BLUE AND GREEN ACADEMICS ON CROSS-STRAIT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: BLUE AND GREEN ACADEMICS ON CROSS-STRAIT,
PRESIDENTIAL RACE, REFERENDA


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Beijing is deeply suspicious of President Chen, DPP
presidential candidate Frank Hsieh and other "Taiwanese"
leaders, but would try to work with Hsieh if he wins the
presidency, a group of academics told the Director October

29. They claimed President Chen is promoting the DPP UN
referendum to preserve his own political power, not to help
Hsieh get elected. Combining the presidential and UN
referenda ballots, as Chen has proposed, could significantly
increase chances that one or both UN referenda could pass.
U.S. objections to the DPP UN referendum have caused Taiwan's
undecided voters to think twice out of concern that its
passage would damage cross-Strait relations. KMT
presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou enjoys a comfortable lead
in opinion polls now, but the last two months of the campaign
will decide the winner. End Summary.


2. (C) The Director hosted a luncheon for four Taiwan
academics on October 29. Professors HSU Yung-ming (Soochow
University) and SHIH Cheng-feng (Tamkang University) are
affiliated with the DPP's Taiwan Thinktank, and Hsu is a
frequent guest on a pro-Green television talk show.
Professors Edward CHEN (Tamkang University) and Spencer YANG
(Chinese Culture University) both regularly contribute
articles critical of President Chen and the DPP to
blue-leaning newspapers. The Deputy Director also attended.

CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
--------------


3. (C) Professors Chen and Yang agreed that if Hsieh is
elected, Beijing will not ignore him as it did President
Chen, and would probably be willing to work with him to
improve the cross-Strait relationship. Yang argued that Hsieh
has tried to signal his "pragmatism" to Beijing by remaining
silent when President Chen verbally attacks China, but
acknowledged that Beijing might interpret Hsieh's silence as
agreement, not dissent. Prof. Hsu asserted that President
Chen, Hsieh, and others in the DPP often use academics and
other intermediaries to communicate with Beijing, to reduce
the likelihood of misunderstandings. But, after seven years
of President Chen's rhetorical tricks, Prof. Yang added,
Beijing is deeply suspicious of "Taiwanese" DPP leaders, who
have no desire for unification or even friendly relations
with China. Beijing finds it easier to trust KMT leaders,
who still "identify" with China. If elected, Yang predicted,
Hsieh will have to overcome this prejudice before
cross-Strait progress can be made.

DPP POLITICS
--------------


4. (C) Hsieh's pragmatism has also led him to try to improve
his relationship with President Chen, and Chen has
reciprocated, argued Yang. Despite his previously lukewarm
support for the DPP UN referendum, Hsieh has embraced the
DPP's UN referendum and recently challenged Ma to publicly
debate the issue, an invitation which Ma thus far has
declined. In return, President Chen arranged a meeting
between Hsieh and senior leaders of a number of
pro-independence groups, a move intended to strengthen
support for Hsieh among deep-Greens skeptical of Hsieh's
independence bona fides.


5. (C) Despite warming relations between President Chen and
Hsieh, Prof. Yang maintained, Chen is actually less concerned
about a Hsieh presidential victory than he is about
maintaining his political influence once out of office.
Chen's recent push to put the UN referenda and presidential
vote on the same ballot has not been calculated to draw more
Green voters to the polls, although it might have that
effect. Instead, Yang argued, Chen's objective is to
increase chances that the DPP referendum itself will pass,
which would be an enormous political victory for Chen and
would guarantee his stature within the party, and perhaps
help protect him from corruption charges. If Hsieh is
elected, Prof. Shih opined, Chen could also try to use his
political clout to force Hsieh to pursue additional
"pro-independence" referenda during his term.


TAIPEI 00002434 002 OF 002


REFERENDUM ISSUES
--------------


6. (C) Prof. Hsu predicted a combined ballot would
dramatically increase chances of one or both UN referenda
passing. If everyone who takes a ballot to vote for
president is considered to have "participated" in the
referendum voting process, one or both referenda would likely
meet the 50 percent participation threshold required by the
referendum statute. (Note: Voter turnout for presidential
elections usually exceeds 80 percent. End note.) Prof. Chen
explained that if the CEC acceded to KMT demands to use the
"two-step" voting procedure used for the 2004 "missile
defense" referendum, voters would vote only on the referendum
endorsed by their preferred party, likely keeping both
referenda from reaching the 50 percent participation
threshold required for a "valid" referendum. Prof. Hsu
disagreed, however, countering that with its own referendum
on the ballot, the KMT can't credibly direct Blue voters to
boycott the referendum vote like it did in 2004. KMT voters
could disregard party instructions and vote in favor of both
referenda, and not just the KMT version.


7. (C) Prof. Shih told the Director recent U.S. opposition to
the DPP referendum had only strengthened deep-Green support
for President Chen and the referendum itself. Prof. Chen
disagreed, arguing that DAS Christensen's remarks struck just
the right tone, respectful of Taiwan's democracy while
pointing out the risks to cross-Strait stability posed by the
DPP referendum. After DAS Christensen's speech, Taiwan
voters no longer view the UN referenda as a domestic internal
affair without international repercussions, added Prof. Yang,
and this has somewhat reduced public support for both UN
referenda.

PRESIDENTIAL RACE
--------------


8. (C) Prof. Shih predicted that Hsieh in the coming months
would echo Ma's policies on cross-Strait relations and the
economy, in an effort to "muddy the waters" and force voters
to make a decision based on the "character" of the respective
candidates. (Note: Hsieh and vice presidential running mate
Su Tseng-chang are widely considered to be highly effective
administrators, while Ma has often been criticized as a
detached and ineffectual leader. End note.) Prof. Shih also
insisted "ethnic identity" remained the most important issue
in the campaign. Prof. Hsu agreed, arguing that Ma's central
campaign themes -- the economy and anti-corruption -- had
become stale. Ma must find a new issue to prevent "ethnic
identity" from becoming the deciding factor in the race. Not
true, countered Prof. Yang, who claimed that voters are tired
of the "ethnic debate" and would cross ethnic lines to vote
for the most competent candidate. All four academics,
however, agreed that the presidential race would be decided
based on events during the last two months of the campaign,
and that polling results before then would be largely
meaningless.
YOUNG