ESTONIA: AGREEMENT REACHED ON HSPD-6 TEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000728

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/VO/F/P AND CA/P
DHS HQ FOR DANIEL SULLIVAN AND NATHAN SALES
FRANKFURT FOR RSC - RCO RUSSEL BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: ASEC CVIS PREL PTER EUN EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA: AGREEMENT REACHED ON HSPD-6 TEXT


Classified By: Consul Rodger Deuerlein for reason 1.4(b, d)


1. SUMMARY: On October 30, a visiting Washington delegation
representing the CA Bureau and the Terrorism Screening Center
reached agreement with GOE interlocutors on the text of a
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6)
Arrangement to share terrorist-screening information.
Substantive changes from the USG model Arrangement were few,
though notably, the Estonians stated they would exclude data
on non-Estonian EU citizens from any HSPD-6 contributions.
END SUMMARY

2 The U.S. delegation was led by Peter Thompson, Deputy Chief
International Programs Division, Office of Policy
Coordination and Public Affairs, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
Accompanying Thompson were attorney Kathleen Hooke of the CA
Bureau,s Legal Advisor Office; and Rick Kopel, Principal
Deputy Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. From
Post, Consul and Regional Affairs Officer participated. The
Estonians were led by Mr. Erkki Koort, Deputy Secretary
General for Internal Security, Ministry of the Interior; with
detailed discussion of the Arrangement text handled by Meelis
Ratassepp, Deputy Department Director at the Security Police
Board (KAPO). Also participating were MFA lawyer Peter
Pedak, KAPO Superintendent Martin Arpo, and Interior Ministry
IT Project Manager Kaija Kiirch.


3. Deputy Chief Thompson opened the meeting by outlining
HSPD-6, explaining in particular its potential benefit to
Estonia, namely, access to information about some 42,000 U.S.
watch-listed known and suspected terrorists. Thompson noted
also that DHS now considers an in)place HSPD-6 Arrangement
as satisfying the Visa Waiver Program accession requirement
for terrorist information sharing.


4. Deputy Secretary Koort described the basic security
situation of Estonia, namely that of a tiny country on the
edge of Russia. He noted that the Estonians did not have
much of a terrorist watch list. He suggested, however, that
they did have information on elements here such as the
Russian nationalist group &Nashi8 whose activities, he
said, had some characteristics of terrorism, and who had
already harmed Estonian, Latvian and UK interests (Several
days after the meetings Meelis Ratassep told Consul the
initial Estonian list for HSPD-6 would be &several hundred8
names long).


5. Regarding more typical sources of international
terrorists, Koort pointed out that there are approximately
2,000 to 3,000 Muslims in Estonia, most hailing from, or
tracing their roots to, Muslim-populated parts of the former
Soviet Union, such as Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
and Tartarstan in Russia. Immigrants from North Africa and
the Middle East total only about one hundred, nation-wide.
This situation will change, however, Koort suggested, when
&migration pressures go up8 with Estonia,s full
implementation of Schengen-Area open-border practices
beginning in 2008.


6. Once past introductions, the delegations made rapid
progress. The Estonians were obviously eager to reach an
agreement and were well prepared for the discussions. Issues
which did require some attention included the meaning of
&non-binding8 under Estonian law (there,s no such thing);
the classification of the completed and signed Arrangement
(to match the Estonian,s classification it will be USG
Confidential); and most significantly, the Estonians,

SIPDIS
planned exclusion of data on non-Estonian EU (or EEA)
citizens from any information they provide under HSPD-6. The
Estonians proposed this exclusion be added in writing to the
Arrangement. It was left out, though with the understanding
that the Estonians would still exclude EU/EEA citizen data.


7. Following the delegations, agreement on the Arrangement
text, the next step, according to Meelis Ratassepp of KAPO,
will be for the GOE to complete an interagency review and
decide upon their preference regarding who will sign it. He
and Kaija Kiirch both indicated that the GOE prefers not to
sign an Aide Memoire as part of this process.


8. COMMENT: Post welcomes this agreement, which we believe
will enhance overall U.S.-Estonian security cooperation *
because it will make the U.S. watch list available to the
GOE, and because it will systematize terrorist information
exchange between our countries. We hope the GOE can be
convinced eventually to contribute data on non-Estonian
EU/EEA nationals via this channel. END COMMENT.

Phillips

PHILLIPS