ESTONIA'S CYBER ATTACKS: LESSONS LEARNED

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TALLINN 000375


SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD NATO RS EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA'S CYBER ATTACKS: LESSONS LEARNED

REF: A) TALLINN 366 B) LEE-GOLDSTEIN EMAIL 05/11/07
B) TALLINN 347

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jeff Goldstein for reasons 1.4 (b) & (
d)


1. (S) Summary. On April 27, Estonia became the
unprecedented victim of the world's first cyber attacks
against a nation state. Although an analysis of events is
ongoing, this event demonstrated the vulnerability of both
government and private sector internet infrastructure.
Working together with Estonian cyber security experts, the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) is preparing a report analyzing
the crisis, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the
Estonian response, and recommend changes to Estonia's cyber
defenses and security. The GOE and Estonian cyber defense
experts all agree that while they successfully responded to
these attacks, they will need to improve Estonia's defenses
to prevent what they described as the nightmare scenario: a
shutdown of Estonia's internet infrastructure as a result
of more serious attacks at some point in the future. End
Summary.


The Nature of the Attacks
--------------


2. (SBU) Starting on April 27, Estonia became the world's
first victim of cyber attacks against a nation state's
political and economic infrastructure. For over a month,
government, banking, media, and other Estonian websites,
servers, and routers came under a barrage of ever-shifting
and coordinated cyber attacks that tried to shut down
specific strategic targets (Ref A). Unlike traditional
cyber attacks which try to "hack" into a system, the
attacks against Estonian sites used the basic architecture
of the internet to disrupt their operation. At Post's
request XXXXXXXXXXXX visited Tallinn to assess the
situationApril 16-18. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that it is
not technically feasible to prevent attacks of this nature,
no matter how sophisticated a country's cyber-defenses are.
However, due to Estonia's rapid response, the attacks did
not seriously threaten Estonia's cyber network and infrastructure.


3. (C) The cyber attacks exposed the strengths and
weaknesses of Estonia's cyber defense system. XXXXXXXXXXXX
told us that the Ministry of Defense is preparing a report to
submit to the GOE by the end of June. Based on our discussions
with GOE, CERT, and private Estonian cyber security experts,
it is clear that the Estonians are working furiously to analyze
where their cyber defenses and protocols worked, failed, and/or
need improvement. Although these cyber attacks were
unprecedented in nature, our Estonian interlocutors all
agreed that the outcome could have been much worse. They
also note that the MOD's report notwithstanding, the impact
on cyber defense policy for both the public and private
sectors will be discussed and felt for a very long time.
The following is a summary of GOE "lessons learned" from
these attacks.

Lessons Learned: What Worked
--------------


4. (SBU) STRENGTH IN BEING SMALL. With a population of 1.3
million people, Estonia's small size was its strongest
asset in reacting rapidly to the cyber attacks. Estonia's
CERT, the GOE's Cyber Defense Unit, and private IT Security
Managers all knew each other for years before the crisis
and were, thus, able to work closely together. Information
sharing and decision making were rapid and flexible.
Everything was handled - from the working level to the
leadership - in an almost seamless fashion throughout the
attacks. "We're talking about a group of ten key people in
the government and private sector who've known each other
for years, trust one another, and all have direct access to

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each other" XXXXXXXXXXXX, commented to us.
"Therefore, there was no inter-agency bureaucracy or
red tape to cut through."


5. (C) E-VOTING. In March 2007, Estonia held the world's
first national election where e-voting was used. From the
outset of the crisis, the e-voting security team was
immediately seconded to CERT and became a vital asset in
responding to the attacks. Although Estonia's CERT has
only two full time staff, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was able
to call upon a roster of 200 programmers and security
experts from the e-voting security team to ensure a 24/7 response
mechanism against incoming cyber attacks. As the e-voting
team was already at work on next generation security
measures (in anticipation for Estonia's 2009 local
elections),there was no need for them to "catch up"
according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. These experts were invaluable
in addressing the wide variety of attacks (e.g., bots, spam,
DDoS, Trojan Horses, etc.).


