Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI376
2007-02-14 10:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

KMT LEADERS LIEN CHAN, WANG JIN-PYNG COMMENT ON

Tags:  PGOV TW 
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6376
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8471
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8497
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RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5666
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000376 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT LEADERS LIEN CHAN, WANG JIN-PYNG COMMENT ON
TAIWAN POLITICS

REF: A. TAIPEI 0356


B. TAIPEI 0216

Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000376

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT LEADERS LIEN CHAN, WANG JIN-PYNG COMMENT ON
TAIWAN POLITICS

REF: A. TAIPEI 0356


B. TAIPEI 0216

Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the Director on February
12, before KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's indictment, KMT
Honorary Chairman Lien Chan suggested that someone other than
Ma might get the KMT 2008 presidential nomination if Ma were
indicted. Lien predicted that if the KMT regains power in
2008, cross-Strait relations will stabilize and improve,
because the PRC leadership, focused on economic development,
trusts and is willing to work with the KMT. In a meeting on
February 14 just after Ma's indictment was announced, LY
Speaker Wang told the Director that Ma is "finished," and
that someone like himself would be the logical KMT
standard-bearer in next year's presidential election. Lien
and Wang both said the KMT is ready to pass the annual
budget, including the defense budget portion, but only if the
DPP compromises on the selection of Central Election
Commission (CEC) members. The Director made it clear to both
KMT leaders that failure to pass the arms procurement budget
threatens the long-term health of U.S.-Taiwan relations. End
Summary.

LIEN WAITING TO PICK HIS MAN
--------------


2. (C) The Director met with KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan
on January 12, the day before KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's
indictment for corruption was announced. The Director
inquired how an indictment might affect Ma's presidential
aspirations. Lien told the Director that if Ma were
indicted, he would have to resign as Chairman (which Ma did
the next day). Lien then explained that party
anti-corruption rules passed by the Central Standing
Committee at Ma's insistence would bar him from participating
in party activities, and Ma's party membership would be
automatically suspended. Unless those rules were changed
(see reftel A) Ma would be precluded from receiving the KMT
presidential nomination, and would have to run as an
independent. (Note: The KMT changed its rules on February 13
to allow Ma to run for president after Ma had announced his
candidacy. End Note.)


3. (C) Lien told the Director that he had urged Ma not to run
as an independent under any circumstances, for fear of

causing a repeat of the Pan-Blue vote split which handed the
DPP victory in the 2000 presidential race. KMT voters are
too "independent-minded," Lien complained, in that they tend
to vote their personal values instead of following party
instructions like their DPP counterparts. This inability to
focus voter support makes it harder for the KMT to win
elections, Lien asserted, and the effect is amplified when
two Pan-Blue candidates run against each other. (Comment:
Lien has not thrown his support to any one candidate,
preferring to wait and see how Ma and LY Speaker Wang
Jin-pyng both fare in the coming weeks, though Wang has
hinted that Lien is sympathetic to his candidacy. End
Comment.)

BLAME THE DPP FOR BUDGET DEADLOCK
--------------


4. (C) On the annual budget question, Lien claimed the KMT
had been ready to pass the annual budget (including the
defense budget portion) during the proposed January 29-31
special legislative session (see reftel B),if the DPP had
been willing to reconfigure the Central Election Commission
(CEC) in proportion to party representation in the LY. The
current CEC is heavily stacked in the DPP's favor, Lien
asserted, and the CEC commissioners have already approved a
future referendum to force the KMT to disgorge its "illicit
assets." The Pan-Blue-dominated LY has no power to check the
executive-branch CEC, Lien continued. Unless the CEC is
reconfigured along more equitable lines, the KMT fears it
will be unable to stop the DPP from including an "illicit
assets" or constitutional reform referendum on the next
presidential ballot.


TAIPEI 00000376 002 OF 003


KMT-PFP ALLIANCE DOESN'T MEAN UNIFICATION
--------------


5. (C) The Director then inquired whether the KMT would
benefit from its recently formed alliance with the People
First Party (PFP). Lien pointed out that the parties had
agreed in principle to jointly nominate candidates for the
next legislative election, but had not yet agreed to the
nomination mechanism. The alliance was simply intended to
limit the total number of Pan-Blue candidates, Lien
continued, and not as a first step toward reunifying the two
parties. PFP Chairman Soong knows his political power is
limited and will know better than to push for too many seats,
Lien predicted. Final decision-making authority will rest
with the KMT. That said, Lien acknowledged that there are
several districts where the KMT has no viable candidate or
where the PFP nominee is clearly stronger. In those cases
the PFP will represent the Pan-Blue.


