Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI2588
2007-12-11 09:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

BURGHARDT VISIT: KMT PRESID. CANDIDATE MA

Tags:  PGOV TW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8553
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #2588/01 3450923
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110923Z DEC 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7547
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7505
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9085
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9304
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2234
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0697
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8789
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1513
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6207
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002588 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: BURGHARDT VISIT: KMT PRESID. CANDIDATE MA
YING-JEOU ON CAMPAIGN, REFERENDUM, CROSS-STRAIT, DEFENSE
BUDGET


Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002588

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: BURGHARDT VISIT: KMT PRESID. CANDIDATE MA
YING-JEOU ON CAMPAIGN, REFERENDUM, CROSS-STRAIT, DEFENSE
BUDGET


Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: On December 9, AIT Chairman Burghardt
delivered a personal message from Secretary Rice to KMT
presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou. The U.S. respects and
supports Taiwan's continued democratic development, which has
been made possible by U.S. efforts to foster cross-Strait
stability. Burghardt urged Ma and the KMT to exercise good
judgment in the days and weeks before and after the
presidential election, to preserve post-election chances for
constructive cross-Strait dialogue. Ma expressed
appreciation and agreement with the Secretary's message,
asserting that it was "in complete conformity" with KMT
cross-Strait objectives. Ma told Burghardt that U.S.
opposition to the DPP referendum had alerted voters to the
danger it poses to cross-Strait stability. Recent KMT polls,
Ma continued, suggest both the DPP and KMT UN referenda will
both fail. Ma and defense policy advisor Su Chi told
Burghardt the KMT endorsed the purchase of six PAC-III
batteries, which would be included in the 2008 defense budget
expected to pass next week. End Summary.



2. (C) AIT Chairman Burghardt met with KMT presidential
candidate Ma Ying-jeou late on the evening of December 9,

2007. Ma was accompanied by legislator and defense advisor
Su Chi, and former ambassador John Feng. AIT Director Young
and EAP/TC Acting Director Doug Spelman were also present. A
relaxed, casually-dressed Ma told Burghardt he had been busy
that day campaigning for legislators in and around Taipei
County. Ma went on to say his recent "long-stay" program had
been a success, helping Ma to improve his relationships with,
and understanding of, rural voters in Taiwan's pro-DPP south.
Ma vowed to continue the long-stay program until the eve of
the presidential election in March 2008. Ma's vice
presidential running mate Vincent Siew had told Burghardt in
an earlier meeting that Ma had frequently endured "rustic"
conditions during his long-stay program, but maintained that
Ma's methodical approach had helped establish the KMT's
"Taiwanese" bonafides, reflected in Ma's sustained lead over
Hsieh.

SECRETARY'S MESSAGE


SIPDIS
--------------


3. (C) Burghardt then delivered a personal message to Ma from
Secretary Rice (see text of Secretary's message at paragraph

SIPDIS
13). Burghardt told Ma there is a sense of optimism in
Washington that, regardless of who wins the next Taiwan
presidential election, the next president could have a real
chance to improve cross-Strait relations. The danger is that
before the election, and in the days and weeks after the
inauguration, irresponsible statements or actions could
jeopardize this rare opportunity. For these reasons, the
U.S. is urging Taiwan to ensure the presidential election is
transparent and fair, so that the results will merit the
respect of Taiwan's voters and the international community.
If the DPP UN referendum does pass, Burghardt continued, some
political leaders may declare it a "vote for independence."
Such extravagant claims would do less damage to cross-Strait
stability if only one person (i.e., President Chen) makes
them. The U.S. is also looking to Ma and the KMT to pass the
defense budget without further delay. Burghardt assured Ma
that the U.S. continues to exert considerable pressure on
Beijing to keep the DPP UN referendum in perspective.
Washington has conveyed to Beijing time and time again that
passage of the referendum will not affect Taiwan's legal
status or its international position. When confronted with
the idea of going to war over a legal nullity, Burghardt told
Ma, the Chinese have tended to back away from saber-rattling,
and to favor more rational alternatives. Ma expressed
appreciation for and agreement with the Secretary's message,
asserting that it was "in complete conformity" with KMT
policy to foster peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations.

