Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT2064
2007-12-03 11:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

GOU INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES AND PLANNING

Tags:  PGOV PINS PBTS MCAP SOCI PHUM ECON UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2002
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #2064/01 3371148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031148Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8855
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3498
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9711
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4114
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3977
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2007
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7224
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 002064 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PBTS MCAP SOCI PHUM ECON UZ
SUBJECT: GOU INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES AND PLANNING

REF: A. C-RE7-02026

B. IIR 6 939 0003 08

Classified By: DATT Jeff Hartman and Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons
1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 002064

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PBTS MCAP SOCI PHUM ECON UZ
SUBJECT: GOU INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES AND PLANNING

REF: A. C-RE7-02026

B. IIR 6 939 0003 08

Classified By: DATT Jeff Hartman and Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons
1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Uzbekistan's vast internal security apparatus
would play a critical role in any GOU efforts to deter or
respond to civil disturbances. Security forces have trained
to improve interoperability and to overcome potential
breakdowns in command and control since 2005. We are not
aware of any serious problems with morale or loyalty within
these forces, as they are well-paid and instances of
"dedovschina" (hazing) and desertion are rare. Multiple,
large-scale protests would seriously tax the ability of
security forces to respond due to limitations in their air
transit capabilities. If the GOU perceived impending unrest,
it could pursue measures including dipping into its reserves
to alleviate socio-economic grievances and redeploying
security forces to areas where the GOU perceives a threat.
End summary.

Question 1:


2. (C) What organization would respond, and who would be in
charge, if large protests developed in Uzbekistan? To whom
are these troops generally loyal (i.e. first-line
management/leadership, troop commanders, head of service,
President)? If there was a breakdown in command and control,
where would it likely develop?


3. (C) If large-scale protests took place in Uzbekistan, the
provincial military district command--which reports to the
National Military Command of the Ministry of Defense
(MOD)--would be the top level of command. Subordinate to
this would be provincial NSS, provincial MVD, local NSS, and
local MVD personnel.


4. (C) Military district command units would be responsible
for isolating protests and would receive reinforcements. The
NSS would have tactical control and would be supported by the
military district command. If necessary, the NSS also would

supervise MOD, MVD, and Ministry of Emergency Situations
(MChS) units. Uzbek security forces have taken part in
simulations, table-top exercises, and some small-scale field
exercises to overcome potential breakdowns in command and
control. Security forces use the MOD Special Modeling and
Simulation Center to test potential scenarios once or twice a
year.

Question 2:


5. (C) What is the current disposition and size of the
special forces units of the MVD, NSS, and MOD?


6. (C) Every city and province in Uzbekistan has at least one
MVD special forces unit that is normally company-sized
(100-120 personnel). Several of these units are located in
Tashkent. The Ministry of Defense has at least five special
forces battalions (300-450 personnel in each),and these work
interoperably with or under the MVD and NSS. Airborne
brigades are located in Ferghana and Chirchik, and Jizzakh
has one mountain brigade (roughly 1,200 personnel).

Question 3:


7. (C) Which special forces units are considered the most
capable in countering large protests? Which units are likely
to be called on first to respond to large protests?


8. (C) The special forces unit at Bakmal in Jizzakh province
probably would be the MOD's first response unit to
large-scale protests. This unit has received higher-quality
equipment than other units, which includes night vision
devices, rifle-mounted night sights, helmets with in-helmet
radio sets, and modern body armor. The unit has also
completed a much greater number of rotations to the MOD's
Special Modeling and Simulation Center than other units have,
and it has the most practice in NSS interoperability. It is
unclear what other units would be most likely to be called on
first to respond to large protests.

TASHKENT 00002064 002 OF 003



Question 4:


9. (C) What, if any, indications have there been that special
forces units would be reticent to carry out orders to shoot
against a crowd of protesters, such as occurred in Andijon in
May 2005? Are there any units considered more loyal to
President Karimov than others? Any units whose loyalty is
questioned by Uzbekistani leadership?


