Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT1744
2007-10-08 01:47:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

CONTINUED GOU INTERFERENCE AND HARASSMENT WITH

Tags:  PREL EAID KPAO PGOV PHUM PINR UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3537
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #1744/01 2810147
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 080147Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8569
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9522
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3326
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3942
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3805
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7179
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0139
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2061
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0817
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 001744 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (P. SPRATLEN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2032
TAGS: PREL EAID KPAO PGOV PHUM PINR UZ
SUBJECT: CONTINUED GOU INTERFERENCE AND HARASSMENT WITH
AMERICAN OFFICERS' TRAVEL AND CONTACT WORK

REF: A. A) TASHKENT 1700

B. B) TASHKENT 1681

C. C) TASHKENT 1677

Classified By: P/E Section Chief Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b, d).

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 001744

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (P. SPRATLEN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2032
TAGS: PREL EAID KPAO PGOV PHUM PINR UZ
SUBJECT: CONTINUED GOU INTERFERENCE AND HARASSMENT WITH
AMERICAN OFFICERS' TRAVEL AND CONTACT WORK

REF: A. A) TASHKENT 1700

B. B) TASHKENT 1681

C. C) TASHKENT 1677

Classified By: P/E Section Chief Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b, d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C/NF) During the last two weeks of September, travel and
contact work by U.S. officials has been hindered or disrupted
by the GOU on multiple occasions. On September 21 (ref B),
poloff,s visit to a Bukhara school was interrupted by a
National Security Service officer and the director of the
school ordered to the cotton fields. On October 5, Embassy
received a diplomatic note complaining about this visit. On
September 23, USAID personnel from the Almaty Regional
Mission were questioned in Samarkand by local Ministry of
Justice (MOJ) officials and their planned project site visit
cancelled. On September 26, CAO and a visiting American
citizen speaker encountered difficulties during their visit
to Bukhara, and planned visits to a local women,s shelter
and the local Business Women,s Association inexplicably
cancelled. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has
reported continuing difficulty accessing its biological
threat reduction and other project sites. Finally, some
official USG visitors continue to experience difficulties
obtaining visas for travel to Uzbekistan.


2. (S/NF) On Saturday, September 29, First Deputy FM Nematov
summoned Ambassador and told him for the third time since
arriving at post on September 12 that the Embassy,s meetings
with political dissidents and human rights activists were
unacceptable. He also complained that Uzbekistan was
mentioned by the U.S. Ambassador in Geneva, in a public
statement, as a country of concern on human rights. On
September 28, Embassy poloff received a phone call from MFA
Protocol Office advising that unaccredited staff should
refrain from official trips outside Tashkent. On October 3,

MFA U.S. Affairs Section Chief informed us that the GOU was
jittery in the lead up to elections and that the Embassy
should restrain itself, a message subsequently reinforced
through COS' host country liaison. Election jitters are a
large part of the reason for stepped-up GOU harassment, but
the GOU's current harassment continues the past two years'
practice of curtailing Embassy outreach and reporting. While
we believe re-engagement with Uzbekistan is in the U.S.
national interest, it is clearly not going to happen
overnight. End summary.

Shutting down Embassy travel and contact
--------------


3. (C) As reported ref B, poloff,s visit to a Bukhara school
on September 21 was disrupted by a local security official.
Ambassador requested a meeting September 27 with First Deputy
FM Nematov (ref A),to discuss this incident as well as other
topics. Nematov responded that Embassy officers must inform
MFA via diplomatic note in advance of their travel and
strongly suggested that they should not be meeting with human
right activists or other critics of the GOU. He also
protested (for the second time) meetings with human rights
activists conducted by another emboff earlier that month in
the Ferghana Valley.


4. (C) On September 23, USAID personnel (Regional Health and
Education Deputy Director and Tuberculosis Specialist) and a
PSI International Amcit paid a routine project monitoring
visit to the Samarkand Youth Power Center (YPC),a drug
demand reduction and HIV/AIDS awareness project. They were
met by officials from the Ministry of Justice, who told them
that Uzbek law required advance permission for any site
visits. The visitors explained that advance notice was
normally given for formal events, such as training and
seminars but that this was not the practice for routine
visits. The MOJ officials filmed this conversation and asked

TASHKENT 00001744 002 OF 005


for signed statements acknowledging violation of Uzbek
procedures. The USAID officials agreed to sign a statement
saying they did not know whether the MFA had been informed of
the visit. Passports were photocopied and returned. The
next day, when the PSI Amcit returned to the site for
scheduled meetings, she was told that local participants who
had been present the day before had all been called in for
interrogation. She reports that the YPC and another NGO
participating in the project (Samarkand Business Women,s
Association) have since been reluctant to contact PSI,s
Tashkent office.


