KMT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MA YING-JEOU ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002547

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2032
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: KMT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MA YING-JEOU ON
ELECTION, MARTIAL LAW, CROSS-STRAIT, AND PERSONAL SECURITY

REF: A. TAIPEI 2503


B. TAIPEI 2537

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s):
1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou met
with the Director on November 29 to discuss upcoming
legislative and presidential elections and election disputes.
While Ma said he was not worried about President Chen's
loose talk of martial law earlier this week, he is concerned
that Chen might do something else less dramatic, such as
declaring a state of emergency. Ma indicated that he sees
his "one-China, different interpretations" and Beijing's
"1992 consensus" formulations as viable grounds for
cross-Strait dialogue in the event he wins the presidency.
He acknowledged some concern for his own personal security
during the upcoming campaigns. The Director urged Ma and the
KMT not to allow campaign differences, such as the voting
format dispute, to grow into an irreconcilable standoff
between ruling and opposition parties, which could produce
confrontation and damage Taiwan's democratic image. The
Director noted that he had passed a similar message to the
President earlier this week (Note: Later the same day,
November 29, he called to relay the same message to DPP
presidential candidate Frank Hsieh). End Summary.


2. (C) Ma Ying-jeou met with the Director on Nov 29, in an
ongoing series of regular meetings with both presidential
candidates in the run up to the March 22 presidential
election. Ma arrived at the meeting directly from speaking
at a 300-plus joint lunch of the American, European, British
and Australian-New Zealand Chambers of Commerce. He was
accompanied by KMT legislator Su Chi, his senior foreign
policy advisor.

One-Step vs. Two-Step Voting Dispute
--------------


3. (C) Ma told the Director that resolution of the ongoing
voting format controversy (Ref A) would depend on what the
Central Election Commission (CEC) does. He noted the CEC has
scheduled a meeting with city and county election commissions
next week to discuss the controversy. Ma did not appear
especially concerned over the dispute, stressing there are
six weeks remaining before the Legislative Yuan January 12
(LY) elections, sufficient time for a resolution. (Comment:
Separately the same day, November 29, there were a number of
indications that both sides are actively considering ways to
bridge the gap between the two formats.)


4. (C) While the controversy itself is "not a big deal," Ma
continued, this blatant effort by the ruling DPP and the CEC
to increase voter turn-out in the LY and presidential
elections is of concern. Why, he asked rhetorically, did the
CEC alter the two-step referendum process used in the two
March 2004 referenda. Because, answering his own question,
the DPP is trying to use referenda to boost the total vote.
By contrast, he claimed, a bit disingenuously, the KMT is
only motivated by its concern about order in the polling
stations.


5. (C) The Director surmised that the DPP might be
frustrated that an insufficient number -- less than the
required 50 percent of registered voters -- had participated
in the two defensive referenda in March 2004, thus nullifying
both. Apparently the DPP hopes a one-step voting process
will help ensure the requisite 50 percent of registered
voters participate in the referenda vote, thus validating the
referendum (Note: A majority of those voters participating
must then vote in favor of the referendum for it to actually
pass). He reiterated that the U.S. remains deeply concerned
over the DPP UN referenda, but stressed that we are also
urging Beijing to exercise restraint and not overreact.


6. (C) Ma told the Director he believes local election
commissions have the authority to run their own elections

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under Article 8 of the Election and Recall Law. While the
CEC claims local election commissions are under its
jurisdiction and it has the power to appoint and remove local
election officials, Ma continued, the CEC cannot possibly run
elections without local government cooperation. So, "there
must be some kind of compromise." (Note: Article 8
establishes a three-tier system of election commissions:
central, provincial/ municipal, and county, each of which is
"under the jurisdiction" of the immediately higher level and
whose commissioners are recommended by that next higher
level. The provincial level has since been abolished in
Taiwan, however, blurring the lines of authority.)


7. (C) Ultimately, Ma claimed, only the LY is
constitutionally empowered to resolve disputes between
central and local governments. Why, Ma reiterated, did the
CEC alter the two-step voting process used in the 2004
referenda? Ma said that it is difficult to impossible at
this stage to predict the chances for passage of the four
referenda at stake. Ma stressed that Taiwan voters are
increasingly frustrated by the voting controversy and
uninterested in the referendum vote. While the overwhelming
majority of people support the right of Taiwan to join the
UN, he said, this simply is not a high priority with voters.


8. (C) The Director expressed the hope that the two sides
could cooperate and resolve the dispute. Fairness and
orderliness of its democracy has been Taiwan's strong suit.
By contrast, some other new democracies are encountering
setbacks: Pakistan is experiencing serious problems and
Georgia and Thailand recently suffered major setbacks.
Taiwan, by contrast, has heretofore done it right. Both
sides, the Director urged, need to remember this and resolve
to work together to solve problems. None of us, he
concluded, want to see conflict. The Director urged Ma, as
he urged President Chen on November 26, to guard against
allowing campaign differences, such as the current voting
procedure dispute, evolve into an irreconcilable standoff
between the ruling and opposition parties that could result
in confrontation and damage Taiwan's democratic image.
(Note: Later the same day, the Director passed a similar
version of this message to DPP presidential candidate Frank
Hsieh via a telephone conversation with his campaign manager,
Y.Y. Lee.)

