Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT1607
2007-09-13 10:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY MAP OF THE WORLD

Tags:  PREL PGOV UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2038
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001607 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY MAP OF THE WORLD

REF: A. A) TASHKENT 0064 (NOTAL)

B. B) TASHKENT 1586 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CDA Brad Hanson for reasons 1.4 B and D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001607

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY MAP OF THE WORLD

REF: A. A) TASHKENT 0064 (NOTAL)

B. B) TASHKENT 1586 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CDA Brad Hanson for reasons 1.4 B and D.


1. (C) Summary: In an Independence Day speech to the
Tashkent Diplomatic Corps August 28, FM Norov outlined
Uzbekistan's foreign policy, rank-ordering relations with
five tiers of countries and international organizations. Not
surprisingly, he extolled relations with Russia and
Russian-supported multilateral organizations. The United
States and western European countries fell into the fifth and
final tier, softened with an olive branch of willingness to
dialogue with these countries where views diverge. Many
diplomatic missions have tried to get a copy of the FM's
prepared remarks, but MFA is not releasing it, suggesting the
FM may feel insecure about some of his remarks, or that the
regime did not want to publish it, lest it detract from
President Karimov's own Independence Day speeches. End
Summary.

2, (SBU) FM Vladimir Norov hosted Chiefs of Mission at a gala
reception in a new exhibition hall within sight of
Uzbekistan's parliament, the Oliy Majlis, August 28, as part
of the GOU's week of 16th independence anniversary
celebrations. He read a fifteen minute speech in Russian,
interpreted into English from a prepared translation. First
half of the speech dealt with forgettable Uzbek aphorisms.
Second half of the FM's speech summarized Uzbekistan's
foreign relations with five groups of countries and
international organizations.


3. (SBU) At the top of the list and meriting the longest
mention were Russia and the Collective Security and Treaty
Organizaton (CSTO, which Uzbekistan only rejoined upon strong
Russian urging in 2006). FM Norov extolled Russia as
Uzbekistan's good friend, as an indispensable partner in
tackling issues of counterterrorism and counternarcotics, and
as an extremely important economic partner. He praised the
CSTO as the major vehicle for economic integration of its
member countries.


4. (SBU) In the second tier of foreign partners, the FM
mentioned the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and
China, but made no mention of any of the other members of the
SCO, i.e, Uzbekistan's immediate Central Asian neighbors, or

Russia, in the SCO context. He characterized the importance
of the SCO and China to Uzbekistan as primarily economic.

5, (SBU) In third rank, Norov mentioned Arab, South Asian,
and Asian and Pacific rim countries as especially important
for economic issues. He mentioned only South Korea and Japan
by name, but he also referred to President Karimov's 2007
state visits to Egypt and Singapore and the recent visits to
Tashkent of the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and Kuwait.


6. (SBU) In the fourth tier were a mixed bag of multilateral,
international organizations. The FM acknowledged that the
European Union in 2007 had devised a strategy for Central
Asia. He stressed the GOU wanted intensified relations with
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and unnamed
Asian multilateral organizaitons.


7. (SBU) In the fifth and final tier came Western Europe and
the United States. Norov stated the GOU would engage with
Germany, France, Italy, Spain (Note: where Uzbeksitan
recently opened an embassy),other countries in Europe, and
the United States of America, wherever natural interests
converge. Almost as an afterthought, he added that
Uzbekistan was open to dialogue with these countries when
views diverge.

TASHKENT 00001607 002 OF 002




8. (C) Comment: FM Norov's summary rank-ordering of
Uzbekistan's foreign relations and priorities in 2007
reflects fairly accurately the GOU's foreign affairs efforts
in 2007. Interestingly, the FM made no mention of
Afghanistan or any of the Central Asian countries by name,
nor did he mention the United Kingdom or Israel, which the UK
Charge and the Israeli Ambassador immediately remarked upon
to the Charge at the reception, nor to the UN or any of its
specialized agencies active in Uzbekistan. Comparing the
FM's speech with a document on Uzbekistan's foreign policy
priorities purportedly written by the GOU and approved by
President Karimov in January (REF A),Russia has replaced
Uzbekistan's immediate Central Asian neighbors in first
place. Arab and Islamic multilateral organizations have also
risen considerably, perhaps because the GOU seeks foreign
investment from these countries and burnishment of its
Islamic credentials for its domestic audience. The EU and
Western European states have fallen from a middle rank to the
lowest rank. Unchanged is the United States in the final
tier of countries and international organizations, but the
U.S. has company now with the Western Europeans.


9. (C) The FM's speech may have been too blunt, too frank, as
MFA is refusing to release it. The Embassy, along with many
other diplomatic missions, has asked MFA for a copy, which we
know exists in written form and in written English
translation. Although the FM delivered it in a semi-public
venue, he may feel uncomfortable or insecure with something
in the speech vis-a-vis the presidential apparat or even
President Karimov, thus accounting for MFA's reluctance to
release the text. Nor has there been any reference to this
foreign policy speech in any GOU-controlled press organ. Or
the regime may have decided simply not to publish a major
speech by the FM, lest it divert attention from President
Karimov's two major Independence Day speeches (REF B),which
commented little on foreign relations and focussed on
domestic achievements.
HANSON