Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TALLINN716
2007-11-02 12:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tallinn
Cable title:
SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
how-toVZCZCXRO6505 RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHTL #0716 3061234 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 021234Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0301 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0342 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000716
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM AND EUR/NB- KATHERINE GARRY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IZ EN
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
REF: SECSTATE 150164
Classified By: DCM Karen Decker for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
(C)
C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000716
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM AND EUR/NB- KATHERINE GARRY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IZ EN
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
REF: SECSTATE 150164
Classified By: DCM Karen Decker for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
(C) 1. The Government of Estonia (GOE) is unlikely to
continue to commit combat troops to Iraq after 2008 absent a
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). With
respect to the four proposed scenarios in reftel, Post is not
aware of any examples of similar action taken by the host
country. In addition, all previous decisions made by the GOE
on Iraq deployment have been drafted by the cabinet and
required parliamentary approval. As such, Post would need to
engage Foreign Ministry lawyers before offering a more
authoritative answer to these questions. Post estimates that
the GOE will require a time frame of at least weeks, more
likely months, to take action on any of the reftel proposals.
2. (C) The GOE and Estonian parliament have consistently
linked Estonia,s ongoing participation in Iraq to renewal of
UNSC authorization. The linkage is specifically cited in the
Government,s coalition agreement. The GOE does not believe
it can justify participation in Iraq politically without an
UNSCR. The Parliament is currently preparing to debate
extension of Estonia,s military mission in Iraq through
2008. As in previous years, the final parliamentary vote on
extending Estonia,s Iraq mandate until the end of 2008 is
predicated on passage of a new UNSCR. (Refs B and C)
3. (C) Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip and Foreign
Minister Urmas Paet have continued to affirm publicly that
Estonian troops will remain in Iraq as long as they are
needed. The GOE clearly links its internal security with its
commitment to support difficult operations abroad. GOE
officials have told us they believe the support Estonia
received from the United States in the wake of the Russian
response to the Bronze Soldier riots was a direct result of
Estonia,s willingness to support dangerous combat operations
in Iraq and elsewhere with no national caveats. However, the
Iraq war remains unpopular with the Estonian public.
Although the next election cycle in Estonia is not until
2009, it is likely that politicians will not want their
stance on involvement in Iraq (absent a UNSCR) to become a
central campaign topic.
4. (C) Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo recently made
statements to the press indicating that Estonia could end its
mission in Iraq in 2008 (Ref B). We believe this statement
was driven primarily by staffing concerns and not by
political considerations. The GOE currently has almost 8
percent of its land forces deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan,
Kosovo, Bosnia and Lebanon. Starting in January 2008,
Estonian will provide 55 troops to the EU Nordic Battle
Group. Estonia has also committed to provide 250 soldiers to
support the NATO Response Force (NRF-14) in 2010. Absent
significant structural changes within the Estonian Defense
Forces, it is highly unlikely that the GOE will have enough
soldiers to staff all of these commitments. If forced to
make a decision on which mission from which to withdraw, it
is post's opinion that Iraq would be the first mission the
GOE would draw down. Estonian Defense Forces interlocutors
have argued that, in the strictly tactical sense, pulling a
platoon out of Iraq is would have less of a negative impact
then pulling a company out of combat operations in
Afghanistan. MOD interlocutors have told us, however, that
even if the GOE withdraws combat troops from Iraq, the GOE
may seek to remain engaged in Iraq by committing more staff
officers in support of the NATO training mission.
5. (C) The one caveat to the above is that the Estonian
military places an extremely high value on the experience
they are gaining in Iraq. Unlike the other missions in which
the Estonians participate, the mission in Iraq affords them
the opportunity to work shoulder to shoulder with American
troops. Even though the GOE has identified Afghanistan as
its priority mission, some senior members of the Estonian
military are worried that after Iraq, there will not be any
opportunities to work as closely with U.S. forces. This
sentiment would likely be taken into account if the GOE is
faced with one of the scenarios outlined in reftel.
PHILLIPS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM AND EUR/NB- KATHERINE GARRY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IZ EN
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
REF: SECSTATE 150164
Classified By: DCM Karen Decker for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
(C) 1. The Government of Estonia (GOE) is unlikely to
continue to commit combat troops to Iraq after 2008 absent a
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). With
respect to the four proposed scenarios in reftel, Post is not
aware of any examples of similar action taken by the host
country. In addition, all previous decisions made by the GOE
on Iraq deployment have been drafted by the cabinet and
required parliamentary approval. As such, Post would need to
engage Foreign Ministry lawyers before offering a more
authoritative answer to these questions. Post estimates that
the GOE will require a time frame of at least weeks, more
likely months, to take action on any of the reftel proposals.
2. (C) The GOE and Estonian parliament have consistently
linked Estonia,s ongoing participation in Iraq to renewal of
UNSC authorization. The linkage is specifically cited in the
Government,s coalition agreement. The GOE does not believe
it can justify participation in Iraq politically without an
UNSCR. The Parliament is currently preparing to debate
extension of Estonia,s military mission in Iraq through
2008. As in previous years, the final parliamentary vote on
extending Estonia,s Iraq mandate until the end of 2008 is
predicated on passage of a new UNSCR. (Refs B and C)
3. (C) Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip and Foreign
Minister Urmas Paet have continued to affirm publicly that
Estonian troops will remain in Iraq as long as they are
needed. The GOE clearly links its internal security with its
commitment to support difficult operations abroad. GOE
officials have told us they believe the support Estonia
received from the United States in the wake of the Russian
response to the Bronze Soldier riots was a direct result of
Estonia,s willingness to support dangerous combat operations
in Iraq and elsewhere with no national caveats. However, the
Iraq war remains unpopular with the Estonian public.
Although the next election cycle in Estonia is not until
2009, it is likely that politicians will not want their
stance on involvement in Iraq (absent a UNSCR) to become a
central campaign topic.
4. (C) Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo recently made
statements to the press indicating that Estonia could end its
mission in Iraq in 2008 (Ref B). We believe this statement
was driven primarily by staffing concerns and not by
political considerations. The GOE currently has almost 8
percent of its land forces deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan,
Kosovo, Bosnia and Lebanon. Starting in January 2008,
Estonian will provide 55 troops to the EU Nordic Battle
Group. Estonia has also committed to provide 250 soldiers to
support the NATO Response Force (NRF-14) in 2010. Absent
significant structural changes within the Estonian Defense
Forces, it is highly unlikely that the GOE will have enough
soldiers to staff all of these commitments. If forced to
make a decision on which mission from which to withdraw, it
is post's opinion that Iraq would be the first mission the
GOE would draw down. Estonian Defense Forces interlocutors
have argued that, in the strictly tactical sense, pulling a
platoon out of Iraq is would have less of a negative impact
then pulling a company out of combat operations in
Afghanistan. MOD interlocutors have told us, however, that
even if the GOE withdraws combat troops from Iraq, the GOE
may seek to remain engaged in Iraq by committing more staff
officers in support of the NATO training mission.
5. (C) The one caveat to the above is that the Estonian
military places an extremely high value on the experience
they are gaining in Iraq. Unlike the other missions in which
the Estonians participate, the mission in Iraq affords them
the opportunity to work shoulder to shoulder with American
troops. Even though the GOE has identified Afghanistan as
its priority mission, some senior members of the Estonian
military are worried that after Iraq, there will not be any
opportunities to work as closely with U.S. forces. This
sentiment would likely be taken into account if the GOE is
faced with one of the scenarios outlined in reftel.
PHILLIPS