Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT1701
2007-09-27 13:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:
CZECH AMBASSADOR ON KARIMOV, ANDIJON AND WAY
how-toVZCZCXRO9912 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHNT #1701 2701308 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271308Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8528 INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3302 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9490 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3916 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3781 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1915 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7170 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0806 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2050
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001701
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV EUN OSCE PHUM PREL UZ
SUBJECT: CZECH AMBASSADOR ON KARIMOV, ANDIJON AND WAY
FORWARD
Classified By: P/E Chief Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b, d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001701
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV EUN OSCE PHUM PREL UZ
SUBJECT: CZECH AMBASSADOR ON KARIMOV, ANDIJON AND WAY
FORWARD
Classified By: P/E Chief Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) AMB paid a courtesy call September 24 on Czech
Ambassador Alex Fojtik, who also represents the EU Presidency
in Tashkent. Fojtik, who is nearing the end of his tour
after nearly three and a half years in Uzbekistan, was
extremely cynical about prospects for genuine democratic
reform in the short term. Rather than directly pursue a
human rights agenda, he urged us to focus more generally on
(a) greater use of mass media and press freedom, as a way of
gradually acquainting Uzbekistan with democratic values; (b)
eliminating corruption and money-laundering; and (c)
education of the next generation. Fojtik is convinced that
Karimov,s one-man rule, with its reliance on so-called clans
whom he alternates alliances with, will not disappear even if
Karimov himself exits the stage. That said, Fojtik does not
believe Karimov will actually exit anytime soon. To the
contrary, he suggested Karimov may try to mark his next
presidential term as the &first8 of a new series of
seven-year terms.
2. (C) On Andijon, Fojtik (speaking personally, not for the
EU) subscribes to the view that there was a serious insurgent
threat, that the numbers of demonstrators reported by human
rights activists and outside commentators were vastly
inflated, and that some 10-20 percent of the crowd was armed.
Fojtik claims that the EU investigators who have twice
visited Uzbekistan to look into the events were given full
cooperation by the Uzbek authorities ) but chose to give
Brussels a one-sided report critical of Karimov, which led to
sanctions he deems to have been useless. He was contemptuous
of Uzbek human rights activists, saying half of them were
corrupt, and pointed to the opposition in Belarus as a better
example of a serious opposition. Again speaking privately,
he said the EU does not understand Central Asia, and the
EU,s strategy for the region is flawed because it does not
have a realistic grasp of how to handle Uzbekistan.
3. (C) Fojtik sees the economy as Karimov,s weak link, and
doubts the President is getting the full story from his
advisers ) though he thought the role of some key advisers
was growing and urged us to pay close attention to
deciphering these linkages.
Comment: Rewriting history, writing off Andijon
-------------- --
4. (C) Fojtik stressed that he was not speaking for the EU.
Still, his comments are notable for two reasons. First, they
reflect a desire to move past Andijon, that we have heard
from European diplomats - such as the OSCE delegation of
PermReps that visited earlier this month, the British
Ambassador and the new Italian Ambassador. These observers
increasingly take the view that as a pragmatic matter, the
GOU simply is not going to revisit the Andijon events, and
linking continued sanctions to an international inquiry is
pointless and counterproductive. The British Ambassador told
AMB and DCM on September 27 that this poses an immense
problem of principle for the EU, which must decide in
mid-October whether to renew sanctions. He hinted that some
amelioration of visa sanctions could occur. Second,
Fojtik,s comments reflect a version of Andijon that, while
not necessarily completely wrong (we do not know the exact
facts ourselves) does seem a bit too convenient for the GOU.
We certainly would question the high percentage of protesters
Fojtik believes were armed.
NORLAND
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV EUN OSCE PHUM PREL UZ
SUBJECT: CZECH AMBASSADOR ON KARIMOV, ANDIJON AND WAY
FORWARD
Classified By: P/E Chief Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) AMB paid a courtesy call September 24 on Czech
Ambassador Alex Fojtik, who also represents the EU Presidency
in Tashkent. Fojtik, who is nearing the end of his tour
after nearly three and a half years in Uzbekistan, was
extremely cynical about prospects for genuine democratic
reform in the short term. Rather than directly pursue a
human rights agenda, he urged us to focus more generally on
(a) greater use of mass media and press freedom, as a way of
gradually acquainting Uzbekistan with democratic values; (b)
eliminating corruption and money-laundering; and (c)
education of the next generation. Fojtik is convinced that
Karimov,s one-man rule, with its reliance on so-called clans
whom he alternates alliances with, will not disappear even if
Karimov himself exits the stage. That said, Fojtik does not
believe Karimov will actually exit anytime soon. To the
contrary, he suggested Karimov may try to mark his next
presidential term as the &first8 of a new series of
seven-year terms.
2. (C) On Andijon, Fojtik (speaking personally, not for the
EU) subscribes to the view that there was a serious insurgent
threat, that the numbers of demonstrators reported by human
rights activists and outside commentators were vastly
inflated, and that some 10-20 percent of the crowd was armed.
Fojtik claims that the EU investigators who have twice
visited Uzbekistan to look into the events were given full
cooperation by the Uzbek authorities ) but chose to give
Brussels a one-sided report critical of Karimov, which led to
sanctions he deems to have been useless. He was contemptuous
of Uzbek human rights activists, saying half of them were
corrupt, and pointed to the opposition in Belarus as a better
example of a serious opposition. Again speaking privately,
he said the EU does not understand Central Asia, and the
EU,s strategy for the region is flawed because it does not
have a realistic grasp of how to handle Uzbekistan.
3. (C) Fojtik sees the economy as Karimov,s weak link, and
doubts the President is getting the full story from his
advisers ) though he thought the role of some key advisers
was growing and urged us to pay close attention to
deciphering these linkages.
Comment: Rewriting history, writing off Andijon
-------------- --
4. (C) Fojtik stressed that he was not speaking for the EU.
Still, his comments are notable for two reasons. First, they
reflect a desire to move past Andijon, that we have heard
from European diplomats - such as the OSCE delegation of
PermReps that visited earlier this month, the British
Ambassador and the new Italian Ambassador. These observers
increasingly take the view that as a pragmatic matter, the
GOU simply is not going to revisit the Andijon events, and
linking continued sanctions to an international inquiry is
pointless and counterproductive. The British Ambassador told
AMB and DCM on September 27 that this poses an immense
problem of principle for the EU, which must decide in
mid-October whether to renew sanctions. He hinted that some
amelioration of visa sanctions could occur. Second,
Fojtik,s comments reflect a version of Andijon that, while
not necessarily completely wrong (we do not know the exact
facts ourselves) does seem a bit too convenient for the GOU.
We certainly would question the high percentage of protesters
Fojtik believes were armed.
NORLAND