FM HUANG ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CAMPAIGN RHETORIC,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002459

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2032
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: FM HUANG ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CAMPAIGN RHETORIC,
AND NORTH KOREA

REF: TAIPEI 2445

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s):
1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Foreign Minister James Huang expressed general
confidence over the state of Taiwan's relations with its 24
remaining diplomatic allies, which bear watching but evidence
no major changes in the near term. At the same time, he
expressed concern that Beijing might try to spring a surprise
in the run up to legislative and presidential elections, to
which the Director responded that we too are concerned about
surprises, both from Beijing and from President Chen. Huang
expressed particular interest in the status of six-party
talks over North Korea, explaining that events in Korea had
already twice determined the course of Taiwan's future --
1895 and 1950. FM Huang, who plans to visit the U.S. in
early December, said President Chen has not yet decided
whether he will attend the January 14 inauguration of
Guatemalan president-elect Alvaro Colom, but indicated this
could involve a transit request. End summary.


2. (C) FM James Huang held a broad-ranging discussion on
Nov. 7 with the Director and Deputy Director on Taiwan's
foreign policy. Huang had originally requested a meeting
with the Director on Oct. 24 to discuss Beijing's ten-day
delay in transmitting to Taiwan a WHO health warning about
tainted Thailand corn exports. In the Director's absence on
official travel to Kaohsiung, MOFA separately passed the
information to AIT (reported reftel). Huang told DIR that he
plans to attend the TECRO chief of missions conference in
Atlanta in early December, after which he will continue on to
visit Taiwan allies in Central America, including the
Dominican Republic, Panama and perhaps Guatemala.

Taiwan Diplomacy Review
--------------


3. (C) FM Huang was generally confident about the state of
Taiwan's relations with its eleven Caribbean and Central
American "allies," as Taiwan terms them. He told DIR that
Guatemala president-elect Alvaro Colom intends to maintain
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Noting that he had been in
the room with President Chen an hour earlier when Chen
telephoned Colom to offer congratulations, Huang said that
Colom had expressed warm, friendly feelings toward Taiwan.
He recalled to Chen that only Taiwan had offered support to
Guatemala's National Foundation for Peace when Colom was
Secretary-General during the early 1990's civil war years.

SIPDIS
Huang said President Chen has not yet decided whether he will
attend Colom's January 14 presidential inauguration. DIR
noted that he could not predict what the U.S. response might
be to a transit request, to which Huang responded that such a
transit would be wholly focused on Guatemala and the region
and, he assured, would not cause the U.S. concern.


4. (C) The state of relations with Nicaragua also appear
stable, Huang told DIR. President Ortega and President Chen
got along very well on Chen's recent visit to Nicaragua,
spending a total of thirteen hours together touring the
countryside. Panama, on the other hand, is always of concern
to Taipei. The fact that a PRC shipping company is the
number one user of the Panama Canal and Panama as a UNSC
member interacts closely with the PRC has raised Taiwan's
antennae, he noted. Nevertheless, President Torrijos has
twice promised President Chen that he would not shift
Panama's recognition from Taipei to Beijing during the

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remainder of Chen's term of office.


5. (C) Huang said that Costa Rica's shift and recognition of
Beijing had not led to an exodus of Taiwan's Central American
allies. While Taipei is closely watching reports of Vatican
interaction with Beijing, moreover, Huang said a shift by the
Vatican would not likely have a significant effect on
Taiwan's heavily Catholic Central American allies.


6. (C) FM Huang told DIR that Taiwan's diplomatic ties with
its five South Pacific allies remain stable. Recent
presidential elections in the Marshall Islands and Kiribati
had not negatively affected Taiwan's relations with either
nation. Relations with the Solomon Islands (SI) were also in
good shape, he said, thought he expressed concern that
Australian policy concerns might undermine these relations.
DIR responded that the Australians -- and the U.S. -- are
indeed quite concerned about Taiwan's relations with the SI
government, and he urged Taiwan to stay in close
communication with Australia. Huang assured DIR that MOFA
officials regularly meet and have a good working relationship
with Australian representatives in Taipei.