5. (C) On September 26, the CAO escorted a PAS sponsored
Amcit speaker, to Bukhara for two presentations on
communications skills, leadership, and small businesses
marketing. One event was scheduled at the Women's Crisis
Center (a shelter poloff also visited during ref B visit),
and the other was to be held with the Business Women's
Association. Both events were cancelled at the last minute
by the respective hosts. In both cases, the hosts told CAO
that they had been informed &by the authorities8 that the
events should not or would not occur. While meeting with a
representative of the Ministry of Public Education in Bukhara
(arranged by the MFA in Tashkent),CAO expressed her concern
about the sudden cancellation. The representative made no
substantive response but said she would pass along the
message.


6. (C) On September 29, poloff departed Tashkent with
visiting SCA/CEN desk officer to Samarkand and Bukhara. MFA
Protocol had phoned poloff the evening before, informing him
that official meetings post had requested would not be
granted and that poloff should not travel until he was
accredited. Poloff thanked the protocol officer, explained
that he was accompanying our desk officer on a
familiarization trip, and departed on his planned trip the
next morning. During the trip, poloff and desk officer
attempted to visit a USG-funded portal monitor site (access
requested via diplomatic note but refused over the telephone
by MFA Protocol). Upon reaching the site, they were politely
refused entry by border guards, who said they were acting on
instructions from Tashkent.

MFA protests and red tape
--------------


7. (C) On September 29 (Saturday),Ambassador was summoned by
First Deputy FM Nematov, whose primary complaint was that the
U.S. Ambassador in Geneva had reportedly mentioned Uzbekistan
among a list of human rights violators. Nematov asked how
this could happen, when President Bush had not mentioned
Uzbekistan in his UN speech and no Third Committee resolution
had been tabled by the United States. Nematov then turned
back to the issue of embassy travel ) the third time he had
raised this with Ambassador in as many weeks. He again
protested that embassy meetings with &lowlife8 such as
human rights activists were unacceptable and advised that
requests by Embassy third and second secretaries to meet with
mayors, governors and their deputies were out of order,
because of the difference in rank. He also told Ambassador
that a diplomatic note had been sent to all foreign embassies
in Uzbekistan in 2006 requiring advance notice of travel
outside Tashkent. (Note: Post has been unable to locate such
a note; we have spoken with several other friendly missions
and none of them are aware of such a note, either. Nor can
MFA's Americas Desk find a copy. End note.)


8. (C) On October 2, poloff and visiting desk officer met at
MFA with Acting Chief of the Department for the USA and
American Affairs Tokhir Mamajanov and Chief of the U.S.
Affairs Section Ismat Faizullaev. In a cordial exchange (in
an otherwise uneventful meeting),Mamajanov discussed the
MFA,s concern with embassy travel and requests for meetings
with senior regional and city officials. Poloff explained
that we were trying to be courteous in requesting the
meetings but that we would be happy to meet at whatever level

TASHKENT 00001744 003 OF 005


MFA deemed appropriate. Note: While Nematov has complained
several times to Ambassador that embassy officers meet only
with riffraff on their travels, the MFA turned down every
request made in September, but one, for official meetings
outside of Tashkent. We also note that Embassy officers at
various ranks have in the distant past had repeated contact
with regional and large-city hokims and their deputies. End
note.


9. (C) On October 4, Embassy received a diplomatic note dated
September 28 referencing our note regarding poloff Tim
Buckley's travel on September 29-October 1 to Bukhara and
Samarkand. The note advised that poloff should refrain from
regional travel while his accreditation is under
consideration. (Note: Currently, two new poloffs are
awaiting accreditation, while P/E Chief has received word
that his accreditation will be issued October 8. All three
arrived in the last ten days of August. All Mission
Americans have received accreditation recently within 4-6
weeks of arrival - a significant improvement over the past
two years, when the GOU refused accreditation to a number of
personnel. End note.)


10. (S/NF) One of P/E's two accredited officers met with MFA
U.S. Affairs Section Chief Ismat Faizullaev (strictly
protect) on October 4. Faizullaev advised, unofficially,
that the Embassy should "slow down" until after the December
23 elections and should not push any new initiatives before
then. Faizullaev opined that the GOU was nervous about the
elections and would be easier to work with afterward. In a
somewhat unusual discussion, a National Security Service
officer on October 4 told GRPO that Embassy political
officers were obtaining distorted views of Uzbekistan by
meeting only with people who had axes to grind with the
government. GRPO mentioned that we had tried repeatedly to
obtain meetings with regional and local officials, most often
to no avail, and that we met with anyone we could - that was
our job. NSS officer said that if the Embassy were to
provide the required notice ten days in advance of travel,
this should not be a problem. NSS officer explained that
Uzbek Embassy officers in the United States were subject to
similar restrictions, but COS quickly disabused him of the
notion. NSS officer's overall message "from NSS Chairman
Inoyatov" was that Embassy should abide by MFA rules on
travel and contacts.


11. (C) Embassy on October 5 received a second diplomatic
note, dated October 4, protesting poloff Tim Buckley's
September 20-23 travel to Bukhara. We will report text front
channel, with comments. It is full of inaccuracies, but the
message from MFA is clear: that the GOU (NSS and MOJ, in
particular) is scrutinizing travel by Embassy officers,
particularly by Pol/Econ officers, and their contact work
during the election season.

