Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT2182
2007-12-29 06:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

ODIHR LIMITED OBSERVER MISSION TO UZBEKISTAN WAS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM OSCE UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNT #2182/01 3630619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290619Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8979
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3579
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9792
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4195
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0083
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0131
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0071
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3798
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2074
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0171
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7255
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0743
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0064
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1701
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0922
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2221
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 002182 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USOSCE FOR ELIZABETH KAUFMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM OSCE UZ
SUBJECT: ODIHR LIMITED OBSERVER MISSION TO UZBEKISTAN WAS
"WORTHWHILE"

REF: A. TASHKENT 2115

B. TASHKENT 2179

Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 002182

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USOSCE FOR ELIZABETH KAUFMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM OSCE UZ
SUBJECT: ODIHR LIMITED OBSERVER MISSION TO UZBEKISTAN WAS
"WORTHWHILE"

REF: A. TASHKENT 2115

B. TASHKENT 2179

Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: On December 26 Ambassador and DCM had an
outbrief with Ambassador Walter Siegl, who headed the OSCE's
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
limited election observer mission for the Presidential
elections in Uzbekistan. Siegl reported that, although the
complete picture of the elections was not observable, the
ODIHR election mission "was worthwhile and we gained
insights." In a December 26 meeting between Siegl and MFA's
Chief of International Organizations Section Durbek Amanov,
the GOU objected to several points cited in ODIHR's official
press release about the elections, which ODIHR will consider
in its final report. First Deputy FM Nematov elaborated on
this in a December 27 meeting with the Ambassador. Siegl
noted that the GOU did not offer sufficient access to the
Central Election Commission (CEC) and its subordinate
offices, making it impossible to trace votes from the ballot
box to the final tabulations. He hopes commonly observed
irregularities, such as heads of household casting ballots
for entire families, can be raised with the GOU "at the
appropriate time." The final report will have "a political
direction" in order to encourage dialogue and not slam the
door shut on future elections cooperation with Uzbekistan.
The press release was tougher than we expected. The key
questions are whether the Karimov regime brushes off
criticism of its faulty election and relaxes in the wake of
its victory, or whether it will take away something
constructive from the criticism and implement election
reforms before the scheduled 2009 Parliamentary elections, or
whether it will just lash out at OSCE and/or others who were
publicly critical of the election. End summary.

A Worthwhile Endeavor
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador and DCM met with Ambassador Siegl in
Tashkent on December 26 to recap the limited election
observer mission and discuss its initial findings. Siegl

said that, although the complete picture of the elections was
not observable, the effort was "worthwhile, and we gained
insights." The final report will also be limited in scope,
but Siegl noted it will be necessary to restate that
Uzbekistan has not implemented ODIHR's recommendations from
the 2004 elections unless the GOU can demonstrate otherwise.

GOU Rebuttal
--------------


3. (C) Siegl also met on December 26 with Deputy Foreign
Minister Amanov, who diplomatically presented the GOU's
objections to several points highlighted in the December 24
ODIHR press release. The GOU insists that it has
"completely" implemented the ODIHR recommendations that
followed the 2004 Parliamentary elections and will provide
specific written documentation of this, which Siegl will
happily consider before issuing the final report. Amanov
also disputed assessments of the noncompetitive nature of the
campaign, and explained that it is inconsistent with Uzbek
cultural traditions "to get at each others' throats." Amanov
told Siegl that, unlike in some western countries, Uzbekistan
does not want smear campaigns. Concerning the candidates'
public support for their incumbent opponent, Amanov stressed
that "their opinions were close" because it is difficult to
object to programs that "further the good of the country."


4. (C) Amanov also gently pointed out to Siegl that the ODIHR
team was the only observer mission that presented criticisms
of the Presidential elections. In contrast, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO),Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS),select bilateral observers, and numerous
GOU-invited individual observers had positive assessments of
the elections. The state-controlled media has, for the most
part, made no mention of the ODIHR observation findings;
although, in one website article (http://gzt.uz/rus/politika)
the Director of the pro-government National Press Center
rebuffed OSCE's criticism and accused the organization of
remaining silent about "leading geopolitical players"
interfering with the internal affairs of Central Asian states
during elections. (See reftel B for more about media
coverage of the elections.)


5. (C) Deputy FM Nematov elaborated on Amanov's objections in
a December 27 meeting with the Ambassador. Nematov stressed
that the GOU did not agree with any of ODIHR's findings, and
found it "paradoxical" out of all the international observers
present, "only" OSCE found cause for concern. This reflected
OSCE's "double standard," Nematov said. The Ambassador noted
that U.S. Embassy observers had also spotted irregularities,
including lack of transparency in the central vote count, but
that our fundamental concerns centered less on the procedural
aspects of voting day and more on the lack of genuine choices
and debate in the overall campaign. Nematov asserted that
OSCE's statement had been prepared well in advance of voting
day, and the ODIHR team had simply mouthed what was expected
of it. He claimed there had been genuine debate, and that
unanimous lines between the various candidates simply
reflected (as Amanov said) everyone's view that Karimov's
programs had been good for the country. However, when
pressed, Nematov agreed that the door to OSCE would be kept
open for a dialogue on election procedures ("as long as there
are no double standards.")


Mysterious Tabulations
--------------


6. (C) Siegl said the ODIHR team documented numerous
instances in which one individual signed the registry
multiple times, generally for family members at the same
address. He listened attentively to our accounts of emboffs
separately witnessing multiple voting as a standard operating
procedure, and hopes that this issue will be raised with the
GOU "at the appropriate time." However, his chief complaint
was that the GOU provided insufficient access to the Central
Election Commission and its subordinate offices, particularly
with regard to computerized registries and voting records.
The restricted access meant that it was simply not possible
to trace a given vote from the polling station ballot box to
the centrally-compiled tabulations. This was not transparent
and there was no way to compare final statistics with voter
registries. The ODIHR observers were also unable to
continually track the ballots and individual polling
stations' protocols in tabulating the votes, as they were
transported from polling stations to the district center.

Report Won't Slam the Door Shut
--------------


7. (C) Although there were numerous -- and unsurprising --
irregularities, Siegl said that he wants to give the final
report "a political direction". He does not want to "slam
the door shut on Uzbekistan" entirely and will note positive
elements such as the presence of a woman and a non-partisan
candidate on the ballot. He added that, just as it was
important for his team to arrive without preconceived notions
about Uzbekistan's past, "so it is important not to harbor
preconceived notions about the future."

OSCE/ODIHR Follow-Up?
--------------


8. (C) Asked if there is some process in place by which ODIHR
can follow up its proposed recommendations to the GOU,
particularly in the run-up to the scheduled Parliamentary
elections in 2009, Siegl said it was likely that the Uzbek
representative to the OSCE in Vienna would be queried
informally about GOU reaction to ODIHR's recommendations.
Emboffs also made the point to Siegl that a key political
reform would be easing up the requirements for political
parties/movements to register and then registering them,
permitting them to field candidates in the 2009 parliamentary
elections.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Although Siegl wants to keep the door open for future
dialogue and engagement with the GOU on elections, the ODIHR
press release was tougher than we expected based on initial
conversations with the ODIHR team (reftel A). The GOU may
hope that the elections will quickly fade from the West's
critical memory during the holidays, but the final ODIHR
report will be issued in mid-January when interest may be
rekindled. A key question is whether the Karimov regime,
secure in victory, will brush off criticism, learn from it
and continue reengagement, or take offense to the criticism,
sulk, and lash out at the critics.

NORLAND