REFERENDUM LOSING STEAM?
--------------


4. (C) The KMT introduced its own UN referendum to dilute

TAIPEI 00002588 002 OF 004


public support for the DPP UN referendum, Ma explained, and
to prove to voters the KMT understands "Taiwan
consciousness." The KMT is actively campaigning for its
referendum, Ma continued, primarily to lure votes away from
the DPP version. According to Ma, KMT polls conducted in
late November (by the reputable National Chengchi University
polling center) indicated public support for the DPP UN
referendum had dropped to 20 percent; only 16 percent of
those polled support the KMT measure, and fully 31 percent of
those polled said they plan to abstain from voting on either.
While Ma said "strong, clear" opposition from the U.S. had
increased public awareness of the cross-Strait dangers posed
by the DPP UN referendum, he also urged the U.S. to voice its
objections in even stronger terms. The public had also
wearied of President Chen trumpeting the referendum while
ignoring bread-and-butter issues like the economy and social
welfare, he added. Based on the declining poll numbers, Ma
predicted that neither referendum would pass.


5. (C) The Director explained that the U.S. must maintain a
careful balance expressing its opposition to the DPP UN
referendum while still showing appropriate respect to
Taiwan's democratic process. President Chen also seems to
score points by standing up to pressure from the U.S. and
China. China is perceived as an enemy in Taiwan, Ma
responded, while the U.S. is undoubtedly Taiwan's best ally.
Conceding that Chen may win some public support by resisting
China, Ma insisted that alienating the U.S. gains him nothing.

"UN FOR TAIWAN" UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
--------------


6. (C) If the DPP UN referendum does pass, Ma continued,
Taiwan's next president might be legally obligated to apply
to the UN as "Taiwan," unless doing so was deemed
unconstitutional. UN rules require a state to apply for
membership under its "legal" name, argued Ma. Without a
change to the constitution, Taiwan's legal name remains the
"Republic of China." Ma stated that if elected president, he
would put this question to the Council of Grand Justices to
decide.

MA'S CROSS-STRAIT PLAN
--------------


7. (C) Turning to cross-Strait relations, Ma said that if
elected, he will seek to improve economic ties first, using
the "Macau model" or whatever mechanism is most appropriate
to secure direct cross-Strait flights, increased tourism, and
ultimately a comprehensive economic agreement to foster
cross-Strait trade. Ma envisioned gradually moving from
economic issues to questions of cross-Strait security and
Taiwan's international space.


8. (C) The "one China, different interpretations" rubric of
the so-called "1992 Consensus" will be "key" to any kind of
dialogue with China, Ma insisted. What about PRC concern
that the "different interpretations" element of the '92
Consensus could lead to independence, Burghardt rejoined.
The KMT, Ma replied, will reassure the PRC that its
interpretation of the '92 Consensus is steadfastly opposed to
independence. The PRC should cherish the opportunity to
strike a deal with a friendly KMT administration, he
predicted. On the other hand, if Beijing decides to play
games, Ma surmised, it must know Taiwan might elect another
President Chen the next time around. Peace agreement
discussions are "a long way off," Ma stated, and would likely
be conditioned on the removal of the PRC missiles aimed at
Taiwan (although removal of the missiles could itself be a
subject of negotiation, Ma noted).


9. (C) Ma predicted that weekend charter flights could be up
and running within a few months after his inauguration, since
most details had already been negotiated. Weekend charter
flights could be expanded to daily charter flights (via
direct, shortest-distance routes) within a few months, Ma
continued, after mechanisms are established to allay Taiwan
Defense Ministry air security concerns. Ma said he would
ultimately like to see daily direct flights pursuant to an

TAIPEI 00002588 003 OF 004


air transport agreement (ATA).


10. (C) Ma stressed the differences between his and DPP
opponent Frank Hsieh's (Chang-ting) policies on cross-Strait
flights. While Ma favors unrestricted cross-Strait air
transportation, Hsieh has refused to commit himself to
anything more than charter flights, which Ma argued will be
inadequate to handle the demand. Ma urged Burghardt to press
Hsieh for greater clarity, seeming to suggest that Hsieh's
hesitation on cross-Strait flights was indicative of greater
ambivalence toward improving cross-Strait economic ties.
Regardless of his intentions, Ma predicted, the Deep-Greens
within the DPP will limit Hsieh's ability to realize
significant cross-Strait improvements.