Playing with Taiwan Politics
--------------


7. (C) Despite the above current stability in Taiwan's
foreign relations, Huang told DIR that he is concerned
Beijing might try for another diplomatic strike against
Taiwan before the January 12 Legislative Yuan (LY) or March
22 presidential elections in an effort to embarrass the
ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). DIR noted that
such a move by Beijing might be conterproductive, much as its
heavy-handed actions in 1996 and 2000 had actually helped the
then-opposition DPP presidential candidates. Huang responded
that Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and its foreign
policy establishment were not in accord and often at odds.
While the TAO had grown much more sophisticated in its
understanding of democratic Taiwan, MOFA and company still
resorted to harsh tactics, as in August 2006 when Beijing got
Chad to break relations with Taiwan just before then-Premier
Su Tseng-chang took off for a visit to Chad. Similarly
embittering Taiwan, he said, Beijing coaxed Nauru to break
relations with Taiwan on the very day in July 2002 on which
Chen Shui-bian took over as DPP Chairman.


8. (C) The most critical period facing Taiwan diplomacy,
Huang mused, could be the period between the March 22
presidential election and May 20 inauguration. If DPP
candidate Frank Hsieh wins, he suggested, Beijing might try
to humiliate Chen Shui-bian as a parting shot, so deep is
Beijing's animosity toward Chen. DIR asked whether Chen
himself might try to elicit a negative reaction from Beijing
before or after the presidential election on the logic that
heavy-handed PRC actions have historically benefited the DPP.
Huang denied the possibility, insisting Chen would not
consider trying to stir up a Beijing reaction before the
elections, nor would he try to stir up controversy after the
presidential election.

Curiosity About DPRK
--------------


9. (C) FM Huang queried DIR on the state of North Korea
negotiations. DIR explained that we are working to open DPRK
nuclear facilities and move toward full disclosure. The
actual destruction of nuclear weapons will be the most

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difficult phase of the negotiation process. Regarding
reports that the six-party talks might be expanded into a
more permanent regional grouping, DIR told FM Huang that
Assistant Secretary Hill had made clear to Beijing that the
purview of such a grouping would not include Taiwan. Huang
asked if the U.S. has a timetable for removing the DPRK from
the state terrorism list and for recognizing the DPRK.
Reiterating that the six-party talks are now focused on the
nuclear facilities issue and on disclosure, DIR asked why
Huang was so focused on the DPRK issue. Because, Huang
replied, the fate of Taiwan has twice been determined by
Korea -- once in 1895, when the Sino-Japanese War started
there and ended with Beijing ceding Taiwan to Japan, and in
1950, when the Korean War locked the U.S. into supporting the
Chiang Kai-shek regime.

Stresses in U.S.-Taiwan Relations
--------------


10. (C) Noting U.S.-Taiwan relations have been under
considerable stress for some months, the DIR told Huang that
the two sides should work closely to manage bilateral
relations over the coming months. He explained that in their
Oct. 31 phone conversation, Deputy Secretary Negroponte had
asked him to assure Taiwan authorities that the U.S. has warm
feelings toward Taiwan and great respect for Taiwan's
democracy, economic development and bilateral security
cooperation. The Deputy Secretary had emphasized that both
the U.S. and Taiwan need to work together on issues of
concern, such as the UN referenda. DIR also noted his
meeting with Under Secretary Burns in Washington in
September, in which the Under Secretary stressed the
importance of preserving our close relations with Taiwan
through this difficult period. Both of these conversations,
DIR noted, reveal the level of concern in Washington over the
stresses that have developed in the relationship and our
determination to prevent this from producing any lasting
damage to our historically very close ties.


11. (C) In response, FM Huang urged the U.S. to distinguish
campaign rhetoric from government policy. For example, he
said, President Chen's "four wants," which had disturbed
Washington, really "have no impact on policy at all." PRC
concern that President Chen might make some dramatic
independence announcement in mid-September were unfounded, he
argued, for President Chen had never even considered making
such an announcement. DIR responded that President Chen is
an energetic campaigner, but he sometimes tends to rhetorical
excess and needs to understand that he is speaking at all
times to several audiences, not just his immediate campaign
rally audience. In the real world, Chen's campaign rhetoric
does have an impact and can elicit responses.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) In his discussion of Taiwan's diplomatic situation,
FM Huang was quite relaxed, despite the foreign policy crises
he has weathered and the constant PRC pressure on Taiwan's
diplomatic partners. Given the number of times Huang has
made urgent requests for U.S. assistance upon getting wind of
impending diplomatic changes, Taiwan apparently has no
indication of any imminent threat to its remaining 24
diplomatic relationships. Huang's queries about DPRK
negotiations, whether for the historical reasons he indicated
or to reinforce Taiwan's own cross-Strait separation, enabled
DIR to highlight the broad range of U.S. interaction and

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cooperation with the PRC on issues of high importance to the
U.S. and to regional security.

YOUNG