ANTADZE ON PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE WITH ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001213

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG
SUBJECT: ANTADZE ON PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE WITH ABKHAZIA

REF: A. TBILISI 861


B. TBILISI 459

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Merab
Antadze told the Ambassador May 22 that Abkhaz de facto
officials appeared to have decided to block contacts with
Georgia at virtually every level of society, rebuffing
Georgian requests to discuss the security situation in Gali
and other issues. He said Georgia strongly opposed inviting
the Abkhaz to a meeting in New York, saying this invitation
should be made only after the Abkhaz had taken constructive
actions. Antadze responded positively to variety of ideas
for U.S. initiatives in the separatist regions, including
American Corners in Gali and Sukhumi, taking a touring
photographic exhibit to Sukhumi, removal of dangerous
radioactive sources from Sukhumi, and a concert in South
Ossetia. He also responded favorably to the idea of a joint
investigation with the Abkhaz of the disappearance of de
facto official David Sigua, saying Georgia favored
reinvigorating joint investigative mechanisms for a broad
range of incidents. On South Ossetia, Antadze said the
Kokoity regime appeared to be getting conflicting advice from
the Russian officials inside the South Ossetian
administration and those in Russia -- suggesting that Russia
has no clear policy on the region. End Summary.

Don't Call Me, I Won't Call You
--------------

2. (C) Meeting on the eve of the Ambassador's trip to
Abkhazia, Antadze said that after the Geneva meeting in
February, the Abkhaz had turned away all Georgian attempts to
arrange meetings. He noted that the Georgians had pushed for
a meeting to discuss the security situation in Gali, as was
agreed at Geneva, and for a meeting on economic subjects
between Prime Minister Noghaideli and de facto prime minister
Ankvab, but these attempts produced no results. He noted
that the Abkhaz had also blocked joint study tours and other
events at the societal level. Antadze said he believed the
refusals came on the recommendation of "Russian supporters"
inside the Abkhaz administration. He noted that when the
Georgians had expressed an interest in a meeting between
President Saakashvili and de facto president Bagapsh, Bagapsh
had sent a message that such a meeting would be "negatively
understood by the Russian side and internal forces."


3. (C) Antadze asked for U.S. support for the Georgians'
newest initiative to re-start dialogue, a call for a meeting
in Geneva to discuss the return of internally displaced
persons and security issues. He said the Georgians strongly
opposed a meeting with the Abkhaz in New York because they
feared that the Russians could use it in their propaganda,
preparing the way for a declaration that Abkhazia is an
independent state. The Ambassador stressed that Washington
had made no decision on a New York invitation, and that the
decision would depend in part on the restoring of dialogue
between the two sides.


4. (C) Antadze said Georgia was attempting to restore
dialogue in other ways as well: trying to arrange a meeting
of the steering committee for the EC-led economic
rehabilitation projects in Abkhazia (which the Abkhaz have
continually delayed for "technical" reasons),and seeking to
re-start the Quadripartite Meetings (QPMs) in a new format
that the CIS peacekeepers do not control. (Note: As noted in
reftels, UN officials have previously told us the Georgians
have delayed resumption of the QPMs by failing to appoint a
representative, as they agreed in Geneva.) Asked by the
Ambassador about a possible joint investigation of the Sigua
disappearance, Antadze said Georgia supported the
reactivation of a joint Georgian-Abkhaz investigative group
that had could work on the Sigua case and a variety of
others. He added this mechanism, which he said had stopped
its activity after Russian opposition made it impossible for
the group to work freely, was one issue he wanted to discuss
with the Abkhaz in a meeting on the Gali security situation.

Supportive of U.S. Program Ideas
--------------

5. (C) The Ambassador raised a number of ideas for programs
the USG might support in Abkhazia, and Antadze responded
favorably to them all. The Ambassador noted that expanding
our program of American Corners in Georgian cities to Gali
and Sukhumi could expose young people in Abkhazia to the U.S.
Antadze agreed, saying he personally believed that having a
"direct source of information" could help break the isolation
in those areas, and he encouraged the Ambassador to mention
the idea to the Abkhaz, stressing that it was an expansion of

TBILISI 00001213 002 OF 002


programs in Georgia proper. He added that it might be
possible to ask the Abkhaz to take some action in exchange
for the facilities, and stressed the importance of all people
having free access to them. Antadze said residents of
Abkhazia would appreciate being able to see a U.S.-sponsored
photographic exhibit that has already toured a number of
Georgian cities. He reiterated his support for the removal
of four radioactive sources in Sukhumi to a facility in
Mtskheta. The Ambassador noted that while we had an
agreement in principle from the sides and a source of
funding, there had also been talk that the Abkhaz were
pursuing removal to Russia. The Ambassador said that Deputy
Foreign Minister Chechelashvili had recently told DCM that
the most important thing for the Georgians was to get the
sources out of Abkhazia, where their security could not be
assured.

Sanakoyev Slowly on the Rise
--------------

6. (C) Turning to South Ossetia, Antadze said he had
requested a recent visit by Russian envoy Yuri Popov after it
became clear that Russian-led peacekeepers were not reacting
to incidents, thereby allowing the situation to escalate. He
said that as a result of Georgian demands the peacekeepers
had finally acted in a few specific cases, although he noted
that such Georgian interventions should not be necessary. He
said that it was clear from recent events that Russia does
not have a clear position on South Ossetia. Antadze said
South Ossetian leader Kokoity was urged by his advisors
representing Russian special services to escalate tensions to
a point that the Russian peacekeepers would be brought into
the equation, perhaps as a justification for increasing the
number of peacekeepers. Messages from Russia itself, Antadze
added, were long-delayed but in the end contradicted the
advice of Russians based in Tskhinvali.


7. (C) Antadze said the current dynamic was not favorable for
Kokoity: public opinion is slowly moving toward the
pro-Georgian Dmitry Sanakoyev, and if the situation remains
stable this trend will increase, especially as Georgia starts
serious economic and social development projects in
Sanakoyev's area and as Sanakoyev gains stature from meeting
with foreign officials. The recent "provocations" in South
Ossetia, Antadze said, were designed to try to stop this
dynamic. Antadze was supportive of the idea of staging a
U.S.-sponsored bluegrass concert in a "neutral" location in
South Ossetia, where people from both sides could attend. If
no appropriate site could be found, Antadze suggested holding
the concert in one of the Georgian villages.

TEFFT