Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI141
2007-01-18 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

KMT SECRETARY-GENERAL WU DEN-YIH ON NEW

Tags:  PGOV PINR TW 
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6242
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000141 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/15/2032
TAGS: PGOV PINR TW
SUBJECT: KMT SECRETARY-GENERAL WU DEN-YIH ON NEW
RESPONSIBILITIES, CHALLENGES AHEAD


Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang,
Reason 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000141

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/15/2032
TAGS: PGOV PINR TW
SUBJECT: KMT SECRETARY-GENERAL WU DEN-YIH ON NEW
RESPONSIBILITIES, CHALLENGES AHEAD


Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang,
Reason 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Recently appointed KMT Secretary-General
Wu Den-yih told AIT Deputy Director on January 12 that over
the next year he will focus on liquidating the KMT's
remaining party assets, improving relations with the KMT
legislative caucus, and overseeing preparations for the
upcoming legislative and presidential elections. Although
the KMT lost the Kaohsiung mayoral race last month, Wu
insisted the party's support in the south has actually grown,
which should narrow the significant advantage enjoyed there
by the DPP in the upcoming presidential elections. KMT
Chairman Ma remains the KMT's best hope of retaking the
Presidency in 2008, and (KMT) LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng is
unlikely to mount a significant challenge for the nomination.
Wu acknowledged the gravest threat facing Ma's presidential
bid is his possible indictment by the prosecutor
investigating his use of a special budget during his
just-ended term as Taipei mayor. Nonetheless, Wu did not
exclude the possibility that Ma could still mount a
successful campaign even if indicted, given the questionable
nature of the charges. End Summary.

Wu on His New Job
--------------


2. (C) Wu Den-yih (Tun-yi) met with the AIT Deputy Director
on January 12 immediately before he took office as the
Kuomintang (KMT) Secretary-General. He told the Deputy
Director that over the next year he will focus on
implementing KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's top policy
priorities within the KMT. A key task will be overseeing the
liquidation of the KMT's remaining party assets by the end of
June. Dealing with the assets issue promptly and
effectively, Wu added, would not only enhance the KMT's
anti-corruption image but also deprive the ruling Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) of a weapon to use against the KMT in
the coming elections. Wu told the Deputy Director that Ma
has personally charged him with improving strained relations
between KMT party headquarters and its Legislative Yuan
caucus, a challenging task. Wu will also play a lead role in
managing the 2007 legislative and 2008 presidential primaries

and election campaigns this Spring. On the legislative
elections, Wu said he hopes to work out a comprehensive
nomination strategy in coordination with the People First
Party (PFP) to minimize splits within the pan-Blue camp.

Assessing the Kaohsiung Mayoral "Loss"
--------------


3. (C) Turning to the KMT's performance in the December
2006 mayoral elections, Wu suggested that the loss in
Kaohsiung was a result several strategic and tactical
blunders. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's attempt to cast the
local election as a national-level referendum on President
Chen's alleged corruption backfired by creating a sense of
crisis that energized DPP supporters but failed to attract
more centrist voters to the KMT candidate. The KMT also made
a poor decision in nominating Huang Chun-ying. Although
Huang had served as a good deputy mayor under Wu's tenure as
Kaohsiung mayor, Wu explained, Huang is too "friendly and
naive" to succeed in southern Taiwan politics. The
investigation into irregularities in KMT Chairman Ma's
mayoral special budget and last-minute opposition allegations
that Huang's campaign had engaged in vote-buying, Wu
continued, further discouraged Blue-leaning supporters from
going out to vote.

KMT's Presidential Election Strategy
--------------


4. (C) Wu insisted the KMT's narrow loss in Kaohsiung did
not mean that support for the KMT in southern and central
Taiwan has eroded. On the contrary, he asserted, since the
2004 legislative election the KMT has been growing stronger
even in the "deep south" districts south of Tainan. Although
the party does not expect to win those districts in a
presidential contest, it hopes to narrow the loss to 5-10

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percent. By losing small in the south and winning big in the
more heavily populated, KMT-leaning areas north of Miaoli,
the KMT hopes to negate the DPP's built-in "southern
advantage." In this strategy, he explained, central Taiwan
would be a "key battleground" in which the KMT and DPP will
likely come to a draw, although the KMT made significant
gains there in the 2005 local elections. Premier Su
Tseng-chang, if he wins the DPP presidential nomination,

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poses the greatest threat to this KMT strategy. Su's past
experience as the highly popular magistrate of Taipei County
could reduce the KMT's margin of victory in the north, making
the overall race much closer, assessed Wu.


5. (C) In terms of campaign issues, Wu predicted Taiwan
identity-related themes will be a major focus of the
presidential race. The DPP will use the issue to attack KMT
Chairman Ma, the most likely KMT presidential candidate, for
being born in Hong Kong and not representing Taiwanese
culture and society. Wu suggested that Ma will attempt to
neutralize the DPP strategy by selecting an ethnic Taiwanese
as his vice presidential running mate. Though southern rural
voters may buy into the DPP's identity-related attacks, Wu
argued that Ma enjoys enough support among southern urban
youth and female voters to close the gap with any DPP
candidate in the south.

