a clear provocation by the Georgians. He
predicted trouble, said he has moved more Abkhaz militia to
the area and requested that UNOMIG and the PKF monitor the
situation. The FSG told him that escalating the situation
and increasing tensions helps nobody. Bagapsh claims that
the FSG mention was the first he heard of the Georgian offer
of joint investigation into Sigua,s disappearace. When
pressed by the FSG, he said he might consider a Joint Fact
Finding Group investigation.


8. (C) Bagapsh said the Abkhaz would not participate in a
Geneva format meeting because there have been no results from
the last Geneva meeting in February. When the FSG said we
would recommend to USG Guehenno that he issue the invitations
to such a meeting and encouraged the Abkhaz to attend,
Bagapsh would make no commitment.


9. (C) During the two hour meeting, Bagapsh dominated the
talking with bombast and threats. Among the threats: he
would block all movement across the Enguri Bridge, install
mines and barbed wire along the border, shoot down any
Georgian helicopters that go to UKG, build an Abkhaz camp
adjacent to the Georgian Patriot Camp. He said that Abkhazia
would never return to Georgia even if no one recognizes
Abkhaz independence. He seemed bothered to have to meet with
the FSG at all.


10. (C) The Russians orchestrated a bold media sham at the
meeting. At one point during the meeting the lone television
camera set up to film only the Russian Ambassador, ignoring
the rest of the FSG. On cue, the Russian Ambassador
announced that he was speaking for the FSG and reiterated
that the FSG told the Georgians to close the Patriot camp, to
be forthcoming with information about Sigua,s disappearance,
and to implement the confidence building measures provided by
the FSG.


11. (C) The FSG took the opportunity to inform the Abkhaz
about the serious threat posed by the spread of African Swine
Flu (ASF) in Georgia, which was first detected in the Zugdidi
area near the Abkhaz border. Both Bagapsh and Shamba said
they have never heard of ASF and they are not aware of any
pig deaths. The Embassy has encouraged the Georgian
Government to share information about ASF with the Abkhaz.


12. (C) Comment: The lack of coordination between Bagapsh
and Shamba was notable. For example, Bagapsh was unaware
that the U.S. Ambassador had discussed with Shamba the idea
of a joint Sigua investigation during his visit May 23, or
that Georgian State Minister Antadze had called Shamba about
it. Twice when Bagapsh appeared to consider meetings with
the Georgians, Shamba interrupted to say that meetings would
not be possible until the UKG and other issues are worked
diplomatically first, via an exchange of documents. Bagapsh
was also surprisingly uninformed about Georgia. He declared
that conditions in Georgia are so bad that if its neighbors
opened their borders to Georgian emigration, 30% of

TBILISI 00001418 003 OF 003


Georgia,s population would stream out looking for work. The
German Ambassador responded that we live in Georgia and it,s
now a very different place than he imagines. Bagapsh said
that,s because of the limited, rich circles we associate
with; he had been to Georgia before and he assured us that we
are misinformed. End comment.
TEFFT