10. (C) We are not aware of loyalty problems within the Uzbek
security forces, as they are relatively well-paid, incidents
of "dedovschina" (hazing) are rare, and there are very few
desertions (reftel). The Armed Forces saturate their troops
with pro-government propaganda to reinforce patriotism,
improve teamwork, and overcome potential loyalty problems.
The Armed Forces also ensure that trainees, officers, and
foreign military visitors know that many protesters at
Andijon in May 2005 were armed and fired on Uzbek security
forces. Nevertheless, the officer corps views its response
at Andijon as panicky and tragically brutal. Special forces
units would be far more likely to open fire on hostile, armed
people if ordered than on peaceful demonstrators. (Comment:
An unidentified number of people in the anti-government
movement at Andijon in May 2005 were armed and shot at
security forces, as verified by independent observers. Six
MOD troops were killed at Andijon, and the MVD, Border
Guards, and NSS all suffered casualties. In addition to the
organized armed opposition group present at Andijon, there
were unarmed local civilians who gathered at the square both
out of curiosity and to demonstrate against the GOU, who
suffered an unknown number of fatalities and injuries in the
firing. End comment.)

Question 5:


11. (C) What, if any, indications have there been that the
leadership of the MVD, MOD, or NSS would hesitate to carry
out orders to use lethal methods to crack down on large
protests?


12. (C) The MOD has undertaken reforms aimed at ensuring a
controlled response to counter civil disturbances. Since
2005, MOD units have pursued escalation of force, law of land
warfare, and rules of engagement training with the German
Armed Forces and the International Committee of the Red
Cross. The former Commander of the Eastern Military District
was sacked for his command's reaction and at least two of the
special forces commanders at Andijon were arrested, tried,
and convicted for dereliction of duty--failing to follow
protocols and hence allowing the situation to spiral out of
control. (Comment: It is unclear whether any of these were
tried for improper use of force or, indeed, whether the GOU
believes after its investigation that the totality of
circumstances warranted prosecution. End comment.) The GOU
plans to have MOD units isolate protest areas so that MVD or
NSS units--which are better-suited for internal security
missions--can deal with protesters inside the cordon. While
we believe the GOU would attempt a controlled response to
civil disturbances consistent with recent training, if these
measures failed, it probably would resort to whatever means
it felt necessary to deal with an armed uprising.

Question 6:


13. (C) What is the capacity of Uzbekistani security forces
to respond to multiple, large-scale (100 ) protests in
different areas of the country?


14. (C) The GOU remains very concerned about the potential
for multiple, large-scale protests. To respond to unrest in
the Ferghana Valley, MOD special forces units--most of which
are located along the border with Tajikistan in Jizzakh,
Samarkand, and Surkhandarya--would have to move through the
Kamchik Pass, which Border Guard units control. Units from
the MOD, MChS, and MVD periodically conduct operational
rotations into the pass, where they are subordinated to the
Border Guards. The GOU does not have the ability to move
entire battalions by rotary-wing air to a trouble spot
because it lacks the lift capacity, maintenance capability,
logistics base, and operational experience for this.

TASHKENT 00002064 003 OF 003


Moreover, they do not have the fixed-wing capability for
these operations because they lack a sufficient number of
airfields with the apron space for moving and off-loading
units. Due to GOU concerns about inadequate security of the
Kamchik Pass, which is the gateway to the Ferghana Valley,
the GOU has implemented Border Guard reforms. After 2005,
the Border Guards were subordinated to the NSS after its
perceived failure to report movement into Andijon from
Kyrgyzstan and its failure to adequately secure the border
areas during and after the incidents. The GOU wants the
Border Guards to firmly control transit through this pass to
prevent potential reinforcement to an insurrection by outside
forces in the Ferghana Valley and to prevent participants in
an insurrection from escaping the country.

Comment:
--------------


15. (C) Obtaining hard, detailed information on specific
plans of security forces to respond to civil disturbances is
extremely difficult, but if civil disturbances were to occur,
Uzbekistan's security apparatus would be critical to any GOU
response. Moving security forces to perceived problematic
areas or conducting "show-of-force" exercises also could help
to deter potential unrest. The GOU also could resort to
economic means as a deterrent. If the GOU believed there was
a serious threat of unrest associated with rising prices of
bread, for example, it could conceivably dip into its $2.3
billion reserves to alleviate socio-economic grievances. The
GOU would find it difficult, however, to use economic
resources to resolve imminent internal security issues. The
GOU has not used its reserves this year. While the prices of
basic commodities have been surging since August of this
year, we are aware of only a few small protests that have
taken place in the regions, including Karakalpakstan and
Ferghana, in recent months.
HANSON