The Martial Law Imbroglio
--------------


9. (C) Ma charged that President Chen and the DPP are "just
using emotionalism," stirring up voters with ethnic identity
issues and Chen's November 25 martial law statement. He
pointed out that Minister of National Defense Li Tien-yu had
followed up Chen's martial law statement by explaining the
Sixth Army would take charge of Taipei in the event martial
law was declared. Ma, however, acknowledged the Director's
point that President Chen had backpedaled the following day,
explaining the KMT is "not really worried about martial law,"
because the president "clearly does not have the authority to
do so." What worries him and the KMT, Ma continued, is "the
fact that Chen raised" this sensitive issue in the first
place. Noting that Hsieh had kept a low profile following
Chen's statement and sought to avoid the issue, Ma said he
had publicly challenged Hsieh to declare his stance.


10. (C) Ma told the Director he is more concerned about the
possibility Chen might declare a state of emergency. While
an emergency decree should be limited to natural disasters,
Ma said, Chen might try to employ it for election purposes.
The president, Ma continued, has the power to issue an
emergency decree that expires in ten days, unless endorsed by
the LY. "But ten days is long enough." Ma noted that Chen
similarly used another exclusive presidential power to
influence the March 2004 presidential election -- he invoked
the presidential prerogative to call a "defensive
referendum." (Note: Article 43 of the Constitution empowers
the President to issue an emergency decree in the event of
natural disaster, an epidemic, or economic crisis, but the LY

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must confirm the decree within one month.)


11. (C) The Director responded that the U.S. is quite
concerned that President Chen's actions might provoke Beijing
to do something. While Beijing, for its part, regularly
urges the U.S. to take a stronger action against President
Chen, the Director assured Ma that there is no "co-management
of Taiwan" between the U.S. and the PRC. The U.S., he
explained, has very different interests in East Asia (and
relative to Taiwan) than China. In particular, we see the
use of force as totally unacceptable.

Private Conversation with Ma
--------------


12. (C) In a separate private conversation, the Director
asked Ma about his personal security, noting the concern
earlier voiced by both Su Chi and KMT Vice Chairman P.K.
Chiang to AIT (Ref B). Ma responded that this is certainly
an issue of concern to him and his colleagues, but admitted
they do not have any intelligence of a specific threat to Ma.
He said simply that in his mind Chen Shui-bian is capable of
anything. Ma added that his (and Hsieh's) official National
Security Bureau-provided security detail will not start until
the end of December, presenting a window of vulnerability as
Ma campaigns around the islands.


13. (C) The Director queried Ma on the possibilities for
cross-Strait dialogue in the event he wins the presidential
election. In particular, the Director noted, how does Ma's
stated willingness to negotiate with the PRC on the basis of
"one-China, different interpretations" jibe with the PRC
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) willingness to negotiate on the
basis of the "1992 consensus?" Ma responded that the two
formulations are actually quite close and that he thinks they
provide a reasonably good basis for negotiations to proceed
quickly. The Director noted that the U.S. strongly supports
the two sides of the Strait talking with each other as soon
as possible.


14. (C) The Director also asked Ma whether he is concerned
the PRC might raise the bar on negotiations if Ma assumes the
presidency. Ma responded negatively, insisting that the PRC
is so ready for dialogue that it will move very quickly to
seize the opportunity of a Ma presidency, in part just to
show up Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. (Note: Separately,
former Mainland Affairs Chairman Su Chi told POL Chief that
Ma is deliberately mixing the two terms "1992 consensus" and
"one China, different interpretations" in his public
statements in an effort to blur the difference and provide a
practical bridge for dialogue. He and Ma believe that
Beijing may be so eager for dialogue and to get the Taiwan
independence issue off the table that it will accept this
obfuscation.)

Keeping Faith With Democracy
--------------


15. (C) Finally, the Director stressed to Ma in their
private conversation the importance of Taiwan political
leaders managing and keeping passions at bay in order to
protect Taiwan's new democracy. Ma agreed, insisting the KMT
will do nothing to undercut peaceful and fair elections. It
is important, the Director concluded, to continue moving
Taiwan's democratization forward in order to build a strong
precedence for good governance for the next president.


Burghardt Visit
--------------


16. (C) The Director told Ma that AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt
will visit Taipei on December 9-10, and would like to meet
with both Ma and Hsieh, in addition to President Chen. Ma
replied that he would be happy to meet with Chairman
Burghardt.


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Comment
--------------


17. (C) On the possibility of a DPP physical threat to Ma,
we suspect this is more a reflection of KMT anxiety that
their opponents will find some dramatic way (viz. the
election eve assassination attempt of 2004, which KMT
hardliners remain convinced, without evidence, was fixed) to
edge them out in next March's election than a tangible fear.
Nonetheless, we will continue to keep our own ear to the
ground, and to highlight the importance of moderation to both
camps.
YOUNG