Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI1142
2007-05-22 00:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN FM HUANG CONCERNED OVER CENTRAL AMERICA

Tags:  PREL TW 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001142 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017
TAGS: PREL TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN FM HUANG CONCERNED OVER CENTRAL AMERICA
RELATIONS; STRESSES RISE OF LEFTISM


Classified By: AIT director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s):
1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017
TAGS: PREL TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN FM HUANG CONCERNED OVER CENTRAL AMERICA
RELATIONS; STRESSES RISE OF LEFTISM


Classified By: AIT director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s):
1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. On the eve of his departure for yet another
damage-control trip to Central America, Foreign Minister
James Huang told the Director on May 21 that Taiwan faces
strong challenges from the PRC to its diplomatic position
there, and requested U.S. assistance in countering that
pressure. In response to FM Huang and to President Chen
Shui-bian's similar request last week, the Director
reiterated that U.S. policy is to remain neutral in the
Taiwan-PRC diplomatic contest. Huang rejoined that there is
a leftist tide in Central America that is not in U.S.
interests and argued for behind-the-scenes assistance to
Taiwan. If PRC pressure continues, Huang said, Taiwan may be
forced to go further in the competition for diplomatic
recognition. Huang did not elaborate what he meant here, and
while it could imply new initiatives on Taiwan sovereignty,
our most likely explanation involves Taiwan seeking to lure
smaller PRC diplmatic partners back through financial
incentives. End Summary.

Response to President Chen
--------------


2. (C) Foreign Minister James Huang (Chih-fang) requested a
meeting with the AIT Director on May 21, just hours before
his departure for a 7-10 day visit to Central America. The
Director began by telling Huang that he first wanted to
respond to President Chen Shui-bian's May 17 request for U.S.
assistance to help Taiwan counter PRC pressure on Taiwan's
diplomatic partner Costa Rica. He asked Huang to convey to
the President that Washington had concurred in his initial
response to the President, that is that U.S. policy is to
remain neutral in the Taiwan-PRC diplomatic struggle. FM
Huang responded that he understood the U.S. position, but
nonetheless asked the Director to convey to Washington
Taiwan's concern that there is a "leftist tide" in Central
America which would not be in the U.S. interest.

PRC Targeting Costa Rica
--------------


3. (C) Costa Rica, FM Huang told the Director, has been
under heavy pressure from the PRC and maybe its regional
partner, Mexico, to shift diplomatic ties to Beijing. Costa
Rica's negative vote on Taiwan's application to join WHO in

Geneva last week, he said, indicated the drift in Costa
Rica's thinking, despite its official explanation that the
vote had just been an error. Costa Rican President Arias, he
said, would like to enhance Costa Rica's role and influence
in the international arena, as well as its participation in
international organizations, such as the UN Security Council.
Arias, he continued, "probably believes" Beijing is
important for achieving that goal and is, thus, looking more
favorably on relations with the PRC.


4. (C) Foreign Minister Stagno, moreover, is a young 35-36,
Huang said, and does not understand the seventy-year
friendship between Costa Rica and Taiwan, or the Republic of
China. Stagno, who was born in France and educated in the
U.S., has little attachment to Costa Rica. He served as
Costa Rica's UN ambassador, where he had lots of opportunity
to liaise with PRC diplomats. Huang surmised that Costa

TAIPEI 00001142 002 OF 003


Rica's negative vote in Geneva reflected the views of Stagno
rather than those of Arias. FM Stagno, he noted, had been
scheduled to attend the regional meeting between Taiwan and
its diplomatic partners in Belize later this week, but
recently begged off explaining that he must visit Eastern
Europe instead.


5. (C) In response to the Director's query about whether
Taiwan could match Beijing's inducements to Costa Rica, Huang
responded that if the issue were purely economic, "we could
probably do something about it." In this instance, however,
President Arias has larger political objectives in which
Taiwan could not match.

Taiwan Sees Rising Leftist Tide in Central America
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Taiwan sees a rising leftist tide in Central America
which, Huang argued, would not be in the interest of the U.S.
Nor, he continued, would it be in the U.S. interest for
Taiwan to lose, one-by-one, its relations in Central America.
Taiwan diplomatic losses, he argued, would mean an extension
of PRC influence in Central America.


7. (C) The Director responded that the U.S. is watching
regional trends very closely. While we have many problems
with Chinese international policies, in general we do not see
China pursuing a revolutionary, or even particularly leftist,
international policy. On the contrary, our greatest concern
with PRC diplomacy has been its tendency to turn a blind eye
to potential partners' internal policies, especially in
seeking access to new energy resources. The U.S. is,
nevertheless, closely watching PRC actions in Central
America.

Other Countries of Concern
--------------


8. (C) Other than Costa Rica, Huang told the Director,
Taiwan is most concerned about Nicaragua and Panama. Noting
that it had been "almost a miracle" for Taiwan to have
maintained relations with Nicaragua under Ortega, Huang felt
Taiwan has stabilized its relations with Nicaragua for the
time being. The problem, he continued, is the recent
emergence of a "third party" in the equation, an issue which
Huang plans to discuss this week in Managua.


9. (C) Panama, Huang said, appears relatively stable now,
with no plans to switch relations soon. Taiwan, however,
must monitor the situation there very carefully. The
situation in Guatemala is worrying, Huang told the Director,
because the opposition appears to be in the lead. Any break
in relations with any of Taiwan's seven diplomatic partners
in Central American, Huang noted ruefully, could set off a
domino effect that would undemine Taiwan's position in the
region.

FM Huang's Central America Trip
--------------


10. (C) FM Huang told the Director he will be in Central
America for ten or more days, visiting Nicaragua, Belize and
"maybe a third country." Departing Taipei the evening of May
21, he will transit Los Angeles and San Salvador, and arrive

TAIPEI 00001142 003 OF 003


in Managua, Nicaragua. There, he will meet with Foreign
Minister Santos, who will host a dinner for him. Huang will
also hold a meeting of Taiwan envoys in Managua to review the
state of Taiwan relations in the region. Huang will then
continue on to Belize to participate in an annual meeting
with Foreign Ministers of Taiwan's diplomatic partners in the
region.

Other Regions Under Less PRC Pressure
--------------


11. (C) FM Huang indicated less concern about Taiwan
diplomatic relations in the other two areas in which its
diplomatic partners are concentrated -- the South Pacific and
Africa. In Africa, he said, while Taiwan's diplomatic
partners has declined from thirteen in the late 1990's to
just five, this has the positive effect of allowing Taiwan to
concentrate its attention and resources on this fewer number
of countries. Huang did not raise the issue of Taiwan's five
diplomatic partners in the South Pacific, which we took to
mean things down there have quieted down for the meantime.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Coming on the heels of President Chen's similar
approach, Huang's entreaty is strong evidence of the growing
PRC facility at competing in Taiwan's small coterie of
diplomatic partners. This competition is not new, but may be
nearing a critical point where Taiwan's leaders can no longer
base their assertion of sovereign independence on the
diplomatic list. Whether Taiwn's next president will
initiate a major review of this policy remains to be seen.
But the Chen administration, now in its finaly year, is
unlikely to veer from the current approach of fighting tooth,
nail and checkbook over every "ally."
YOUNG