Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT1753
2007-10-10 13:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

ICRC'S GLOOMY OUTLOOK ON GOU COOPERATION

Tags:  PREL PREF PHUM UZ 
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RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #1753 2831304
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101304Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8583
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3337
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9535
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3953
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3816
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2066
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0822
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001753 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM UZ
SUBJECT: ICRC'S GLOOMY OUTLOOK ON GOU COOPERATION

REF: TASHKENT 1448 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

Classified By: P/E Section Chief Ted Burkhalter; resons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001753

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM UZ
SUBJECT: ICRC'S GLOOMY OUTLOOK ON GOU COOPERATION

REF: TASHKENT 1448 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

Classified By: P/E Section Chief Ted Burkhalter; resons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: ICRC's Head of Regional Delegation for
Central Asia, Yves Giovannoni, met Ambassador October 5 and
expressed concern at continuing lack of cooperation from the
GOU, including on prison access. Giovannoni said ICRC was no
longer willing to be used for political advantage by the GOU
and might have to downgrade its Uzbekistan office at some
point. He suggested the ICRC could, in theory, play a role
in "moving past Andijon," but doubted the security services'
willingness to cooperate. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador on October 5 called on Yves Giovannoni, the
new Head of ICRC's Regional Delegation in Central Asia, and
his deputy, Raffaello Muller. Giovannoni stressed that ICRC
was downgrading its mission in Tajikistan and that it would
have to draw a line in Uzbekistan at some point. ICRC had,
he said, allowed a piecemeal approach previously in
Uzbekistan, and had tried to work with the GOU on issues like
prison access. The GOU had taken advantage of ICRC, using
events for political advantage, and ICRC was no longer
willing to tolerate this. ICRC was not willing to compromise
on the application in Uzbekistan of worldwide modalities.


3. (C) Giovannoni said that the EU carried little influence
with the GOU and that, with the deterioration of the
U.S.-Uzbek relationship, U.S. leverage had also been lost.
Muller added that, while he believed Uzbekistan's political
class cared about its international image, the Ministry of
Interior (MVD) and National Security Service (NSS) understood
neither the humanitarian purpose nor the confidentiality
procedures of the ICRC. The MVD and NSS, he said, cared only
about their assigned mission objectives (i.e., fighting
extremism) and had a blank check from Karimov to do what they
needed to do.


4. (C) Muller complained that when applying for visas for its
personnel, the ICRC must submit to the GOU detailed agendas,
including for internal training and seminars. Giovannoni
noted that because of difficulties with the authorities, ICRC
has been forced to cut back its budget for Uzbekistan. He
compared the problems here with those ICRC faced in its
now-reduced Tajikistan office.


5. (C) Both Giovannoni and Muller told Ambassador of
difficulties ICRC has encountered in its contact work. After
the 2005 Andijon events, Muller said, the GOU had ordered
ICRC to refrain from travelling to the Ferghana Valley. The
ICRC had been forbidden from spreading the word that it could
place refugees and their families in contact with one
another. Muller also described how, slowly, the number of
individuals coming to visit ICRC in its Tashkent offices had
dropped. International NGOs, he said, had noted the same
trend around that time. Based on a pattern of cancelled
appointments and no-shows, he believed that ICRC's phones
were monitored and that individuals who phoned ICRC were then
being discouraged from maintaing contact. He believed this
practice remained in force.


6. (C) Giovannoni thought that ICRC could play a useful role
(as he put it) in "moving past Andijon," but he doubted the
security services would cooperate. He noted EU attitudes had
shifted and that many - if not most - EU diplomats thought an
investigation into Andijon now simply impossible. He agreed
and thought ICRC could play a role, for example, in training
Uzbek security forces to respond more appropriately in future
security crises. However, he confirmed the existence of deep
mutual suspicion and distrust between the GOU and ICRC. He
appreciated Ambassador's having raised with First Deputy FM
Nematov the issue of ICRC access, but was pessimistic that
the GOU would cooperate. He thought the subject was best not
raised again prior to the December 23 elections.


7. (C) At the end of the day, the best Giovannoni and Muller
could muster was the hope that ICRC could keep its foot in
the door, so that it could be prepared if a humanitarian
situation arose.
NORLAND