Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI2492
2007-11-15 09:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

KMT VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VINCENT SIEW ON

Tags:  PGOV TW 
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RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6166
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RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002492 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VINCENT SIEW ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, CROSS-STRAIT


TAIPEI 00002492 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002492

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VINCENT SIEW ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, CROSS-STRAIT


TAIPEI 00002492 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: KMT vice presidential candidate Vincent Siew
told the Director November 9 the KMT presidential campaign
strategy is to try to neutralize the "Taiwan identity" issue
by convincing voters that the KMT has embraced it to the same
extent as the DPP. The hope is that voters will then decide
based on who can best manage the economy and cross-Strait
relations, issues where the Ma-Siew ticket holds a
significant advantage. An economic downturn would help the
KMT, Siew argued, by forcing voters to put self-preservation
before ideology. Siew predicted that Beijing will keep quiet
until after Taiwan's presidential election, regardless of
President Chen's provocations. But if DPP candidate Frank
Hsieh wins the presidency, cross-Strait tensions could
increase, especially if Chen still dominated the DPP. Siew
claimed it would be much easier for China and Taiwan to
resume meaningful cooperation if Ma were to win. He also
promised the KMT would do a "much better" job of managing
relations with the U.S. End Summary.


2. (C) The Director met with KMT vice presidential candidate
and former economic minister Vincent Siew (Hsiao Wen-chang)
at Siew's Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation (CSCMF) on
November 9. Siew was accompanied by CSCMF Chief Executive
Officer Douglas Hung. A relaxed, talkative Siew told the
Director his recent visit to the U.S. had been a great
success, enabling him to meet with many senior officials,
including dozens of members of Congress. Siew said he was
also well-received by the overseas Taiwanese communities in
the U.S. and Canada.

MOVING TO THE MIDDLE
--------------


3. (C) The Director observed that both presidential campaigns
had begun to move toward the center, with DPP presidential
candidate Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting) echoing KMT proposals to
loosen restrictions on cross-Strait trade and investment, and
KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou showing a greater
sensitivity to "Taiwan identity." Siew responded that the
KMT strategy is to convince voters "there is no meaningful
difference" between the DPP and KMT on the question of Taiwan

identity, and that Ma and the KMT identify themselves with
Taiwan and will put Taiwan's interests first. With the
identity issue out of the way, Siew asserted, the KMT will
handily defeat the DPP on the other issues of importance to
voters, including governing competence, the economy,
cross-Strait relations, and anti-corruption. Siew claimed
the KMT had a lock on at least 23 of the 73 district seats up
for grabs in the January 12 legislative election, leaving
fifty or so seats still in play. The probability of
"independent" Blue candidates running against KMT district
candidates is low, Siew continued, but the risk is always
there.

ECONOMY'S IMPACT ON RACE
--------------


4. (C) Noting the global economy appears to be facing a
potential downturn, the Director asked Siew if this might
help the KMT win the presidential election but also make it
more difficult to govern once Ma is in office. What
strategies might the KMT use to sustain Taiwan's domestic
economy? The KMT has traditionally used large-scale public
works projects to stimulate domestic demand, Siew replied.
With the exception of the high-speed railway system, he
alleged, the DPP government has largely neglected Taiwan's
domestic infrastructure. The KMT would also relax limits on
capital returning to Taiwan from the PRC, thereby making
investment in Taiwan itself more attractive and affordable.


5. (C) Siew, a native of Chiayi, argued that Ma's long-stay
program had dramatically improved his popularity in southern
Taiwan, especially in the DPP strongholds of Kaohsiung and
Pingtung. Ma's popularity also improved in Chiayi and
Tainan, though initial gains have receded in recent polls.
Siew told the Director he and Ma visit Kaohsiung and Pingtung
on a regular basis, helping them to hold on to polling gains
there, but have not been able to return to Chiayi and Tainan

TAIPEI 00002492 002.2 OF 003


as often.

