Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI2078
2007-09-10 08:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN UN REFERENDA: BLUE PERSPECTIVE

Tags:  PGOV TW 
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RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002078 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN UN REFERENDA: BLUE PERSPECTIVE


Classified By: Acting Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002078

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN UN REFERENDA: BLUE PERSPECTIVE


Classified By: Acting Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: The KMT was forced to float its own UN
referendum to counterbalance the DPP version, and to deflect
DPP accusations that the KMT does not "stand up" for Taiwan.
The DPP UN referendum is an attempt to exploit the growing
sense of "Taiwan identity," and KMT presidential candidate Ma
Ying-jeou is using the KMT referendum to shore up his
"Taiwanese" credentials. KMT Secretary General Liao Feng-te
told AIT the internal debate over the referendum has split
the KMT into two camps, with those facing an election in
favor, and those hoping to maintain good KMT relations with
Beijing opposed. The KMT leadership sees the DPP similarly
divided over its own referendum, with Deep-Green hardliners
like DPP party chairman Yu Shyi-kun squared off against
relative "moderates" like DPP presidential candidate Frank
Hsieh. Deep-Blues hope President Chen's anti-U.S. rhetoric
will cause "swing" voters to believe the DPP has damaged
Taiwan's relationship with its chief benefactor. According
to KMT insiders, if Chen withdraws the DPP referendum, the
KMT will promptly follow suit. End Summary.

KMT SEES DPP REFERENDA AS A THREAT...
--------------


2. (C) KMT Deputy Secretary General Liao Feng-te, who doubles
as the KMT's campaign policy director, told AIT on September
5 that the KMT learned its lesson on referenda during the
2004 presidential election. At that time, when confronted
with the DPP referendum on improving Taiwan's missile
defenses, the KMT simply urged its voters to boycott the
proposal. Although the referendum failed to pass, it
succeeded in drawing thousands of deep-Green voters to the
polls. Thus, Liao concluded, the KMT decision in 2004 to
forego a referendum of its own put the party at a serious
disadvantage. The lesson was especially bitter since the
2004 presidential race was decided by less than three-tenths
of a percent. This time around, the KMT strategy is to
counter each DPP referendum with an equal and opposite KMT
version.

...COUNTERS WITH ITS OWN INITIATIVES
--------------


3. (C) The DPP currently has proposed two referenda: one on
seeking UN membership as "Taiwan" and another for the return
of "illicitly gained KMT assets." The KMT plans to counter

the DPP referenda with two of its own. The first proposes to
increase Taiwan's participation in international
organizations (including the UN) under "any practical name,"
and the second to stamp out "official corruption" in
government (i.e. the DPP administration). If the DPP pushes
a third referendum to improve Taiwan's "defense" against "PRC
aggression," Liao stated, the KMT will offer voters the
alternative to endorse direct cross-Strait flights. The KMT
referenda may not actually draw Blue voters to the polls,
Liao conceded, but they should help prevent Blue voters from
inadvertently helping to pass the DPP measures (i.e. even
voting against a referendum helps it cross the 50 percent
participation threshold required for validity). With the
votes thus split among competing Blue-Green referenda, Liao
predicted, the odds are very low that any of them will garner
the fifty-percent participation required for passage. Liao
also ruled out the possibility that the DPP would encourage
its voters to support the KMT UN referendum, which the DPP
leadership has publicly and repeatedly characterized as a
"fraud" on the Taiwan people.

BUT KMT SPLIT OVER UN REFERENDUM
--------------


4. (C) Liao admitted there had been intense debate inside the
party on whether the KMT should offer its own referendum on
UN membership. The party divided into two camps -- those who
are facing an election and those who are not. KMT
presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT's legislative
candidates all realized that a KMT-sponsored UN referendum
would help deflect DPP accusations that the KMT does not
"love Taiwan." Others, including former KMT Chairman Lien
Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong, feared the negative impact
such a proposal would have on the KMT's relationship with

TAIPEI 00002078 002 OF 003


Beijing. Beijing has sought to discourage the KMT from
pushing its own UN referendum, Liao acknowledged, using back
channels to convey its message to Lien Chan and others.


5. (C) Liao denied press reports that Beijing had sent a
strong letter to former KMT Chairman Lien Chan opposing the
KMT UN referendum. He explained that Beijing has many subtle
methods to communicate with Lien and the KMT, and would not
have been "so stupid" as to send a letter which could be
discovered and exploited by DPP opponents. (Note: PFP
Executive Policy Director Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao),however,
separately insisted to AIT that the press reports were true,
and that the letter was essentially Beijing's "last warning"
to the KMT to withdraw its referendum; see para. 8 below.
End Note.)