6. (C) INFORMATION GATHERING. Our MOD interlocutors credit
Estonian law enforcement and cyber security experts'
(public and private) close monitoring of Russian-language
internet forums as key to CERT's ability to rapidly respond
to the attacks. On April 28, less than 24 hours after the
first cyber attacks, Russian-language internet forums
(e.g., http://2ch.ru and http://forum.xaker.ru) were
exhorting people to attack specific GOE websites and
offering links to software tools. Patient monitoring of
these internet-forums led to intelligence on targets,
dates, and exact times for coordinated attacks.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us privately that without this
information, the cyber attacks against GOE sites could hav
inflicted far more damage than they did.


7. (C) SECURE ONLINE BANKING. Hansabank and SEB
successfully weathered the cyber attacks against them
because of defensive measures and procedures already in
place. According to CERT, the banks' procedures are in
many ways superior to the GOE's. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that due to the longstanding problem of cyber crime
in the region - often with banks as prime targets - the banks
were well prepared for the attacks. For example,
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us, organized gangs have
employed bot attacks in the past. As a result, Hansabank
had the necessary cyber security measures in place to defend
against this type of attack.
In the end, Hansabank-s sites successfully repelled every
attack and were able to provide their Estonian customers
access to their online accounts. (Note. Almost 90% of all
financial transactions (e.g., bill payments) are done
online. Hansabank and SEB alone handle over three-fourths
of that traffic. End Note.)

Lessons Learned: What Failed
--------------


8. (S) FORMAL PROCEDURES. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us
he believes that Estonia-s formal and institutional procedures
for responding to cyber attacks failed completely.
Throughout the crisis, ad hoc meetings and decision making
based on established informal contacts and relationships
were used to disseminate information - instead of
formalized institutional channels with clear communication
chains. Additionally, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the GOE
did not keep an official record or log of decisions and actions
taken during the crisis. Consequently, it is uncertain how
thorough the GOE's post-crisis assessment or efforts to
improve Estonia's formal cyber defense procedures will be.
XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that neither CERT nor the GOE
had the personnel to "put out the fire and also act as a secretary
to take down the minutes." (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX claims
of staff shortages are somewhat questionable given that he
told us that neither he nor any of his staff had to work
over-time during the cyber attacks. End Note.)


9. (S) LACK OF CENTRALIZED GOE POLICY. MOD interlocutors
admitted that there was no consistent GOE policy across

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ministries on cyber security, broadband capacity, and
information sharing. For example, some ministries use
static websites while others use more vulnerable dynamic
websites. Ministries also use different internet providers
which have different security procedures in place. This
unnecessary complexity made initial information sharing
between ministries more cumbersome and confusing,
especially for ministries with fewer resources for IT risk
management (e.g., the Ministry of Population, Ministry of
Education, Ministry of Culture, etc.). XXXXXXXXXXXX,
told us that creating a consistent policy for the various ministries
will be a key recommendation in the MOD's report.


10. (S) MONITORING. The cyber attacks also exposed
Estonia's total lack of a comprehensive monitoring system.
Estonia does not have a national IP (internet protocol)
network of sensors to precisely monitor traffic for cyber
attacks. As a result, the GOE and CERT did not have any
hard data on the number of computers and/or servers that
were used in the attacks. XXXXXXXXXXXX, Estonia's main telecommunication and IT provider, told us that his company
relies on U.S.-based Arbor Networks to monitor its network.
Our MOD and private sector interlocutors all agreed on how
important it was for Estonia to have its own monitoring network,
but they could not confirm on the likelihood that the GOE
would invest in this infrastructure upgrade.


