NEW SHAKEUP IN SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001427

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR UZ
SUBJECT: NEW SHAKEUP IN SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORS

REF: TASHKENT 1420

Classified By: CDA Brad Hanson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) President Karimov has released his State Advisor for
Law Enforcement, Anvar Nabiev, from his duties and appointed
him instead as a Deputy General Prosecutor. This appears to
be a clear demotion for Nabiev, who gained prominence as the
lead prosecutor in the 2005 Andijon show trial. A
parliamentary contact claimed that Nabiev's transfer came
about as the result of an investigation into his corrupt
activities. Meanwhile, the Open Dialogue Project's Country
Director (protect) speculates that Nabiev's apparent demotion
is part of a plan for him to eventually succeed NSS Chairman
Inoyatev. This speculation seems too convoluted to us.
Nabiev is notoriously corrupt and it is possible that his
activities became too well known for President Karimov to
bear. It is also possible that Karimov is setting the stage
for the December elections by putting people loyal to him in
key positions and that the President believes that Nabiev's
prosecutorial skills will be needed in the coming months. As
is usual, there are plenty of possibilities, but no
certainty, about why the move was made. End summary.

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Presidential Advisor Demoted...Maybe
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2. (C) State Advisor to the President for Law Enforcement
Issues Anvar Nabiev has been relieved of his duties and
reassigned as a Deputy Prosecutor General, according to the
independent website Uzmetronom.com and Embassy contacts.
Nabiev, a career National Security Service (NSS) officer
known to be close to NSS Chairman Inoyatov and President
Karimov's wife, Tatiana, had served in the position since
early 2006. Before moving to the Presidential Apparat,
Nabiev served as the First Deputy Prosecutor General, where
he gained prominence as the lead prosecutor in the 2005
Andijon show trial. As State Advisor, Nabiev was, in theory,
responsible for supervising all of Uzbekistan's law
enforcement and internal security forces. Thus, his return
to the Prosecutor General's Office appears to be a clear
demotion.


3. (C) A parliamentary contact claimed that Nabiev's apparent
downfall was started by an open letter from criminal court
judge Zokir Isaev to President Karimov in late June. Isaev
wrote that he recently had been pressured by Nabiev to find
an individual charged with fraud guilty despite a lack of
evidence and to allow clearly guilty defendants under
Inoyatov and Tatiana Karimova's protection to go free. The
contact said that Karimov ordered an investigation against
Nabiev, which uncovered evidence of corruption. According to
the contact, the former State Advisor has lost influence with
the President and, in typical Karimov style, will likely be
subjected to "dismissal by a thousand demotions."


4. (C) Open Dialogue Project Country Director Mjusa Sever
(protect) offered Poloff an alternative explanation for
Nabiev's transfer back to the General Prosecutor's Office.
Sever said that she was told by unidentified NSS contacts
that Nabiev is being groomed as Inoyatov's eventual
successor. Sever speculated that it would be "unseemly" for
Nabiev, who as State Advisor technically was more senior than
Inoyatov, to be "demoted" into the job of NSS Chairman. She
suggested it was more palatable for Nabiev to return to a
less senior position in the General Prosecutor's Office for a
time before being promoted into Inoyatov's job.

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Comment: Many Possibilities, No Certainty
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5. (C) While we cannot rule out Sever's speculation entirely,
we are inclined to think that Nabiev's transfer most likely
is due to a reason other than a convoluted plan for him to
eventually succeed Inoyatov. Nabiev is notoriously corrupt,
so much so that he earned the nickname "50 cents" because his
standard asking price for favors reportedly is $50,000. He
is much too well connected to be caught up in an ordinary
corruption investigation, and we seriously doubt that Judge
Isaev's letter was the catalyst for his downfall. However,
President Karimov has made rooting out public corruption a
very public priority, and it is possible that Nabiev
reputation for corruption became too well known for even
Karimov to bear in the run-up to December's Presidential

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election.

(C) It also occurs to us that Nabiev's transfer may be more
about ensuring that Karimov loyalists are in the right
positions prior to the election. An MFA contact recently
told us that he thought the transfer of former Justice
Minister Otakhonov to the Presidential Apparat had something
to do with "upcoming events in December" (reftel). The
President typically seeks to cloak all he does in an aura of
legality. It is possible that he believes that Nabiev's
services as a prosecutor, ably demonstrated during the
Andijon show trial, might be needed in the near future. As
is typical, however, there are many possibilities but no
certainty about why Karimov made the move.
HANSON