GOU WANTS TO REVIVE SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE UNIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001900

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL ANDREW BUHLER, SCA/CEN BRIAN RORAFF; DUSHANBE
FOR DEA PAUL HACKETT;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM UZ
SUBJECT: GOU WANTS TO REVIVE SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE UNIT

Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary. Poloff met with Kamol Dusmetov, Director of
the National Center of Drug Control and the Deputy Chairman
of the State Commission of Drug Control (which is part of the
Cabinet of Ministers). Dusmetov told poloff that the GOU
would welcome the revival of collaborative efforts on the
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU),which previously
benefited from International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL) funds and DEA expertise. Dusmetov was
surprisingly candid in explaining that, in the wake of
Andijon, GOU officials were not courageous enough to convince
President Karimov that it was a worthwhile program despite
USG involvement. He said they "were sad to lose" the
effective SIU and that the counter-narcotics struggle "should
not be politicized." This is the latest in a series of
signals that the GOU may be willing to reengage on law
enforcement, which suits Uzbekistan's interest while avoiding
other, more contentious issues. Regional DEA officer
welcomed the developments but noted that DEA staff would need
Uzbek visas to effectively implement a program with the SIU.
End summary.


2. (C) On October 31 poloff met with Dusmetov to obtain
updated narcotics data for the annual INCSR Report. Dusmetov
took the opportunity to drop multiple hints that the GOU
would like to reestablish cooperative efforts on the SIU.
The SIU was established under the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD) with INL funds for equipment and salaries as
well as DEA operating expertise and funds, but it was
essentially shut down after the 2005 Andijon incidents due to
its USG ties. Post conducted end-use monitoring in late 2006
of substantial equipment provided to the SIU, which was still
intact and accounted for. The MVD still occasionally uses
the resources in its operations, although the SIU is not
functioning as an effective, independent entity as it was a
few years ago.


3. (C) Dusmetov described the SIU's previous work as highly
effective in counter-narcotics operations, and said "we were
very sad to lose such a department." He explained that,
"when the relationship was chilled" in the aftermath of
Andijon, President Karimov wanted explanations of all
USG-funded programs. Unfortunately, he added, no one had the
guts to stand before Karimov and describe the merits of the
SIU, so the President decided to end cooperation without
having a complete picture of the SIU's contributions.
Dusmetov lamented that even now "no one has the power to
bring this issue back to the President", but inferred that
the Embassy could offer a continuation of cooperation to
support the SIU through official diplomatic channels. In
particular, he recommended "the first steps should be on a
high level", and that the State Commission of Drug Control
would be the most appropriate starting place for this issue.


4. (C) Dusmetov restated several times during the meeting the
message that Uzbekistan would welcome a revival of the SIU.
He did not send his notetaker or our LES translator out of
the room, and it seemed clear that he was passing a message
rather than expressing personal opinions. Dusmetov agreed
with poloff that there was common ground between our
countries on counter-narcotics and said "this serious issue
should not be politicized." Dusmetov also emphasized that
cooperation "remained stable through our troubles", referring
to training programs, equipment donations, and drug demand
reduction efforts after Andijon.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) It will be interesting to see if similar themes emerge
during the initial meetings, November 1, of our bilateral
Border Security Assistance Working Groups. The GOU seems
genuinely concerned about the ripple effects of increased
drug production in Afghanistan, and revival of the SIU would
suit its interests without touching on issues it deems more
sensitive. DEA regional officer in Dushanbe welcomed these
developments but noted that it would not be practical for DEA
to remotely operate with the SIU. Staffing and visa hurdles
would need to be overcome to enable DEA staff to effectively

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operate a program in Uzbekistan again. Post will work with
DEA and Department on a strategy to test the GOU's sincerity
on reviving the SIU, which would almost certainly require a
DEA in-country presence.
NORLAND