GOU PROVIDES WRITTEN REBUTTAL TO EU ON HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 001817

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PHUM EUN KIRF PGOV PREL SOCI UZ
SUBJECT: GOU PROVIDES WRITTEN REBUTTAL TO EU ON HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. TASHKENT 1345

B. TASHKENT 1447

C. TASHKENT 1414

D. TASHKENT 1764

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During an Embassy event on October 9, MFA
U.S. Affairs Chief Ismat Fayzullaev provided, at Deputy
Foreign Minister Nematov's request, the Ambassador with a
written GOU rebuttal to recent public statements made by EU
officials criticizing human rights abuses in Uzbekistan. The
rebuttal, written prior to the EU's October 15 decision to
partially suspend sanctions, vigorously defends the Uzbek
government's record on civil society development, media
freedom, religious freedom, ICRC prison monitoring, and
investment in health and education. Although the document
provides little new information or rhetoric, it underscores
that the Uzbeks do not share our perception of what
constitutes an honest dialogue on human rights abuses with
the EU or any other international actor. Nevertheless, it
also reconfirms that the GOU follows very closely statements
made by foreign institutions and individuals about
Uzbekistan, suggesting the regime still values international
legitimacy. This in turn suggests there is a limited basis
on which to selectively engage the GOU on human rights as
part of an overall improvement in the tone of our bilateral
relationship. End summary.

REACTION TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY EU OFFICIALS
--------------


2. (C) The written statement responds to recent public
statements by EU officials, including those of Riina Kionka,
an EU human rights envoy and personal representative of EU
foreign policy chief Javier Solana, who is quoted as saying
that EU sanctions against Uzbekistan have been effective in
opening a channel of communication with Uzbekistan, but that
the Uzbeks have not expressed a sincere desire to discuss
human rights issues. In their response, the Uzbeks describe
Kionka's statements as "prejudiced and even provocative" and
claim that they have always been open to dialogue with the
EU. It points out that the Uzbeks have discussed human
rights on numerous occasions with the EU and agreed in
November 2006 to a structured and recurring dialogue on human
rights. The Uzbeks appear especially rankled that the EU is
pursuing a human rights dialogue with only Uzbekistan as part
of its new Central Asia Strategy. British poloff Ben
Greenwood confirmed to poloff on October 19 that the
Government has shared the document with European Embassies in
Tashkent. We will provide the desk with a copy via
classified email.


3. (C) In their reply, the Uzbeks defend their record on
civil society development, media freedom, religious freedom,
ICRC prison monitoring, and investment in health and
education. But much of the rhetoric differs little from
previous public and private statements by the GOU, and the
evidence cited to back up their assertions is often
misleading, and in a few cases -- such as with the number of
NGOs operating in the country -- exaggerated to the best of
our knowledge.

UZBEKISTAN INVITES OSCE ELECTION OBSERVERS; LEAVES DOOR OPEN
TO OTHER MONITORS
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The response states that the government "intends to
invite" observers from the OSCE to observe the December 23
presidential election. On October 19, OSCE Human Dimension
officer Bernard Rouault informed the Embassy via email that
the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights - Elections (ODIHR) had received a formal written
request to provide observers for the December presidential

TASHKENT 00001817 002 OF 005


election and forwarded us a copy of the official request.
The GOU's response to the EU states that "everyone who wishes
will be invited as observers" and will be able to monitor the
election, theoretically leaving the door open to other groups
as well.

GOVERNMENT NUMBERS ON CIVIL SOCIETY EXAGGERATED
-------------- --


5. (U) In the document, the government recognizes that NGOs
"play an essential role in the democratization of society"
and notes that it "pays close attention to the creation of
favorable legislative norms" aimed at supporting civil
society. It claims that there are now more than 5,000 NGOs
in Uzbekistan, including 50 branch offices of international
NGOs. It goes on to say the number of NGOs has increased two
and half times since 1995 and more than 25 foreign NGOs whose
activity was suspended by court decisions were able to
re-register with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and have
continued their operations in Uzbekistan. The statement
obliquely refers to NGOs which "roughly and occasionally
consciously break" their "statutory purposes" or Uzbek laws.


6. (C) USAID Country Director reported that the government
figure of 5,000 NGOs in Uzbekistan was exaggerated and
estimated that the true number of functional local and
international NGOs is now closer to 300 based on data shared
among other donors. He reported that the government forced
all international NGOs to re-register with the MOJ in 2006
and thought it was likely that approximately 25 of them
funded by USAID have since continued operations, with only
two -- the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Open
Dialogue Project -- engaged in any sort of human rights or
political reform work.


7. (U) Poloff consulted a useful website (www.uzngo.info)
that lists local NGOs that have closed and those which
continue to operate in each of Uzbekistan's provinces. The
website names over 300 local NGOs that were either forced to
close or chose to liquidate themselves under government
pressure between 2004 and 2007. It also lists 299 local
NGOs, 290 government-controlled NGOs (GONGOs) and 247
professional and sport associations that continue to operate
as of June 1.