DTRA project site access difficulties
--------------


12. (C) Just prior to a September Biological Threat
Reduction(BTRP) project team visit, Embassy,s Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) office was informed that requested
access to several laboratories in Tashkent, Samarqand and a
new work site in Qarshi was still pending Uzbek National
Security Service (NSS) approval. After post followed up with
the project,s Implementing Agent, the Ministry of Emergency
Situations, as well as with the Ministries of Health and
Agriculture, access was approved but escort by a Ministry of
Health official was required. Subsequent travel with the
official in company proceeded without incident.
Additionally, despite President Karimov,s stated desire to
improve relations (ref A),the WMD-PPI project contractor
(Washington International Inc.) and its subcontractors still
have not been granted access to GOU Ports of Entry where
WMD-PPI project equipment has been installed. DTRA Chief and
DCM raised access problems with MFA officials Mamajanov and
Faizullaev September 28.

TASHKENT 00001744 004 OF 005



Continued visa difficulties
--------------


13. (C) Some official USG visitors continue to experience
difficulty obtaining visas to come to Uzbekistan. On October
2, the MFA confirmed to us that Barbara Cates (DRL/IRF) would
not be issued a visa for her planned October 13-17 visit.
According to the MFA, Ambassador at Large for Religious
Freedom Hanford conducted a successful visit in June, A/S
Boucher and DAS Feigenbaum had not mentioned religious
freedom in their most recent meetings with senior GOU
officials, and there was therefore no need for Cates to
visit. Note: Religious Freedom was actually raised by FM
Norov during his meetings in New York, and senior USG
officials in fact spoke with him at length on the issue. End
note. (See also septel.)


14. (C) Also in the past two weeks, Moscow-based FAA
representative Brian Staurseth and Kazakhstan-based Treasury
representative Tim Whelan failed to obtain visas in time for
planned travel, despite having submitted diplomatic notes at
the Uzbek Embassy in Moscow (where both were at the time
working) nearly one month in advance. Staurseth subsequently
received his visa, after intervention by the Uzbek Civil
Aviation Administration, and is hoping to reschedule for
November. On October 4, post learned that an agricultural
specialist invited by the GOU and funded through a USAID
contract had not been issued a visa in time for her planned
travel to Uzbekistan. We are attempting to learn whether the
required diplomatic note was properly forwarded to the Uzbek
Embassy in Washington. Regardless, these incidents
underscore the continuing difficulty of any official travel
to Uzbekistan.

Comment: Engagement on whose terms?
--------------


15. (C) The renewed pressure on Embassy travel comes on the
heels of Ambassador,s arrival and predates by one week the
announcement of a presidential election campaign. Probably a
major factor is that the GOU is extra nervous in the run-up
to the December 23 presidential election. We believe
President Karimov is also trying to lay down a marker in his
renewed approaches to the USG ) i.e., he is ready to
cooperate where interests coincide but will resist our
efforts to conduct activities that he perceives to be aimed
at regime change (spearheaded, as he sees it, by State
Department and USAID civil society programs). Additionally,
with the arrival of additional Embassy staff in August and
September, we have been able to conduct more trips outside
Tashkent than has been the case for some time. That has
undoubtedly attracted GOU attention. We note with some
interest, though, that the GOU has not objected to travel
outside Tashkent by other USG agencies. DATT was twice in
the Ferghana Valley in September, and even when DATT met in
August with a human rights activist, the GOU remained silent.


16. (C) Successful re-engagement with the GOU is in the U.S.
national interests. However, this is clearly not going to
happen overnight. The current harassment, complemented by
residual harassment of local EXBS and ESTH staff, is ugly but
expected. Our success will depend largely on identifying the
right players and the right levers within the GOU, and even
then our leverage may prove insufficient. One complication
may be the role of the National Security Service (NSS),whose
influence within the GOU,s power ministries has grown
significantly in the past several years and whose influence
within the Presidential Apparat we believe remains strong.
That we do not know where NSS Director Rustam Inoyatov and
his senior deputies stand on the question of broad-based
re-engagement complicates our task.


17. (C) The Embassy has little choice but to abide by the new
travel restrictions and notification requirements, including
the demand that only accredited officers may perform official

TASHKENT 00001744 005 OF 005


travel. We will proceed very cautiously on a case by case
basis with human rights activists and contacts outside
Tashkent. Reports on the GOU's limitations on our activities
stand a fair chance of being picked up by media outlets such
as RFE/RL and the BBC (Uzbek officials appear indifferent to
the damage their restrictions wreak on Uzbekistan's image
abroad).


18. (C) More generally, we will continue to analyze and
report on developments in Uzbekistan using as broad a base of
contacts as possible, including those civil society activists
still willing to meet with us. While we are concerned about
the intimidation of such contacts, we believe we should
maintain as broad a base of contacts as is possible.
Finally, we will continue to request meetings with
appropriate GOU officials on all our trips.
NORLAND