11. (S) WHACK-A-MOLE. In the initial stages of the cyber
attacks, the Estonian method of response was to block each
and every attack through its corresponding ISP address as
it happened. XXXXXXXXXXXX dubbed this the "whack-a-
mole" response and opined that prior to April 27 this
approach might have been sufficient. However, the sheer
volume of the recent cyber attacks quickly overwhelmed the
Estonian defenses. CERT, Elion, and the GOE's Cyber Defense
Unit were eventually forced to apply broader and more
stringent filtering mechanisms on all internet traffic to
prevent the attacks from entering Estonia. XXXXXXXXXXXX
observed that unlike the United States and many European
Union members who routinely filter foreign internet
traffic, prior to the recent attacks, the Estonian network
filtered very little foreign traffic.


12. (S) INDUSTRY VULNERABILITY. While Hansabank and SEB
successfully weathered the cyber attacks, many other
smaller private Estonian sites that were attacked were
overwhelmed. With no industry standard or best practice in
place in Estonia, many smaller businesses and/or private
organizations (e.g., schools, NGOs, etc.) did not have the
technical expertise or financial means to ramp up their
broadband capacity. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that CERT's
log of complaints and reported cyber attacks since April 27 is
over 10 Tb (Tera bits). (Note. One TB is equal to one
million Mega bits. To put this in perspective, the entire
content of the online U.S. Library of Congress uses less
than 10 TB. End Note.) As the majority of Estonian (SME)
small and medium size enterprises employ online services as
part of their daily business, the GOE is now aware that an
industry standard with readily available cyber defensive
software, tools, training, and public awareness-raising
must become a part of Estonia's cyber defenses.

Lessons Learned: Nightmare Scenarios
--------------


13. (S) TARGETING KEY ROUTERS AND SITES. Our Estonian
interlocutors all agreed that even during the attacks'
peak, Estonia's cyber network was not in any serious danger
of being shut down. In some ways, Estonia was lucky. Rein
Ottis, MOD Cyber Defense Chief, noted that had the attacks
specifically targeted Estonia's key servers and routers,
they could have shut down Estonia's entire cyber
infrastructure. On May 4, two routers belonging to the GOE
and Elion were attacked with an unknown data packet that
crashed the routers almost immediately. XXXXXXXXXXXX
told us that if enough key routers and/or servers were shut down,
it would be the internet "equivalent of blowing up key roads and

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intersections in the city Tallinn to bring all traffic to a halt."


14. (S) UNANNOUNCED AND BETTER TIMED ATTACKS. Most of the
cyber attacks were discussed in advance on Russian-language
internet forums, giving the Estonians the opportunity to
ramp up broadband capacity in advance. XXXXXXXXXXXX
told us that the perpetrators gave away the element of surprise
and often timed their attacks in the evening (when Estonia's
internet usage is at its lowest). Had they not made these
mistakes, XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the attacks could
have shut down their GOE targets for up to a week.
XXXXXXXXXXXX was thankful that they had advance
information about th May 15 attacks against Hansabank and
SEB. However, many of the attacks which employed bots
were unannounced and far more challenging, and in some
cases did crash their targets. If all attacks had been like this,
XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX could not
confidently predict whether Estonia's defenses would
have held.


15. (S) 2ND TIER STRATEGIC ATTACKS. Estonia's banks were
generally well prepared for cyber attacks. However, the
economic impact could have been worse if the attacks had
focused on 2nd tier strategic targets which possessed less
formidable defenses (Ref B). XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated
the fallout would have been far more significant if Estonia's
logistic-transport companies had been attacked. "As over
three-fourths of all grocery stores, petrol stations, and
shops rely on the internet for their orders and
deliveries," asked XXXXXXXXXXXX, "can you imagine the
damage this would bring? Cyber crime seems abstract to most
people. There's nothing abstract about empty shelves in
stores." XXXXXXXXXXXX also listed a whole range of
other strategic services and businesses that would have been far
easier to crash than the banks. The MOD felt that
XXXXXXXXXXXX descriptions were far fetched, bordering
on "science fiction." However, when we mentioned
XXXXXXXXXXXX's comments to XXXXXXXXXXXX
he felt that recent events have changed the parameters
of the debate on possible threat scenarios. He said,
"Last year, I would've considered a cyber war against my
country as science fiction, too - but not anymore."

GOLDSTEIN