HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH UZBEKISTAN INTENSIFYING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 002006

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PINS EAID UZ
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH UZBEKISTAN INTENSIFYING

REF: A. TASHKENT 1999

B. TASHKENT 2000

Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary. In response to the Ambassador's request for
a meeting with President Karimov, First Deputy Foreign
Minister Nematov summoned the Ambassador on November 20 to
discuss the reasons for such a high-level meeting. The
Ambassador emphasized the prospect of an upcoming sanctions
vote in Congress and that Karimov could help the GOU's case
by demonstrating personal engagement and spurring GOU action
on specific, concrete human rights concerns. The Ambassador
described his upcoming trip to Washington, including planned
personal meetings on the Hill to discuss the sanctions.
Nematov appeared genuinely shocked and angry that the U.S. is
considering sanctions based on Andijon, and stated multiple
times that it was "absolutely incomprehensible", particularly
given recent EU steps to soften its stance. Nematov conceded
that "we fully and openly acknowledge the Andijon events were
a national tragedy" in which "many peaceful people died", and
he added the President said so as well. Nematov emphasized
that the root of the Andijon tragedy was "a terrorist act
committed by armed bandits", and he also said tough policies
are necessary given the widespread instability in the region.
The Ambassador noted that Uzbekistan has at the very least
an image problem that persists in Washington, and that more
sources of independent verification of the human rights
situation would be helpful. The Ambassador raised recent
allegations of torture contributing to the deaths of two
prison inmates, which Nematov vehemently denied. Nematov
proposed an early meeting to discuss ICRC prison visit
access. Separately, the Ambassador met on November 21 with
Foreign Minister Norov and was informed that the requested
meeting with Karimov would occur on November 22. We hope --
and believe -- that the threat of sanctions may have jolted
the GOU into an awareness of the precarious state of our
rapproachment. End summary.

MFA Screens Request for Meeting with Karimov
--------------


2. (C) First Deputy Foreign Minister Nematov summoned the
Ambassador on November 20 to explore the reasons for a
requested audience with President Karimov. He seemed
concerned that such a request had even been made, and
listened carefully as the Ambassador explained that Congress
is sour on Uzbekistan and that two different sanctions bills
were gathering momentum in the House and the Senate (the
latter being of particular concern). The Ambassador noted
that the Department is concerned about the sanctions and that
he planned to personally visit the Hill next week to discuss
the proposals during a regional COM conference in Washington.
The Ambassador stressed that a personal meeting with Karimov
would carry some weight and enable the Department to point to
recent personal engagement and concrete steps.

"Absolutely incomprehensible"
--------------


3. (C) Nematov seemed genuinely shocked by the prospects of a
new round of sanctions rooted in the Andijon events and
stated numerous times during the meeting that it is not
comprehensible. He demanded to know "what concrete
accusations are they making?" He said this was particularly
surprising since the EU has recently lifted sanctions and is
softening its stance on Uzbekistan, so it is "simply not
understandable" that the U.S. would be doing the opposite.
He added that "Uzbekistan does all that is possible to
continue a dialogue" and recounted how "European experts" on
two occasions reviewed the Andijon events, including film and
documentary evidence, and concluded that the underlying cause
of the incidents was a "terrorist act committed by armed
bandits." He also said the GOU itself promptly implemented
"concrete measures" to ensure it does not happen again. He

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said the GOU considers the matter closed, and was incredulous
that "these senators want to make an enemy of Uzbekistan"
based on what he said were faulty, unreliable sources used by
Human Rights Watch.

Andijon "a National Tragedy"
--------------


4. (C) Comment: While Nematov was upset by the prospect of
sanctions, it is significant that he stated "we fully and
openly acknowledge that the Andijon events were a national
tragedy." He added that, although it was a terrorist act,
that "many peaceful people died." His response seemed
emotional and unscripted, but he claimed that President
Karimov himself has made similar acknowledgements about
Andijon. We will note, however, that European observers say
the EU experts were "stonewalled" by the Uzbeks and still do
not have a full accounting of what happened. End comment.


A Tough Neighborhood
--------------


5. (C) Nematov also frankly conceded that Uzbekistan's
domestic policies are tough, but he feels his country
successfully balances stability, religious freedom, and a
gradual democratic process. He cited Uzbekistan's regional
situation and, while European countries have the luxury of
peaceful, stable neighbors, Uzbekistan must be concerned
about Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chinese Turkestan, and
proximity to Iran. South and Central Asia, he continued, is
afflicted by terror groups, instability, and seemingly "99
percent of the world's narcotics passing by" en route from
Afghanistan. On Pakistan, he said the GOU is concerned that
Musharraf "is in a tough position" and specifically mentioned
Waziristan. He added that "Karzai cannot control the
internal situation" in Afghanistan.

Strategic Realities
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador told Nematov that such regional
instability is also a reason why the U.S. seeks strategic
cooperation with Uzbekistan. Nodding agreement, Nematov
thanked the Ambassador for his "openness" and was interested
that the SCA Ambassadors are gathering in Washington to
conduct meetings on the region.

Paucity of NGOs Contributes to Image Problem
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador noted that Uzbekistan at the very least
has an image problem which persists in Washington, and that
this made it easier for influential human rights groups to
persuade powerful members of Congress to introduce sanctions
bills. He said that it is difficult for either the USG or
the GOU to offer convincing alternate viewpoints since there
are so few NGOs in the country which could provide
independent verification. The Ambassador cited a November 7
report issued by Human Rights Watch alleging torture in
Uzbekistan, and said that while torture can occur in any
system the important thing is to have a mechanism to identify
and address it.

Nematov Refutes Prisoner Torture Allegations
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of two recent inmate
deaths that were alleged to have been caused by torture
(reftel A). Nematov was aware of the allegations and
vehemently denied them. He strongly asserted that the
inmates died of natural causes and referenced MFA documents
that claim the inmates both had illnesses. One allegedly
suffered from heart and stomach ailments and the other from a
myriad of ailments including tuberculosis, hepatitis, and

TASHKENT 00002006 003 OF 003


bronchitis. He claimed both were taken by ambulance to a
civilian hospital, where they received the same treatment any
citizen would get. He said any deaths are a shame,
especially for grieving loved ones, but he said these inmates
"had violated laws", and "every nation has its criminals".


9. (C) In response to Nematov's comments, the Ambassador
underscored that the GOU's assertions would be more credible
in the international community if there was an ICRC-style
prison visit regime in place to provide independent
verification. Nematov suggested an early meeting with MFA,
MVD, the ICRC, and the Ambassador to discuss the next steps
in facilitating renewed ICRC prison visits.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Nematov's genuine shock about the sanctions gathering
momentum in Congress indicates the Uzbek Embassy may not have
kept MFA well-informed about key policy developments. The
Uzbeks are very sensitive (Nematov specifically noted that
the GOU appreciated that President Bush did not mention
Uzbekistan at the UNGA, but he was puzzled and upset by
alleged U.S. statements in Geneva critical of Uzbekistan) and
the renewed threat of visa sanctions over Andijon has already
elicited a strong reaction. In this respect, the threat of
additional sanctions has proved useful. However, if
sanctions are ultimately adopted, the slowly reemerging
bilateral relationship may backslide, even as Uzbek relations
with Europe improve. This would be extremely unhelpful to
U.S. strategic interests in the region. We hope the planned
November 22 meeting with President Karimov will help spur the
GOU to take some immediate steps to address Congressional
concerns.

NORLAND