Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI2502
2007-11-19 10:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN ON COMPETING UN

Tags:  PGOV TW 
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002502 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2022
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN ON COMPETING UN
REFERENDA AND UPCOMING ELECTIONS

Classified By: Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002502

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2022
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN ON COMPETING UN
REFERENDA AND UPCOMING ELECTIONS

Classified By: Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: KMT Vice Chairman John Kuan told the Deputy
Director November 14 that China now understands better why
the KMT had to launch its own referendum to remain
competitive in next year's presidential race. Kuan, echoing
others in the KMT, predicted low voter turnout and high
thresholds for passage would doom both UN referenda to
failure. Kuan insisted the large number of signatures in
support of the DPP UN referendum is not a reliable indicator
of public support and argued that U.S. opposition has reduced
public support for the DPP UN referendum. He stated that
KMT-governed cities and counties will disregard the CEC
decision requiring a "one-stage" voting process for upcoming
legislative election and related referenda, regardless of the
consequences. Finally, Kuan predicted the KMT might win at
or near a 69-44 seat majority in the next legislature, but
noted the DPP would likely try to use the legislative defeat
to energize Green voters for the presidential election. End
Summary.

COMMENT
--------------


2. (C) John Kuan, the KMT's top election strategist, was
primarily responsible for the party's controversial decision
to promote its own UN referendum as a way to counter the
expected effects of the DPP referendum on the presidential
election. While Kuan and some other KMT contacts maintain
that the DPP's UN referendum is unlikely to pass, a DPP
pollster has told AIT that introduction of the KMT referendum
increases the likelihood that the DPP referendum will pass
because a significant number of Blue voters is likely to
cross party lines and vote for both referenda. While Kuan
argues that U.S. opposition has reduced support for the DPP
UN referendum, some pro-Green contacts argue that U.S. and,
especially, PRC opposition stirs up the Green base, increases
support for the UN referendum and other DPP causes, and
allows President Chen to portray himself as bravely standing
up to outside pressure.

CHINA GETS KMT REFERENDUM
--------------


3. (C) John Kuan (Kuan Chung) told the Deputy Director that
he had recently returned from Jinan University in Guangzhou,
China, where he had delivered a speech on the KMT UN

referendum. Kuan said he told his PRC audience that the KMT
had styled its UN referendum to recognize the Taiwan people's
desire for international respect and living space, but
defused the "name rectification" issue to avoid damaging
Taiwan's relations with the U.S. and China. Kuan told the
Deputy Director that he met with several academics and local
party members, and is hopeful that his message was relayed to
Beijing.


4. (C) Kuan stated his belief that Beijing now understood
better why the KMT had to launch its own UN referendum to
dilute the appeal of the DPP version and to remain
competitive in the presidential race. Immediately after the
KMT announced its referendum, he continued, Beijing harshly
criticized the decision. Since then, PRC leaders have
largely kept quiet, suggesting to Kuan they understand and
accept the KMT's rationale for the referendum. On the home
front, Kuan added, the KMT is doing its best to attract
referendum supporters, but many Blue voters care little about
the referendum, especially in the south where the focus is on
the economy and its poor performance.

REFERENDA WON'T PASS
--------------


5. (C) Kuan said he could not predict how Beijing might react
if one or both of the UN referenda were to pass, but argued
that chances of that happening were extremely low. He
explained that voter turnout for Taiwan presidential
elections has never exceeded 80 percent of eligible voters,
and cited a recent study by DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui that
suggested voter frustration would keep turnout for next
year's presidential election at or below 75 percent. A

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referendum is only valid if at least 50 percent of all
eligible voters participate, and will pass if a simple
majority of them vote in favor.


6. (C) Taiwan has approximately 18 million eligible voters,
Kuan continued. If turnout is limited to 75 percent, only
13.5 million voters will participate in the presidential
election and referendum ballot. With the electorate so
polarized, Kuan argued, Blue supporters will likely only cast
ballots in favor of the KMT referendum, and Green voters will
only support the DPP version. According to Kuan, the
electorate is also roughly split along Blue-Green lines
(approx. 6.75 million voters each). By Kuan's reasoning,
even if all 6.75 million DPP voters endorsed the DPP
referendum, some 2.25 million Blue voters would have to cross
party lines for it to surpass the 9 million voter threshold,
which Kuan argued is a virtual impossibility.

