Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT1853
2007-10-25 09:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

(C) MY WAY OR NO WAY: UZBEKISTAN GETS DEFENSIVE ON

Tags:  KENV ETRD ENRG PREL TBIO ZK UZ 
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VZCZCXRO9059
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #1853/01 2980937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250937Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8654
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3383
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9589
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3999
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3862
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1937
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2087
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 001853 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR OES/ETC, OES/PCI, OES/STC, SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE,
DOE FOR NNSA,
EPA FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: KENV ETRD ENRG PREL TBIO ZK UZ
SUBJECT: (C) MY WAY OR NO WAY: UZBEKISTAN GETS DEFENSIVE ON
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS

REF: TASHKENT 1608 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ECON OFF B. OLSEN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 001853

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR OES/ETC, OES/PCI, OES/STC, SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE,
DOE FOR NNSA,
EPA FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: KENV ETRD ENRG PREL TBIO ZK UZ
SUBJECT: (C) MY WAY OR NO WAY: UZBEKISTAN GETS DEFENSIVE ON
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS

REF: TASHKENT 1608 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ECON OFF B. OLSEN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D).


1. (SBU) Summary: President Karimov,s speech at the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Bishkek on
August 16 was the clearest and most official statement of
Uzbekistan,s position on the use of transboundary waters of
Central Asia. In an effort to legally justify its position,
on September 4 Uzbekistan surprisingly acceded to two United
Nations conventions governing the use of international
watercourses. Uzbekistan is citing the conventions to defend
the status-quo regime on water sharing, a regime that favors
the interests of Uzbekistan over those of upstream countries.
Meanwhile, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan reportedly are
coordinating a strong push both domestically and
internationally to attract foreign direct investment to build
hydropower infrastructure and make the current water sharing
regime more equitable. End summary.


2. (SBU) The information sources for this cable include
official statements and reliable press reports. The regional
ESTH LES is based in Tashkent, travels throughout the region
and engages in extensive discussions with environmental
experts. The cable has been reviewed by Embassy Bishkek and
Embassy Dushanbe.


3. (SBU) At the SCO,s annual summit in 2007, energy
cooperation was added as a priority to the agenda,
demonstrating increased interest among its members,
especially energy-hungry China and Russia. While China and
Russia are interested in increasing natural gas imports, the
general new energy focus, including hydroelectric power, has
brought to the foreground the long-standing transboundary
water issues among Central Asian countries.


4. (SBU) Given the importance of agriculture, namely cotton,
to Uzbekistan,s economy, Uzbekistan does not want to alter
the current water-sharing regime that allows water to flow

freely downstream in the spring and summer. Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan thus far have failed to equitably trade water for
power or receive compensation for their seasonal energy
losses. Both possess enormous hydropower generating
potential, but are unable to meet domestic electricity demand
in the winter. Energy imports from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan meet some needs during the cold months, but
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have not been able to negotiate a
consistent supply of energy at fair prices with Uzbekistan.

Karimov,s Watery Offense
--------------


5. (SBU) At the summit, President Karimov repeatedly quoted
passages from two United Nations (UN) conventions to defend
his position in support of the status quo. (Note: Soon after
the summit the Uzbeks acceded to the two water conventions
(on September 4). End note.) He cited the 1997 United
Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses and the 1992 UN Economic
Commission for Europe,s Convention on the Protection and Use
of Tran-boundary Watercourses and International Lakes. At
the 2007 UN General Assembly, UNGA, in September, Foreign
Minister Norov made similar points, devoting the first half
of his speech to transboundary water issues and the rights of
downstream countries.


6. (SBU) Karimov cited the conventions, saying that measures
should be taken by upstream countries to mitigate the
consequences or compensate the affected countries. Karimov
noted technical feasibility studies for hydropower projects
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should be examined by third
parties to protect downstream users and the environment. If
this is not done, he warned, the planned projects would
negatively affect the lives of tens of million people, worsen
the water supply and accelerate an ecological catastrophe of
the shrinking Aral Sea.