VICTORY DEPENDS ON PARTY UNITY
--------------


6. (C) Noting the tensions within both major parties, the
Director asked Siew if party unity would be the deciding
factor in the presidential race. The party that fractures
the least will probably win, Siew replied. The KMT is trying
very hard to preserve party unity, he continued. While there
is dissension within the party over the "'92 Consensus" and
the National Unification Guidelines, those are "long-term"
issues and should be set aside until the legislative and
presidential elections have passed. The most unified party,
Siew reiterated, will probably win the presidential election.


7. (C) The Director noted that the KMT list of at-large
legislative candidates announced on November 7 omitted
several candidates that Ma had promised to include, giving
the impression that the KMT legislative and presidential
campaigns were not well-coordinated. (Note: To make the KMT
at-large list more appealing to voters in the south, Ma had
promised publicly to include former Chi Mei Hospital Director
Steve Chan (Chi-hsien) and two relatives of "228" victims on
the list. Chan, who is best-known for treating President
Chen following the March 19, 2004 shooting, orchestrated Ma's
recent "long-stays" in southern Taiwan. End note.) In
compiling the at-large list, Siew explained, the demand to
resolve conflicts among competing local factions trumped
"image" concerns. According to Siew, despite his upset over
the at-large list, Chan will stay with the Ma campaign.

CROSS-STRAIT POSSIBILITIES
--------------


8. (C) The Director expressed concern that as the
presidential race draws to a close, President Chen might try
to boost DPP chances by provoking a harsh response from
China. Will the PRC be able to hold its criticism of Chen
until after the election? Siew replied that PRC President Hu
Jintao's recent remarks suggest that China is more "relaxed"
about Taiwan's presidential election, and will refrain from
saying or doing anything that might affect the election
result. However, if Hsieh wins and it appears to Beijing
that Chen still wields significant power, then cross-Strait
relations could enter into a "highly uncertain and risky"
period. If Hsieh is elected president, asked the Director,
will President Chen be a problem for him, or will Chen's
power gradually fade like that of former KMT president Lee
Teng-hui? Chen will almost certainly be a problem, Siew
argued, because unlike Lee, who left the KMT to found the
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU),Chen is still active in the
DPP and could remain party chairman even after he steps down
as president. (Note: DPP interlocutors consistently tell us
if Hsieh wins he is mandated by the party regulations to take
over as DPP Chairman. End note.)


9. (C) On the other hand, Siew continued, if Ma returns the
KMT to power, the mutual trust between the KMT and CCP will
make meaningful cross-Strait cooperation much easier to
achieve. The Director cautioned that Beijing might not
accept talks based on the "one China, different
interpretations" framework espoused by Ma. Beijing is less
concerned about semantics and more concerned that the KMT win
the presidency, Siew replied. If Ma wins, he continued, both
sides will be more than willing to work out the details as
they go along. Will it be difficult to reduce confrontation
between the ruling and opposition parties, asked the
Director. When he served in President Lee's cabinet, Siew
replied, he had urged Lee to include DPP officials in the
cabinet, and to compromise with the DPP where possible. If
Ma becomes president, Siew continued, he will urge Ma to use
similar strategies to foster cross-party cooperation.

LOOKING FORWARD
--------------


10. (C) In closing, the Director remarked that the USG
respected Taiwan's political process, and looks forward to
working with whomever the Taiwan people elect as their

TAIPEI 00002492 003.2 OF 003


president. After the election, the U.S. and Taiwan must work
together to repair damage done to the relationship by the
recent furor over the UN referendum, by focusing on the
strength of the U.S.-Taiwan economic and security
relationships. Siew acknowledged the U.S. as Taiwan's most
important ally, and promised that a KMT government would be
"much, much better" at managing Taiwan's important
relationships. Siew said he and Ma understood that Taiwan is
a small country with a small economy, and that nothing can be
gained by damaging relationships with the U.S. and China.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Siew continues to tell us he had no expectation of
returning to politics until Ma asked him to be his running
mate. An accomplished administrator and economic specialist,
Siew has often struck us as "too nice to succeed in
politics." He earned the reputation of an uninspiring
campaigner as Lien Chan's vice presidential partner in the
2000 election. That said, if elected he would be a much more
formidable VP than the current incumbent.
YOUNG