GOU CLAIMS NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ALSO INCREASING
-------------- --------------


8. (U) The GOU reply claims that the number of human rights
NGOs in Uzbekistan is increasing and lists several groups
supposedly active in Uzbekistan, including Human Rights
Watch; Ezgulik and the Independent Human Rights Organization
of Uzbekistan, the only two registered local human rights
organizations; and several quasi-governmental NGOs.


9. (C) Comment: Although Human Rights Watch has not
officially departed Uzbekistan, the organization was
effectively forced to close its doors in July after the MOJ
refused to accredit its last remaining expatriate staff
member (ref A). In 2006, the government also forced the
closure of several international NGOs involved in human
rights issues, including Freedom House and the American Bar
Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative
(ABA/CEELI). The closing of such organizations, plus tacit
limitations on the two international NGOs still operating and
limits on Embassy activity, have all significantly lessened
the availability of human rights information in Uzbekistan.
End comment.

GOU DECREE ON PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO NGOS
--------------


10. (C) In defending its record on civil society, the reply
highlights an April 28 decree of the Cabinet of Ministers

TASHKENT 00001817 003 OF 005


under which officially registered NGOs engaging in "socially
significant activity" for at least one year are eligible to
receive state funding in the form of subsidies, grants and
"state social orders." According to the decree, subsidies
are intended to defray an NGO's basic operating expenses and
will be administered directly by the Ministries of Finance
and Justice. Grants and state social orders essentially are
government contracts awarded competitively to NGOs for the
fulfillment of social projects. However, the Uzbek reply to
the EU neglects to mention that the funding is available only
to officially registered NGOs, the majority of which are
quasi-governmental. During a government-organized human
rights conference on October 17, National Human Rights Center
Director Akmal Saidov (also a presidential candidate) stated
that 17 grants have been dispersed to NGOs since the
legislation went into effect in July. He did not mention
which organizations had received the grants.

DIDN'T YOU READ ABOUT OUR FREE MEDIA?
--------------


11. (U) According to the reply, Uzbekistan's mass media is
immune from censorship and there are approximately 500
independent newspapers, magazines, radio and television
stations, news agencies and websites in the country. It
further claims that the government is actively promoting
greater competition between media outlets.


12. (C) Comment: Independent newspapers and television
stations exist in Uzbekistan, but they all practice heavy
self-censorship and almost always carry stories favorable to
the government. The GOU's claims about promoting greater
competition between media outlets is especially difficult to
accept given the recent case of the independent "Odamlar
Orasida" ("Among the People") newspaper, which was forced to
close in July after attaining a circulation of 24,000 copies
in just a few months - a readership higher than that of most
official publications. Its success was largely attributed to
discussions of social issues such as infant mortality,
homosexuality and prostitution, which are largely ignored by
competing government-supported newspapers (ref B). Embassy
press information assistant FSN reported that "Odamlar
Orasida" was told that it could reopen if it replaced its
editor, which it agreed to do, but the newspaper still has
been unable to reopen. End comment.

THE GOU ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
--------------


13. (U) In defense of the GOU's record on religious freedom,
the reply notes that the number of mosques in Uzbekistan has
increased from only 84 in 1990 to 2,029 in 2007. In the past
year, 900 students attended Uzbekistan's 10 madrassahs and
124 students studied at the Tashkent Islamic Institute under
the Muftiate (Note: To become an imam, an individual must
graduate from a madrassah or the Tashkent Islamic Institute.
End note.) In addition, 49 students attended Uzbekistan's
Orthodox Seminary and 33 its Protestant seminary. The
statement notes that the law allows religious organizations
to "make, export, import and distribute religious materials"
and observed that the New Testament and 16 books of the New
Testament have been translated into Uzbek and published.
Since independence, the government has reportedly assisted
more than 50,000 Uzbek citizens conduct pilgrimages to holy
sites.


14. (C) Comment: Given reports of overflowing mosque
attendance, especially among youth, it is unclear whether the
government is training enough imams or allowing the
construction of enough mosques to meet the spiritual demands
of its people. Furthermore, despite its recognition that
Christian literature has been translated into Uzbek, the
Government has detained several shipments of such material.
Last year, the GOU detained 4,500 copies of Uzbek

TASHKENT 00001817 004 OF 005


translations of several Old Testament books (ref C). The
government also has continued to detain shipments of
Jehovah's Witnesses religious material headed for both
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (ref D). In the past year, the
number of pilgrims from Uzbekistan participating in the Hajj
increased from 4,500 to 5,000, but this number is still only
a fraction of the country's total possible number of
pilgrims. End comment.


15. (U) The GOU's response to the EU recognizes some limits
on religious freedom in Uzbekistan, including laws against
proselytism, missionary activity, and the formation of
religious political groups or religious associations
promoting religious hatred. The statement also broadly
defines proselytism as "actions aimed at the manipulation of
believers of one faith into another."

