DPP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANK HSIEH ON DOMESTIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001046

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2032
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: DPP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANK HSIEH ON DOMESTIC
POLITICS, CROSS-STRAIT ISSUES, AND U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh told
the Director on May 9 that if elected, he would seek common
interests between the U.S. and Taiwan, strengthen mutual
trust, and work to maintain strong security cooperation with
the U.S. Hsieh said he supported a more open
economic-centered cross-Strait policy and that he would work
to negotiate a coalition arrangement with non-DPP legislators
so that the Legislative Yuan (LY) could function effectively.
Hsieh analyzed the recent primary results and said he is
considering selection of a running mate but does not want to
make the decision quickly. That said, Hsieh discussed the
strong points of former acting Kaohsiung Mayor Yeh Chu-lan
and noted that President Chen would prefer Premier Su
Tseng-chang to be the vice presidential candidate. Hsieh

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told the Director he would like to make a trip to the U.S. if
possible, perhaps in June or July, before the presidential
campaign begins in earnest. End Summary.


2. (C) The Director met with DPP candidate Frank Hsieh on
May 9 to congratulate Hsieh on winning the party's May 6
primary and to discuss his presidential campaign. Hsieh said
he was maximizing his exposure in the media during the
current honeymoon period, which he expected to last just four
days. Although confident he would win the overall primary
contest with Premier Su Tseng-chang and two other hopefuls,
Hsieh was surprised by the 16,000 vote margin of his victory
in the party member vote. Although President Chen had
personally assured him twice that he was taking a neutral
position in the primary contest, several people had told
Hsieh that Chen had in fact quietly asked them to support Su.



3. (C) Hsieh attributed Su's defeat to a combination of
factors. Su's top-down approach of working though county
magistrates and city mayors had been less effective than
Hsieh's bottom-up grassroots campaigning. Su's reliance on
the New Tide faction hurt him because of the anti-New Tide
movement within the party. Su fell especially short in
Taipei County, where he had hoped to capitalize on his
popularity from the time he was county magistrate. Hsieh
said he had expected to lose Taipei County by 6,000 votes but
ended up in a virtual dead heat. Su had made a strategic
mistake, Hsieh explained. Su's supporters running against
other DPP candidates in legislative districts in Taipei
County had led these other DPP candidates to line up behind
Hsieh. Finally, Su had made another mistake at the very end
by portraying the election as a confrontation with Hsieh
alone, because this had led supporters of the two weaker
candidates to jump ship and vote for Hsieh.


4. (C) Hsieh told the Director that President Chen had urged
him to quickly choose a running mate to balance the political
forces within the party, and may have wanted him to choose
Su. Hsieh said he had told Chen that he did not want to make
a quick decision. The most important factor in choosing a
vice presidential candidate, Hsieh explained to the Director,
is to have a running mate that will help win the election.
Hsieh noted that KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung is a Hakka,
adding that the DPP will have trouble winning Hakka votes if
Taiwanese hold all of the top DPP positions. Some people had
suggested that former acting Kaohsiung Mayor Yeh Chu-lan, a
Hakka from Miaoli County, would make a good running mate.
Hsieh pointed out that Su might not add much to his campaign
since their political backgrounds were both centered in
southern and northern Taiwan. The critical battleground in
the presidential election will be central Taiwan, since DPP
strength in the south and KMT strength in the north will
cancel each other out. Su, however, is unpopular in central
Taiwan because of his previous strong opposition to combining
and raising the status of Taichung City and County.


5. (C) KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou has a good image, is
highly educated, and appeals to women voters, Hsieh noted.
Ma's weak point is poor crisis management. The indecisive Ma
even manages to turn non-crises into crises. That said, the
negative effects of Ma's special mayoral allowance case have

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already played out, Hsieh suggested. Although a cooperative
Wang Jin-pyng would be an addition to Ma's ticket, Hsieh did
not think Ma actually wants Wang as his running mate. Ma
looks down on Wang and would prefer someone who is more
highly educated and polished. According to his recent
internal polling, Hsieh noted, he would beat Ma with Su as
his running mate but would lose to Ma either on his own or
with Yeh Chu-lan as vice presidential candidate. But he
noted that polls could fluctuate over time.