DEFENSE BUDGET: PAC-IIIS ON THE WAY
--------------


11. (C) Burghardt then asked about the status of the 2008
defense budget. KMT legislator and Ma defense policy advisor
Su Chi told Burghardt that the Legislative Yuan (LY) would in
the coming week approve the purchase of six PAC-III batteries
(in addition to the PAC-II upgrades already approved) and
would also approve "frozen" funding for the purchase of F-16
C/D aircraft, pending Washington's approval of the sale. Su
said the KMT caucus was acting pursuant to Ma's "direct
order" to approve the purchase of the PAC-IIIs. (Note: Su
Chi told AIT earlier in the week that Ma had rejected his
argument that purchase of the PAC-IIIs was still barred by
the failed 2004 missile defense referendum. End note.) Ma
asked Burghardt whether he thought Beijing would be less
critical of Taiwan's arms purchases if a KMT president were
in office. Beijing's objections will be no less strenuous,
replied Burghardt, because the Chinese cannot back away from
the position that no one, including the U.S., should sell
weapons to Taiwan. Beijing will probably voice its
objections to signal to the next U.S. president that arms
sales to Taiwan can damage U.S.-PRC relations, added the
Director.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND
--------------


12. (C) Burghardt asked about the conspiracy rumors swirling
around Taiwan regarding what the DPP might do to clinch a
presidential victory, including possible assassination plots,
staged public disturbances as pretext for declaration of a
state of emergency, and even staged military incidents to
provoke a Chinese reaction. (Note: VP running mate Siew told
Burghardt separately that both he and Ma are concerned for
their personal safety. End note.) Ma replied that anything
is possible from President Chen, who, as the president of a
democratic country, recently raised the specter of martial
law. Burghardt commented that PRC observers had been asking
what the "two bullets" would be this time (referring to the
March 19, 2004 election-eve shooting which injured President
Chen and Vice President Annette Lu). Ma quipped
sardonically, "If they're accurate enough, they only need one
bullet." In any event, he continued, the KMT is making its
contingency plans.

ORAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY RICE
TO KMT CANDIDATE MA YING-JEOU
--------------


13. (C) Continued stability in the Taiwan Strait serves the
interests of the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan. The
U.S. has the highest regard for Taiwan's democracy, and
believes that our approach to cross-Strait issues and to
Taiwan's security has allowed your democracy to flourish. We
have made clear that we deeply regret the DPP's decision to
pursue a referendum on UN membership under the name Taiwan,
which we believe unnecessarily threatens stability in the
Strait and thus your security. This referendum should not
take place. We believe that you agree with us on this point.

The U.S. has the highest regard for Taiwan's democracy. It
is therefore very important that the upcoming elections be a
model of democracy in every way, throughout the electoral

TAIPEI 00002588 004 OF 004


season and in the period before the inauguration, regardless
of electoral outcomes. We also urge you to consider
carefully the effect that pronouncements in the course of New
Year's messages and your possible inaugural speech will have
on the atmosphere of trust that has long characterized
Taiwan's relationship with the U.S.

We ask that you continue to show leadership on defense
matters, so that the 2008 military budget passes without
undue delay and so that Taiwan devotes adequate resources to
self-defense programs. We will continue to oppose PRC
threats and to urge Beijing to engage in direct dialogue with
Taiwan's elected leadership. We will also work to protect
Taiwan's international space.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Ma seemed relaxed and confident, despite his hectic
schedule. We take some of Ma's comments, including
concerning the DPP referendum and Frank Hsieh's cross-Strait
policy, to be in large part motivated by partisan sentiments.
It is very much in the KMT's interest to portray to this
island's voters the impression that Washington secretly wants
Ma to win, despite our oft-restated neutrality toward Taiwan
electoral processes. End comment.


15. (C) Chairman Burghardt did not have the opportunity to
review this message.
YOUNG