BLAMING THE ICRC FOR SUSPENSION OF PRISON MONITORING
-------------- --------------


16. (C) From 2001 until the suspension of its prison
monitoring program in 2004, the statement notes that the ICRC
conducted 119 visits to correctional facilities and
interviewed more than 1,500 prisoners. It accuses the ICRC
of breaking its confidentiality agreement with the GOU by
distributing a memo among Tashkent's diplomatic corps in
February 2005 explaining its decision to suspend visits to
detention facilities. During negotiations in May, the GOU
claims that it offered to allow the ICRC to visit a women's
prison colony in Tashkent and a prison in Bukhara, but ICRC
rejected the proposal. The statement also notes that ICRC
has prison monitoring agreements similar to the one with
Uzbekistan with only a few other countries.

NEXT ROUND OF HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH EU SET FOR SPRING
-------------- --------------


17. (C) The statement stressed that Tashkent is ready to
continue dialogue with the E.U. on human rights, but that the
agreement reached in November 2006 stipulated that the
dialogue could only be conducted within the framework of the
Subcommittee on Justice and Home Affairs, which only meets
once a year. The Uzbeks indicate that they prefer to wait
until the Subcommittee meets again in the second quarter of
2008 to hold the next round of the human rights dialogue.

NO CRISIS HERE...
--------------


18. (C) The statement also takes umbrage at the words of
Alain Deltroz of the International Crisis Group, who is
quoted as stating that the "...E.U. should isolate Uzbekistan
from other Central Asian republics" and that "Uzbekistan
faces social catastrophe" with plummeting standards in the
fields of health care and education. In the sphere of
health, the statement argues that infant mortality since
independence has dropped from 35 cases per 1,000 births to 14
cases and that life expectancy has increased from 66 to 70
years for men and 70 to 74.5 years for women. Since the
launch of a national educational program in 1997, the
statement says the GOU has spent more than 5 billion dollars
on building or renovating 1,140 academic lyceums and
professional colleges and providing modern equipment to 4,680
secondary schools. It claims that the government currently
spends 9 percent of GDP on education, a figure much higher
than any of its neighbors.


19. (C) Comment: According to an USAID Health Advisor, the
GOU's figures on life expectancy appear to be roughly
accurate, but its figure on infant mortality appears to be
too low. In a report this year endorsed by the Uzbek
Ministry of Health, UNICEF reported an infant mortality rate
of 48 cases per 1,000 births. On the other hand, the
government has been clearly investing funds in building new

TASHKENT 00001817 005 OF 005


lyceums and colleges across the country. This year, the
government also instituted a reform by which all students
will attend college or lyceum for three years after finishing
the 9th grade at secondary school. However, salaries for
teachers remain low and corruption within the educational
system remains a serious and growing problem. Embassy's
economic FSN estimated that Uzbekistan spends about 7 percent
of GDP on educational expenses. End comment.

...BUT IMPOSITION OF WESTERN STANDARDS COULD LEAD TO "PUBLIC
EXPLOSION"
-------------- --------------


20. (C) The statement argues that Western moral standards
cannot be "artificially introduced" into Uzbek society,
claiming that the imposition of democratization from outside
could lead to a "public explosion." The statement also
accuses "partisan forces" in the West of using false
information and "double standards" for their own
"opportunistic purposes." The response ends with the
government's rejection of a "master-student" dialogue with
the EU, stating that any negotiations must be a "two-way"
street.


21. (C) During the government-sponsored human rights
conference on October 17, GOU officials used similar rhetoric
to describe the country's interaction with the EU on human
rights. National Human Rights Center Director Saidov stated
that any dialogue on human rights with Uzbekistan must take
into account the "culture and psychology" of its people and
the government will refrain from engaging with countries who
have "other interests in mind." He reiterated that the GOU
will continue its dialogue with the EU, but that the
"attitude" of "some EU countries" has been obstructive,
singling out the United Kingdom in particular. Deputy
Foreign Minister Minovarov accused "western" countries of
using human rights as a "pressure tactic" to achieve their
geopolitical interests in the region.

COMMENT
--------------


22. (C) The written statement does not include any rhetoric
that we have not heard before. The statement as a whole
simply underscores that the Uzbeks do not show our perception
of what constitutes a serious dialogue on human rights with
the EU or any other international actor. If their response
is to be believed, Uzbekistan suffers from few, if any, human
rights abuses and the West is cynically using the issue as an
instrument for geopolitical gain. While the Uzbeks are not
fully closing the door to dialogue on human rights with the
EU or other partners, we doubt that much progress can be
made, at least in the short term.


23. (C) The statement also reconfirms that the GOU follows
closely statements made by foreign institutions and
individuals about Uzbekistan. The regime values
international legitimacy. We need to weave greater focus on
Uzbekistan's image abroad into our discussion with the GOU on
human rights.


24. (C) In one important respect, though, the GOU is being
completely honest: a significant element within the GOU, and
in particular within the security services, has long argued
that US and EU prescriptions on human rights and greater
political freedom would result in chaos or worse. They still
seem to believe this.


25. (C) The GOU has now formally invited the OSCE to observe
the December presidential election, but it also has clearly
left the door open to inviting other, possibly competing,
groups to monitor the election, such as a delegation from
friendly Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.
NORLAND