BEIJING KNOWS KMT REACTING TO POLITICAL PRESSURE
-------------- ---


6. (C) Liao insisted that despite Beijing's objections, the
CCP leadership understands that a growing sense of "Taiwan
identity" among voters forced Ma and the KMT to demonstrate
their sensitivity to "Taiwan-centric thinking." Beijing, he
claimed, understands the objective of the KMT referendum is
not to promote Taiwan's accession to the UN, but rather to
increase Ma's appeal to Taiwan-minded voters and to defeat
the DPP's pro-independence UN referendum.

UN REFERENDUM ISSUE MAY LOSE URGENCY
--------------


7. (C) Voters will lose interest in the UN referendum issue
after Taiwan's current bid to join the UN is rejected by the
General Assembly in mid-September, Liao predicted, and an
increasingly weak President Chen will be forced to turn to
other issues. Chen and DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun spent much
of their limited remaining political capital to overcome
objections to the UN referendum from Frank Hsieh and other
"moderates" in the DPP. Hsieh will grow stronger (and Chen
weaker) as the presidential election draws closer,
strengthening Hsieh's hand to suppress more radical
"deep-Green" proposals which could alienate him from Taiwan's
centrist, or "swing," voters.

DEEP-BLUES UNHAPPY WITH MA, KMT REFERENDUM
--------------


8. (C) PFP Executive Policy Director and James Soong advisor
Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao) complained to AIT that Ma Ying-jeou
wrongly views Beijing as the monolithic CCP of twenty years
ago, where one person could decide issues unilaterally. Ma
also mistakenly reasons that, because the KMT opposes
independence, it is entitled to and can count on Beijing's
support. In reality, Chang argued, Beijing does not
understand the KMT UN referendum to be merely a "campaign
tactic," but rather, a major concession by the KMT to the
DPP's pro-independence agenda. Beijing, Chang argued, does
not care who wins the presidential election, as long as the
winner is "pragmatic" and does not push independence. (Note:
Chang is negotiating terms for PFP legislators, including
himself, to run as KMT candidates in the next LY election,
and claims to be in frequent contact with KMT Chairman Wu
Po-hsiung and KMT Secretary General Wu Den-yih. End note.)
Chang expressed concern that Chinese President Hu Jintao
would be under enormous pressure to respond forcefully to
Taiwan's UN referenda before Taiwan's presidential election
takes place in March 2008.

DPP WILL NOT EASE UP ITS UN OFFENSIVE
--------------


9. (C) With few successes to his credit, Chang told AIT,
President Chen is now looking to earn his place in history by
"protecting Taiwan's dignity" in the face of pressure from
both the U.S. and the PRC. Chen hopes to replace former
president Lee Teng-hui as the "father of Taiwan independence"
by standing up to the same kind of pressure which caused Lee
to knuckle under in 1996. The deep-Blue Chang argued that
everything, including the presidential election, is of
secondary importance to Chen, and that this single-mindedness
makes him less likely to compromise. U.S. admonitions

TAIPEI 00002078 003 OF 003


against the DPP UN referendum have had little effect, Chang
asserted, because President Chen believes they have not come
from a "high enough level" to be taken seriously. The DPP
can always score points with voters by standing up to
Chinese, or to some extent, even U.S. pressure, but with his
recent anti-American rhetoric, Chang continued, President
Chen runs the risk of turning the DPP into the
"anti-American" party, which could hurt public confidence in
the DPP and its presidential candidate Frank Hsieh
(Chang-ting). Hedging their bets, the PFP (with KMT support)
has challenged the DPP UN referendum in administrative court,
arguing that it falls outside the intended scope of Taiwan's
referendum law. Chang expressed cautious optimism that the
court could return a favorable verdict, but could not say
when this might happen, or whether such a verdict would be
"final."

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Deep-Blues view the KMT's UN referendum as a betrayal
of the party's "pro-China" fundamentals, and they would like
Ma to kill it. But Ma's greatest vulnerability continues to
be his "mainlander" status. His "long-stay" program and the
KMT UN referendum, therefore, are essential elements of his
strategy to appeal to "Taiwanese," especially centrist,
voters. Therefore, as long as the DPP continues its "UN for
Taiwan" push, Ma and the KMT dare not retract their own, for
fear of appearing to "kowtow" to Beijing. The deep-Blues
want the U.S. to pressure President Chen into withdrawing the
DPP referendum, to give Ma and the KMT the political cover
they need to withdraw the KMT UN referendum. There is no
consensus on this issue even among the Blues.
WANG