TASHKENT 00001853 002 OF 003



7. (C) Comment: Karimov's statement is self-serving. With
more reservoirs to hold water, water usage would become more
efficient as water would be released when needed. The living
standard of the Tajiks and Kyrgyz would improve as they would
have better access to electricity and heating. More water
released in the winter to create electricity would result in
more water reaching the Aral Sea and less being siphoned off
for crops, as is currently done, thus improving the water
supply of those living near the Aral Sea. Uzbekistan's
policies (both Soviet and post-Soviet) account for the
majority of man-made adverse effects on the Aral Sea. Recent
expert commentary suggests there is no hope of restoring the
"southern" (Uzbek) Aral Sea to its 1960's level, but rather
that the best that can be hoped for is to stabilize the
current annual losses and keep the sea at its existing,
vastly reduced level. Even this, an American scientist
remarked, is not possible without dramatic improvements in
Uzbek irrigation and water management techniques, practices
which are far from being enacted. End comment.


8. (C) Karimov further defended his argument by citing
relevant rules and procedures of the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, which require prior consent of all
concerned countries before international water projects are
approved. (Note: In September, the Head of the World Bank
told the DCM the GOU had warned the Bank to proceed very
cautiously on offering any support for major dam projects
(reftel). End note)

The Upstream Defense
--------------


9. (SBU) The Tajik Government aims to finish its Soviet-era
hydropower projects and build new ones. In 2004, Russian
Aluminum (RUSAL),Russia,s giant aluminum producer signed a
deal to finish the Rogun power station on the Vakhsh River, a
major tributary of the Amu Darya. Later that year, the
Russian company United Energy Systems started construction of
Sangtuda-1, and Iran started construction of the Sangtuda-2
power station, both on the Vakhsh River. In August 2007,
Tajikistan and Afghanistan agreed to jointly construct the
Dashtijum hydropower plant on the Pyandj River. It should be
noted that the Rogun project has not progressed since 2004,
Sangtuda 2 is behind schedule, and only Sangtuda 1 is on
schedule. So while there is a swirl of activity on
hydropower projects in Tajikistan, there is not uniform
progress. Similarly, the Kyrgyz Parliament voted in June
2007 to allow private investment in the unfinished Kambar-Ata
1 and 2 hydropower projects. Kyrgyzstan plans to establish a
joint venture with Kazakhstan and Russia to build these
hydropower stations, estimated to cost USD 2.5 billion.


10. (SBU) Upstream hydropower projects aim not only to make
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan energy exporters, but also to
secure greater influence in regional politics. Once these
power stations are operational, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
should be able to better mitigate winter energy shortages,
meet domestic energy demands and export excess electricity to
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China. These stations will
allow for the long-term control and manipulation of the flows
of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya by upstream countries. This
is exactly what Uzbekistan wants to prevent.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Uzbekistan can be expected to take further steps to
hinder the implementation upstream of hydro energy
infrastructure. Media reports and comments from Tajik
Government officials in recent months suggest that
Tajikistan,s move to terminate a deal with Russian RUSAL
over the height and type of Rogun dam was caused by Uzbek
interference. Uzbekistan's meddling is rumored to be the
cause of the Chinese dropping finance for the construction of
a Tajik hydropower plant on the Zarafshan River. (Note:
While Uzbek interference may be a factor, but Tajik
Government failure to improve the investment climate in

TASHKENT 00001853 003 OF 003


Tajikistan has certainly also hindered Rogun and other
projects. End note).


12. (C) The Uzbeks' use of international law in public
discourse demonstrates their increased concern over Tajik and
Kyrgyz efforts to harness water energy, a god-given resource
in Karimov's view. In its typical balancing game, Uzbekistan
has taken the issue to an international forum. The Uzbeks
feel the pinch by the Tajiks and Kyrgyz and are trying to use
international conventions to defend the current water regime.
Uzbekistan historically has been reticent to join
international and regional organizations. This new move may
provide a partial legal basis for Uzbekistan to maintain the
status quo. However, if Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not
have access to reliable energy supplies, or if water
cost-sharing agreements are insufficient and/or ignored by
neighbors, then both countries could well argue that they are
obliged to produce energy domestically through water
resources. Transboundary water issues will continue to
plague this region until the parties develop enough trust or
see enough mutual interest to sit down together and negotiate
a regional water management scheme--something that still
appears to be far down the line.
NORLAND