KMT Chairman Ma's Presidential Prospects and Challenges
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Wu told the Deputy Director that, as
Secretary-General, he will remain neutral while overseeing

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the KMT's presidential primary this spring, but added that he
is a strong supporter of KMT Chairman Ma. Ma, he insisted,
remains the KMT's best hope of retaking the Presidency in

2008. LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Ma's rival within the party,
is unlikely to mount a significant challenge as the 2005
chairman contest was the party's "real" presidential primary.
Although Wang has no peer as an LY Speaker, he lacks the
necessary executive skills to serve as Premier, let alone
President. Wang's best hope, continued Wu, is to become Ma's
vice presidential running mate. Wang's supporters have been
pressing for a VP slot on the KMT ticket, but Wang himself
has no intention of pushing himself on Ma.


7. (C) The gravest threat to Ma's presidential bid, Wu told
the Deputy Director, would be Ma's indictment by the
prosecutor investigating Ma's use of a mayoral special budget
during his term as Taipei mayor. If indicted, Ma's only
recourse would be to follow through on his earlier pledge to
resign as Chairman, leaving Vice Chairman Wu Po-hsiung in
charge to oversee a new election to fill the chair vacancy.
Secretary-General Wu posed two possible subsequent scenarios.

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In the first, KMT members would elect a proxy chairman for
Ma and the KMT would support Ma as an independent
presidential candidate. In the second, the KMT could elect
one of Ma's rivals who would then use the chairmanship to
launch his own presidential bid. The latter option is more
unlikely, Wu believed, because KMT supporters are weary of
improving the DPP's odds of winning by fielding two
candidates from the pan-Blue camp. Moreover, he noted that
there could be a public outcry against the indictment given
Ma's general reputation as an ultra clean official and the
rather questionable nature of the charges.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Eloquent, talkative, and frank, Wu has been widely
viewed as an effective legislator who has refrained from the
typical shenanigans, showmanship, and back-room politics
indulged by many of his colleagues. His fellow legislators,
however, also see him as distant and isolated, something of a
loner (like Ma, they say). Some critics charge that as
Secretary-General Wu will have a difficult time helping

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Chairman Ma bridge the strained relationship between the LY
caucus and KMT headquarters. That task will be complicated
and difficult as Taiwan moves to a single-member district
system for the 2007 legislative elections. Wu was widely
rumored to have been a prospective vice presidential running

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mate to Ma, but those prospects now appear slim given his new
responsibilities.


--------------
Appendix: Wu Den-yih Political Profile
--------------


9. (C) Wu Den-yih (Tun-yi),age 59, is a native of Nantou
County in central Taiwan and a graduate of Taiwan National
University. Initially a reporter and then editor with the
China Times newspaper, Wu embarked on a political career in
1973 when he was elected to the Taipei City Council. Wu was
viewed as a KMT rising star in the 1980s as the party sought
to cultivate and promote a new generation of "ethnic
Taiwanese" leaders. He was appointed Nantou County
magistrate between 1981 and 1989, and then appointed Mayor of
Kaohsiung, Taiwan's second-largest city. He ran in the first
openly competitive Kaohsiung mayoral race in 1994, soundly
defeating DPP challenger and Kaohsiung native Chang
Chun-hsiung by 150,000 votes. Wu lost his re-election bid in
1998 by 3,000 votes to Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting)--now one of
the two DPP front-runners for president--in part because of
allegations that Wu was having an extra-marital affair. The
cassette tape that supposedly recorded a conversation between
Wu and his mistress was later found to have been forged. Wu
was elected in 2002 and 2005 to the Legislative Yuan,
representing Nantou County. Wu has served on the KMT's
Central Standing Committee, the party's highest policy-making
body, since 1997.


KMT Insiders on Wu, Other Personnel Changes
--------------


10. (C) Outgoing KMT Secretary-General Chan Chun-po,
promoted to be the sixth KMT Vice Chairman, told AIT on
January 11 that Ma had made a "good decision" to select Wu as
Chan's successor. As a "serious" legislator, very responsive
to his constituency and collegial, Wu will be able to help Ma
improve relations and oversight of the LY caucus, predicted
Chan. Pointing to his own shortcomings, Chan noted that Wu
would be a more eloquent and well spoken secretary-general.
Chan assessed that in addition to Wu, Ma's appointment of
Yang Tu as Director of Communications and Culture and Su
Chun-pin as party spokesman would strengthen public relations
and improve the party's image, moving it away from the "deep
Blue" extreme toward the political mainstream ahead of the
upcoming legislative and presidential elections. Some of the
strongest critics of Wu's and Ma's recent personnel changes,
remarked Chan, are people like KMT Legislator Ting
Shou-chung, who are long-time supporters of former Chairman
Lien Chan.


11. (C) In contrast to Chan, KMT Director of Mainland
Affairs Chang Jung-kung told AIT on January 9 that Wu was a
"poor choice." Wu's selection "complicates" Ma's
relationship with KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan and LY
Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, explained Chang. Wu had "alienated"
Lien Chan by refusing to actively support Lien's 2000
presidential bid after PFP Chairman James Soong asked Wu to
be his vice president running mate. Despite being ethnic
Taiwanese, Wu does not enjoy close relations with Wang and is
not considered part of Wang's "bentu" (ethnic Taiwanese)
faction. Chang suggested that as a result Ma will have a
more difficult time forging any consensus or compromise with
his two erstwhile rivals within the party. Chang cynically
implied that Ma's other personnel moves mainly aimed to
strengthen his position within the party at the expense of
his rivals.
YOUNG