6. (C) There are significant advantages to keeping the two
parties separate, Lien explained, at least until after the
next LY election. The PFP still has 21 legislators, and they
will continue to receive their allotted government subsidies
until their terms end. Also, the PFP could still attract a
significant percentage of party votes under the new
two-ballot system, creating the possibility that the party
could hang on to at least some at-large LY seats. If the PFP
does not attract a significant percentage of party votes
during the December 2007 LY elections, however, it may
collapse. Lien confided that he and Soong had already agreed
that if this happens, the parties should be consolidated.
Lien said he was unsure whether Soong had completely
withdrawn from politics, despite his mid-December 2006
announcement to that effect. Soong is probably still
actively involved in PFP affairs, Lien suggested, since Soong
is essentially the heart of the party.

SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEMS CAN WAIT
--------------


7. (C) How can the KMT calm public fears, the Director asked,
that if it regains power in 2008 the party will strike a deal
with the PRC inimical to Taiwan's interests? The KMT is in
no rush to resolve PRC-Taiwan sovereignty questions, Lien
insisted. If the KMT assumes power in 2008, its first
priority will be to "stabilize" the cross-Strait
relationship. Although dialogue would be based on the "1992
Consensus (on one China)," Beijing understands that the
majority in Taiwan wish to preserve the status quo. The
Director then asked whether the KMT was concerned that
Beijing might try to redefine the "92 Consensus" to Taiwan's
disadvantage. Lien responded that Beijing has been unwilling
to publicly commit to a fixed interpretation of the "92
Consensus" because it fears President Chen's DPP government
will manipulate the terms for political purposes. In
contrast, Beijing trusts the KMT, and the two sides have
already privately worked out a definition acceptable to both
sides, which will not be changed.


8. (C) The Director then asked Lien whether the KMT is
concerned that China's increasing military capability could
make Beijing more willing to force early unification. In
response, Lien recalled the five-point accord he reached with
PRC President Hu Jintao two years ago. This stressed the
importance of Beijing's then-newfound willingness to accept
the idea of a long-term peace accord coupled with
confidence-building measures. China will seek to minimize
cross-Strait tensions, not amplify them, he continued,
because the PRC leadership consensus is that China needs
domestic peace and cross-Strait stability to fully exploit
what it sees as an "unprecedented opportunity to grow and
develop." At the same time, Lien agreed that Taiwan must
maintain adequate defenses. Lien said that he was planning a
fourth trip to Beijing later this year, but the subject
matter had not yet been decided.

WITHOUT LEE, TSU IS RUDDERLESS
--------------


9. (C) Lien said the meaning of Lee Teng-hui's recent remarks

TAIPEI 00000376 003 OF 003


on Taiwan independence had been unclear, possibly because Lee
is uncertain of the direction in which he himself wants to
go. Lien cryptically added that the "KMT (leadership) had
been working with Lee," and suggested that Lee may no longer
be the political tactician he once was.

WANG MAKING A MOVE?
--------------


10. (C) In a separate meeting with the Director on February
14, shortly after Ma's indictment had been announced, but
before Ma announced his presidential candidacy, KMT LY
Speaker Wang Jin-pyng claimed Ma's presidential chances were
finished. As a result, the KMT now faced two significant
problems. First, the party must elect a new chairman within
the next three months, and the sooner the better. Lien Chan
would like to return as chairman, Wang added, but is not
interested in running for president a third time. Second,
the party must select its presidential candidate. Wang
rejected Vice Chairman Wu Den-yih as too corrupt, and Vice
Chairman Chiang Pin-kung as too powerless to become the KMT's
presidential candidate. Instead, the party should nominate
someone like Wang himself, a native Taiwanese who is popular
in the South and capable of overcoming the DPP's existing
advantage there. Wang for the first time in his meetings
with the Director openly criticized Ma as a "poor and
ineffective leader," who should have been, but was unable to,
lead the party to victory in the Kaohsiung mayoral race.
According to Wang, the KMT's grassroots organizations are
still stronger than the DPP's, which should give the KMT a
good chance of winning the presidency if the party chooses
the right candidate.

PASS THE BUDGET
--------------


11. (C) Wang echoed Lien's comments on the annual budget
impasse -- aside from blocking the annual budget, the KMT has
no way to force the DPP to compromise on the CEC. The
Director urged Wang to use his good offices to secure passage
of the current annual budget package, including the defense
budget portion. If Taiwan does not demonstrate the political
will to put its self-defense before domestic political
wrangling, the Director cautioned, it will have a negative
long-term impact on U.S.-Taiwan relations that is likely to
extend into the next president's tenure.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Though both knowledgeable KMT insiders, both Wang and
Lien harbor deep resentment against Ma Ying-jeou for his
rapid rise to the party's leadership. Whether a party
desperate to regain power next year will decide to back Wang
will depend in large part on the success of Ma's efforts to
regroup following his indictment. For now, we are betting
the KMT is going to stick with Ma, long seen as the clear
front-runner to replace Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president
next May. But it is still early.
YOUNG