Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT1989
2007-11-16 10:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

NATO PURSUING LIMITED REENGAGEMENT WITH UZBEKISTAN

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL NATO UZ AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8324
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #1989/01 3201039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161039Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8781
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3457
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9667
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4073
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3936
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1975
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7210
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2136
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1657
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001989 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL NATO UZ AF
SUBJECT: NATO PURSUING LIMITED REENGAGEMENT WITH UZBEKISTAN

REF: A. 06 TASHKENT 2332

B. TASHKENT 989

Classified By: POLOFF STEVEN PROHASKA FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001989

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL NATO UZ AF
SUBJECT: NATO PURSUING LIMITED REENGAGEMENT WITH UZBEKISTAN

REF: A. 06 TASHKENT 2332

B. TASHKENT 989

Classified By: POLOFF STEVEN PROHASKA FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus
and Central Asia Robert Simmons reported that his meetings
with Foreign Minister Norov and Defense Minister Mirzayev on
November 12 were substantive and he had been well-received.
Uzbekistan has resumed participation in Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) activities, is working with NATO's
Central Asia Liaison Officer, and wants assistance with the
destruction of rocket fuel. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan has
refused to participate in a collective group that discusses
policy on Afghanistan and has not rejoined NATO's Planning
and Review Process. The Defense Minister expressed interest
in an expanded number of bilateral agreements. The GOU also
is pessimistic about the current situation in Afghanistan.
Post supports continued NATO efforts to reengage with
Uzbekistan as long as cooperation is a two-way street. End
summary.


2. (C) NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and
Central Asia Robert Simmons visited Tashkent for meetings
with GOU officials on November 12. During a debrief for NATO
embassies, Simmons said that his visit was well-received and
he had substantive discussions with Foreign Minister Norov
and Defense Minister Mirzayev. Since his last visit in
December (reftel A),NATO's relationship with Uzbekistan has
had its ups and downs, he said. Simmons welcomed the
resumption of a dialogue with the GOU and was pleased with
Uzbekistan's resumption of participation in Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) activities. He was also pleased
that the GOU is working with the NATO Central Asia Liaison
Officer, Tugay Tuncer. Simmons is trying to get the
NATO-Uzbekistan relationship back on track.


3. (C) Simmons noted that NATO and Uzbekistan have continued
their political dialogue and that this has been working well.
NATO's Desk Officer Alexander Vinnikov had had a substantive

and positive visit to Tashkent earlier this year. Turning to
Afghanistan, Simmons noted that Uzbekistan has good
cooperation with Germany, but even Germany cannot move
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) staff members
in and out of Afghanistan using the German airbase at Termez.
Simmons said that NATO has established a special 26 N
collective group including the countries of Central Asia to
discuss policy on Afghanistan. Uzbekistan was the only
Central Asian state which failed to participate in the
meeting that took place the preceding week. Foreign Minister
Norov indicated to Simmons that the GOU welcomes bilateral
dialogue, but it is not interested in joining this collective
group.


4. (C) The GOU officials were pessimistic about the situation
in Afghanistan, Simmons said. They had said that the shift
to terrorism and suicide bombings was a bad sign, and they
believed that although NATO was winning some battles, it was
"losing hearts and minds" in Afghanistan. Simmons added that
the GOU was very concerned about the narcotics situation in
Afghanistan. (Note: Uzbekistan has an extensive array of
intelligence sources in Afghanistan, but mostly drawing on
biased Uzbek sources in the north; Mirzayev himself was
assigned to Mazar-i-Sharif during the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. End Note.)


5. (C) Simmons said he thought the GOU agreed to rejoin the
Planning and Review Process (PARP) in May. (Note: In May
Deputy Defense Minister Niyazov made a commitment that
Uzbekistan would rejoin PARP, which Uzbekistan has failed to
take part in since 2004, reftel B. End Note.) Foreign
Minister Norov indicated he was open to rejoining the PARP,
but Defense Minister Mirzayev instead wanted an expanded
number of bilateral partnership agreements. Simmons said
that there were roughly 110-115 such agreements before the

TASHKENT 00001989 002 OF 002


Andijon events, but this number has since shrunk to 10. NATO
is aiming to increase the number to about 20.


6. (C) Simmons said that the GOU is interested in receiving
assistance with the destruction of melange. (Note: Special
machines can eliminate melange, a rocket fuel residue, by
converting it into fertilizer. End Note.) NATO first must
have a technical team visit, which Simmons plans to join
sometime in the Spring, he said.


7. (C) Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan does not push NATO to
cooperate with the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
Simmons opined. Uzbek officials simply state that they are
members of the CSTO during their interaction with NATO
officials. Simmons noted that during his last visit in
December, the Uzbeks had accused the West of driving
Uzbekistan toward the CSTO because of the West's reaction to
the events of Andijon. Simmons said Brussels was more open
to cooperation with the SCO, which is a broader organization
with a broader mandate. NATO does not currently cooperate
with the CSTO and he did not see this changing soon.


8. (C) Comment: Uzbekistan's failure to participate in NATO's
26 N collective group is not surprising given the GOU's
traditional aversion to active participation in multilateral
security fora and general preference for bilateral security
cooperation. Uzbekistan's unwillingness to take part in
collective groups such as these does not square with its
previously expressed desires to hold a "leadership role" in
Central Asia, including on NATO. Post continues to support
NATO efforts to reengage with Uzbekistan, bearing in mind
that cooperation should be a two-way street and we will need
to encourage the Uzbeks to do their part.
NORLAND