6. (C) On another election issue, Hsieh confirmed that the
DPP would like to combine the presidential and legislative
elections on a single date. The KMT also prefers holding the
two elections together because they believe Ma's coattails
will help their LY candidates.


7. (C) Because the DPP will not be able to win an outright
majority in the upcoming LY elections, Hsieh said, one of the
important planks in his platform is to create a coalition
with non-party and other non-DPP LY members to achieve a
majority so that the LY can function effectively. Hsieh
emphasized that he would try to accomplish this within two
months of becoming president. Taiwan needs political
stability and effective government, especially in the LY, to
be competitive internationally.


8. (C) Hsieh observed that national security concerns
currently play too big a role in cross-Strait policy. He
would give greater emphasis to the economic viewpoint, Hsieh
said. Taiwan needs to be freer and more open. Businesses
will not identify with the government or follow laws that are
too restrictive, a dangerous situation. Hsieh noted he had
stuck to his position on the cross-Strait issue during the
primary despite being attacked by the Deep Green, adding that
his victory in the DPP primary showed that party members
accepted his viewpoint. Hsieh said he would work gradually
to let skeptics better understand his policies.


9. (C) The Director asked Hsieh about his relations with
President Chen and whether he expected Chen in his final year
to pursue controversial issues such as constitutional change
to establish his legacy. Hsieh pointed out that policy
differences with Chen had led him stepping down as premier in
early 2006. Campaign programs are different than final
goals, which need to be pursued gradually, Hsieh observed.
Chen understands the importance of winning the 2008 election,
because if the DPP loses, the KMT will want to reverse much
of what the DPP has done and will also want to dig up dirt on
the DPP from the account books left by the DPP. In addition,
Hsieh pointed out, Chen cannot do anything major on issues
such as constitutional change.


10. (C) Chen would like to hold a referendum on the popular
issue of joining the UN under the name Taiwan, Hsieh
suggested, but there is not enough time to collect the
signatures needed to hold such a referendum. Hsieh said that
he was not personally opposed to this since more than 70
percent of the public support this position. Entering the UN
under the name Taiwan does not violate the "four noes," Hsieh
asserted, adding that he believed this issue should not
matter since Taiwan will be kept out of the UN regardless of
whether it uses the name "Taiwan" or "Republic of China."


11. (C) The Director stressed the importance of maintaining
cross-Strait stability. He explained to Hsieh that the U.S.
had not dictated the "four noes" to Chen Shui-bian in 2000.
We had explained U.S. interests to Chen and he had come up
with the "four noes." If Hsieh were elected, the Director
said, we would continue to talk about our common interests,
but we would not dictate to Taiwan. Hsieh responded that he
would seek common interests between the U.S. and Taiwan, and
would work to strengthen mutual trust. He would let the U.S.
know what he would do, and he would not do those things he
had said he would not do. Hsieh also said he would pay
attention to working closely to ensure continued U.S. support
for Taiwan's security.


12. (C) Hsieh told the Director he would like to make a trip
to the U.S. and wondered whether he would be allowed to make

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such a visit after his nomination. The Director said the
question would need to be talked over with Washington, but
there was precedent for such a visit. Hsieh said he would
prefer to make such a trip to the U.S. soon, perhaps in June
or July, because once he had begun campaigning in earnest,
there would be no way to take time off to travel abroad.
Hsieh also hopes to visit Japan and perhaps Singapore and
Europe if time permits.

Comment
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13. (C) Hsieh comes across as sober-minded about the
challenges he faces in beating the more popular Ma Ying-jeou,
but he also strikes us as quietly confident in his own
abilities as a politician and a competitor. His tone in
discussing Chen Shui-bian is proper, but betrays no great
affection for his long-time rival. While recognizing that he
needs the DPP establishment to win next year, Hsieh suggests
he will seek to distance himself from some of the party's
more radical ideas, and will expect President Chen to give
him some running space as he outlines his campaign strategy.
We see Chen's willingness to restrain himself as a key test
of Hsieh's ability to unite the DPP behind his candidacy in
the coming months.

YOUNG