REFERENDA SUPPORT WEAKENING?
--------------


7. (C) Kuan told the Deputy Director that U.S. opposition to
the DPP UN referendum had noticeably dampened public support
for the measure. According to Kuan, 75 percent of the public
supported the DPP UN referendum before U.S. officials began
to criticize it. Following the public statements from Deputy
Secretary Negroponte, NSC Senior Director Wilder, and DAS

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Christensen, public support is down to 57 percent.
Additionally, 39 percent of those polled said U.S. opposition
to the measure would affect their referendum voting decisions
(39 percent would also ignore U.S. opposition). Kuan
acknowledged the DPP has obtained more than twice the
signatures required to get its UN measure on the ballot, but
insisted such numbers were not indicative of actual support
for it, since members of the public "will often sign whatever
is put in front of them."

KMT ON VOTING: MIGHT MAKES RIGHT
--------------


8. (C) Kuan told the Deputy Director the KMT expects the
DPP-controlled Central Election Commission (CEC) to order a
"one-stage" balloting process, versus the "two-stage" process
urged by the KMT. If that happens, the KMT would have "no
choice" but to disregard the CEC's decision, Kuan said.
(Note: On Nov. 16 the CEC decided to use the one-stage voting
process for the Jan. 12 legislative elections and non-UN
referenda. End note.) Kuan argued that the local election
commissions, and not the CEC, are vested with the authority
to make balloting and procedural decisions. Regardless of
what the law says, he added, KMT-controlled cities and
counties could probably disregard the CEC decision with
impunity. KMT mayors and magistrates govern 18 of Taiwan's
25 city and county electoral districts, accounting for 70
percent of Taiwan's population, Kuan explained. If the local
election commissions in those 18 jurisdictions use a
"two-stage" process in violation of the CEC decision, he
asked, what can the central government do? It cannot order
the arrest and removal from office of so many local leaders
without provoking a public outcry, Kuan insisted, and any
lesser punishment (i.e. censure) would simply be shrugged
off.


9. (C) Kuan added that existing voter registration
requirements made it illegal to combine the presidential and
referendum votes on one ballot. Voters must be registered at
least four months in advance of a presidential election to
participate, but at least six months in advance of any
referendum vote. If the two ballots are combined, Kuan
argued, it would be possible for those registered only four
months in advance to vote on the referendum.

KMT LEGISLATIVE CHANCES GOOD
--------------


10. (C) The KMT is confident of winning as many as 22 of the
39 at-large legislative seats and 44 of the 74 district seats
(including 5 of 6 aboriginal seats) up for grabs in next
January's election, Kuan said. (Note: Others have told AIT
the KMT can count on winning up to 18 at-large seats and up

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to 50 district seats. End note.) If all goes well, Kuan
continued, the KMT will have a solid 69-44 majority in the
next LY. The downside, Kuan lamented, is that the DPP may
try to use its legislative defeat to persuade voters to
"balance" the government by voting for a DPP president. But
the conventional wisdom in Taiwan is that legislators who
share party affiliation with the president do better at
delivering government projects to their districts. If local
self-interest trumps the desire for split government, Kuan
concluded, a KMT LY victory will help Ma get elected.

FISSURES IN THE KMT
--------------


11. (C) Kuan admitted that the KMT list of at-large
legislative candidates had exposed divisions within the
party, which he characterized as "tempests in a teapot." The
new, smaller LY districts have forced legislative candidates
to become more "local," Kuan explained. To craft a
competitive at-large list, Kuan continued, KMT Chairman Wu
Poh-hsiung had to favor candidates with strong local ties, at
the expense of more reform-minded, but less locally-connected
candidates, who publicly criticized the party. Kuan insisted
that the KMT is more unified than it has ever been at this
stage of the legislative and presidential elections, but
conceded that it must do more to avoid public contradictions
between its central leadership, legislative candidates, and
Ma.

HSIEH'S PROBLEM: PRESIDENT CHEN
--------------


12. (C) DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh is at a
significant disadvantage, Kuan asserted, because he cannot
distinguish his own policies from President Chen's without
being contradicted by him. According to Kuan, Deep-Greens
view Hsieh with suspicion because his "moderate" statements
on cross-Strait relations have caused them to question his
commitment to Taiwan independence.


13. (C) Kuan told the Deputy Director that there is little
chance that a viable "third force" could emerge in Taiwan
politics during this electoral cycle, but it might be
possible during the next presidential election (in 2012).
Former president and TSU spiritual leader Lee Teng-hui is
trying to bring this change about, Kuan continued, and Ma and
the KMT have taken special pains to show proper respect to
Lee and to avoid offending him. Ma does not expect Lee to
endorse him for president, Kuan noted, but Lee's continued
criticism of Chen and the DPP would almost certainly help Ma
at the polls.
YOUNG