Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI78
2007-01-11 09:49:00
SECRET
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

CROSS-STRAIT TRADE IN RESTRICTED CHEMICALS

Tags:  CN CW ETTC KNNP PARM TW 
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VZCZCXRO5311
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #0078/01 0110949
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O 110949Z JAN 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3700
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6199
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0160
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4428
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0188
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 6762
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0312
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8374
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 9888
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 7431
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0412
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 0707
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000078 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/TC, ISN/CB AND ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2027
TAGS: CN CW ETTC KNNP PARM TW
SUBJECT: CROSS-STRAIT TRADE IN RESTRICTED CHEMICALS

REF: A. TAIPEI 72

B. MIKULAK-NEELY EMAIL OF 1/9/2006

C. 06 TAIPEI 66

D. 05 STATE 3573

Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert Wang, 1.4 B/C

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000078

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/TC, ISN/CB AND ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2027
TAGS: CN CW ETTC KNNP PARM TW
SUBJECT: CROSS-STRAIT TRADE IN RESTRICTED CHEMICALS

REF: A. TAIPEI 72

B. MIKULAK-NEELY EMAIL OF 1/9/2006

C. 06 TAIPEI 66

D. 05 STATE 3573

Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert Wang, 1.4 B/C


1. (S) Summary: During the January 8 meeting reported ref A,
the Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) Export Control Task
Force Head Wally Su (Shi-hwa) also provided AIT Econ with
details and documents related to Taiwan's ongoing trade with
the PRC in Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)-restricted
schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals. End summary.

Taiwan Imports Both Schedule 3 and 2 Chemicals from China
-------------- --------------


2. (S) BOFT's Su provided AIT with copies of end-user
certificates issued by BOFT and with Taiwan Customs documents
showing CWC-restricted chemicals imported from China. The
Taiwan Customs documents showed five different types of
schedule 2 and four different types of schedule 3 chemicals
had been imported from China into Taiwan within the past
couple years. Su explained that BOFT is the only agency that
issues end-user certificates.

State-owned Companies Export Restricted Chemicals to Taiwan
-------------- ---


3. (S) The end-user certificate Su provided to AIT was for a
Taiwan company to import 10,000 kg of phosphorous oxychloride
from Sinochem International Corporation in Shanghai, China.
BOFT had issued the certificate on November 28, 2006. Su
said that BOFT investigates the importing company before
issuing an end-user certificate by searching its own database
for information on the company. BOFT then contacts the
Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) in the Ministry of
Economic Affairs to verify that the import is an appropriate
chemical for the company to import. Su added that sometimes
the IDB will contact one of the chemical trade associations
(Taiwan Chemical Industry Association, TCIA, or Taiwan
Specialty Chemical Association, TSCA) for a written
confirmation that the requested import is appropriate. Su
said Taiwan Customs will not/not allow CWC-restricted
chemicals into Taiwan without an end-user certificate issued

by BOFT, but left inspection of the export license up to the
exporting country's officials. In addition to China, Taiwan
imports schedule 3 chemicals from the United States,
Malaysia, India, and Japan.


4. (S) Note: The written confirmation sometimes provided by
the chemical trade associations may be the document that PRC
CWC officials are referring to in ref B. End note.

Taiwan Also Exports Restricted Chemicals to China
--------------


5. (S) BOFT's Wally Su said that BOFT also grants export
licenses for schedule 3 chemicals to be exported to China,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and other destinations.
According to BOFT, Taiwan does not produce any schedule 2
chemicals. He cited the penalties imposed on BOC Lien Hwa
for re-exporting restricted chemicals to China as an example
of Taiwan's effective control of these exports (reported ref
C).

U.S. Interests Involved
--------------


6. (S) Comment: China's efforts to block Taiwan's
international trade in CWC-restricted chemicals has resulted
in China becoming Taiwan's major trading partner in these
restricted chemicals, at least according to official Taiwan
trade statistics. This partly explains why the TCIA and its
PRC counterpart, the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry

TAIPEI 00000078 002 OF 002


Association (CPCIA) have held annual meetings for the past
several years, with the venue alternating between Taiwan and
mainland China (ref B),even though the CPCIA continues to
block TCIA participation in the International Council of
Chemical Associations.


7. (S) Although PRC officials are willing to allow exports
(referred to as "internal transfers" by the PRC) of schedule
3 and schedule 2 chemicals to Taiwan, they do not require an
end-user certificate from BOFT, and do not have an ability to
inspect, regulate, or check the bona fides of the importing
company. This inability to inspect or monitor highlights
ongoing concerns about Taiwan's possible biological/chemical
weapons programs, plans to develop satellite space launch
capability, and expressed interest in building retaliatory
measures to deter a PRC attack. The PRC also apparently
lacks any mechanism to verify the exports actually enter
Taiwan and are not being transshipped to terrorist entities.


8. (S) The current situation also leaves some of Taiwan's
most advanced industries (specialty glass, fire-resistant
fabrics, semiconductors, LCD monitors, etc.) increasingly
dependent on China for supplies of chemicals critical in the
manufacturing process. This brings increased PRC control
over Taiwan's high-tech economy that can be used to speed the
migration of these industries to China or to disrupt the
supply of these high-tech produsts to global markets.


9. (S) Given the current absence of any outside monitoring
of chemicals in Taiwan, AIT believes it would be in U.S.
interests to urge Taiwan to accept U.S. inspection and
monitoring of its production, use, and trade in
CWC-restricted chemicals, just as it now accepts
post-shipment, end-user license, blue lantern and other
inspections and verifications. In return, the U.S. could
offer to make available to Taiwan industry the restricted
chemicals needed in legitimate manufacturing. Following our
current practice with non-U.S. origin nuclear reactor
components, we could consider non-U.S. origin chemicals to be
covered under the same inspection and monitoring
arrangements.


10. (S) AIT believes that one possible extra-CWC framework
for such an inspection and monitoring arrangement would be
the Export Control Gameplan developed by ISN/MTR in August
2005 (ref D). This program, in which Australia, Germany,
Japan, and the UK also participate, was designed to provide
training and other resources to help Taiwan strengthen its
control over imports, exports, transits and transshipments of
sensitive commodities. End comment.
YOUNG