ARNAULT: ABKHAZ LEADERSHIP IN ANGRY MOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG
SUBJECT: ARNAULT: ABKHAZ LEADERSHIP IN ANGRY MOOD


Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d).

Summary
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1. (C) Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
Jean Arnault told the Group of Friends Ambassadors May 15
that Abkhaz de facto president Bagapsh is angry and
politically weakened in the aftermath of his decision to
release three Georgian students May 3 without any
corresponding Georgian action on the case of missing Abkhaz
official David Sigua. Arnault said Bagapsh appears ready to
cut off all contacts with Georgia, something Arnault fears
will increase the potential for a miscalculation that could
lead to a major confrontation during the "hot summer" ahead.
Arnault said he would inquire with the Georgians on Sigua,
and would undertake initiatives on the ground designed to
reduce the risk of a miscalculation. Given the threat of a
complete break in communication between the sides, Arnault
recommended a visit to Tbilisi and Sukhumi by senior
representatives of the Friends from capitals in order to
engage at the level of Saakashvili and Bagapsh. End Summary.

A "Botched Exchange"?
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2. (C) Arnault told Ambassadors and other representatives
from the U.S., Russian, German, British, and French embassies
that he had gone to Sukhumi late last week with the hope of
reactivating dialogue between the two sides, especially on
the security situation. Instead, he found Bagapsh in an
"angry mood" over what Bagapsh suggested was a botched
attempt to exchange the three Georgian students, whom the
Abkhaz detained along the cease-fire line in March, for
Sigua, who was abducted by unidentified perpetrators in Gali
in February. Bagapsh was particularly unhappy that

-- his "gesture of goodwill" in releasing the students was
taken by the Georgian government as an opportunity to
criticize the Abkhaz authorities;

-- as of his meeting with Arnault March 10, Bagapsh had heard
nothing about Sigua and was concerned he had been "tricked"
by the Georgians;

-- the Abkhaz political class was increasingly critical of
him for giving something to the Georgians while getting
nothing in return.


3. (C) In response to questions from the Friends about the
students' release, Arnault said he understood that Aslan
Smyrba, an ethnic Abkhaz who had previously served as mayor
of Batumi in the Georgian region of Adjara, had served as an
intermediary. The first two Abkhaz de facto officials Smyrba
approached -- "foreign minister" Shamba and Gali district
chief Kishmaria -- were reportedly skeptical of Smyrba and
recommended against dealing with him in the absence of proof
he could deliver Sigua. Then Smyrba got a meeting with
Bagapsh, who released the students within hours afterward.
Arnault noted that the Georgians have consistently said they
had nothing to do with Sigua's disappearance. He said it was
not clear to what extent Smyrba had been authorized to speak
on behalf of the Georgians or what he might have promised to
the Abkhaz about Sigua.


4. (C) Arnault noted that Shamba -- a formidable figure in
Abkhaz politics who has been seen in recent years as an ally
of Bagapsh -- had formed a new NGO on March 12 together with
two hardline foes of Bagapsh, de facto vice-president Raul
Khajimba and general Vladimir Arshba. Arnault added that
tough anti-Georgian rhetoric was increasing in Abkhazia, with
political figures calling for something to be done in
response to alleged Georgian actions. Arnault said Bagapsh
had indicated to him that unless Sigua is released soon, he
would cut off all dialogue with Georgia, including at the
civil society level. Arnault said it was his impression that
Bagapsh's disposition on this is "here to stay." Arnault
said that a total collapse in the two sides' relationship
would be a serious problem; with the likelihood of continued
tensions and incidents in Kodori and Gali, the lack of
communication would make it harder to prevent a
"miscalculation" from escalating into a major confrontation.

Next Steps for UN and Friends
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5. (C) Arnault said he had requested meetings with Georgian
President Saakashvili and Minister of Internal Affairs
Merabishvili to get more information on their view of the
Sigua case. To help reduce the risk of miscalculation, he
said the UN would reactivate its post in Azhara, in the Upper
Kodori Gorge, as soon as the weather permitted. He said the
UN would also undertake two initiatives in Gali: a review of
the security presence of each side, to determine if they are

TBILISI 00001141 002 OF 002


exceeding the agreed limit of 600 personnel, and a permanent
base in conjunction with the CIS peacekeepers near a youth
camp that the Georgian government is building at the mouth of
the Enguri River near the cease-fire line.


6. (C) Arnault said that while the idea of a Geneva-style
meeting involving representatives of the two sides was a good
idea in principle, he thought the more pressing need now was
communication with the leaders on the two sides. In the
absence of direct contact, he thought a visit by senior
representatives of the Friends as soon as possible, to meet
with Saakashvili and Bagapsh, would be the next best thing.
The Friends reacted positively to the idea, while noting that
it would require consultation with their capitals. Russian
Embassy Counselor Vasily Korchmar claimed that he believed
the key to dialogue was on the Georgian side; if given a
signal from Tbilisi, he believed the Abkhaz would be ready to
meet.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) Everyone in the meeting noted that we do not know if
the Georgians have Sigua or not, or if he is alive or dead.
All also agreed that it is probably better for the Friends
not to get involved in that question; Arnault said he thought
the likelihood of Sigua's release was small, especially given
the Georgians' declarations that they do not have him. In
any case, Arnault's description of Bagapsh's internal
political crisis raises the troubling prospect that the
situation along the cease-fire line is even more tense and
dangerous than we thought it was. During his visit to
Abkhazia May 23, the Ambassador will encourage Bagapsh and
other de facto officials to maintain lines of communication
with the Georgians, as well as to undertake demilitarization
and other steps to build confidence. We agree with Arnault
that a visit by representatives of the Friends from capitals
could help restore communication between the two sides' top
decision-makers, something that may be essential to managing
the fallout of provocative incidents.

TEFFT