Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SUVA57
2007-01-23 20:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Suva
Cable title:  

MILITARY AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT ASK TAIWAN MISSION

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR EAID FJ TW CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6373
OO RUEHKN RUEHMJ RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0057/01 0232046
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 232046Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3695
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0238
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1531
RUEHKN/AMEMBASSY KOLONIA PRIORITY 0180
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO PRIORITY 0622
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 1113
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND PRIORITY 0325
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 0041
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 0731
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0184
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000057 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR EAID FJ TW CH
SUBJECT: MILITARY AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT ASK TAIWAN MISSION
IN FIJI FOR ARMS AND AID

REF: A. SUVA 35


B. SUVA 15

C. STATE 7966

D. SUVA 30

Classified By: Ambassador Dinger per 1.5 (B) and (D)

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000057

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR EAID FJ TW CH
SUBJECT: MILITARY AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT ASK TAIWAN MISSION
IN FIJI FOR ARMS AND AID

REF: A. SUVA 35


B. SUVA 15

C. STATE 7966

D. SUVA 30

Classified By: Ambassador Dinger per 1.5 (B) and (D)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The Taiwan Trade Mission in Fiji has been approached
separately by the Fiji military and the Prime Minister's
Office with requests for aid. A high-ranking military
officer asked the Trade Mission to pass to Taipei a request
for arms and military equipment. The Prime Minister's Office
asked for a continuation of Taiwan's "grass roots" funding,
wherein over USD 1 million annually has been channeled
through the PM's office. The Taiwan representative to Fiji
told us he referred the two requests to Taipei. We strongly
urged that Taiwan say "no" to both. End summary.

Request for Military Aid
--------------

2. (C) Sherman Kuo, Taiwan's unofficial representative to
Fiji, told us that in early January Lt. Colonel Ratu Tevita
Uluilakeba Mara, Commanding Officer of the RFMF third
infantry regiment, approached him about having Taiwan provide
arms and military equipment to Fiji. Kuo said Mara was very
vague, and specified no value or amount of equipment desired
by the RFMF. Kuo told Mara he would seek Taipei's guidance.
Kuo told us he was surprised by the request, since Taiwan
has never developed a military-to-military relationship with
Fiji. He suggested that Mara, who is a long-time
acquaintance, may have been "fishing" without instructions
from his superiors. Kuo said he downplayed the request when
he passed it to Taipei verbally. (Comment: Mara is in the
top echelon of RFMF leadership and was a key player in
planning and executing the coup. He is unlikely to have put
forward any initiative without Bainimarama's explicit
approval. End comment.)

Widescreen TVs From the Taiwan Community
--------------

3. (C) Kuo said Mara was also involved in a more modest
request for Taiwan assistance. Mara approached a Taiwanese

businessman in late December, suggesting that it would be a
good idea for the Taiwan community to donate money and other
items to the RFMF. The businessman in turn suggested to Kuo
that the Taiwan Mission should be the donor. Kuo told the
businessman that the Mission wanted no part of this
transaction. Ultimately, two Taiwan businessmen donated
large flat screen TVs and other items to the RFMF on behalf
of the Taiwan community in Fiji, saying they were grateful
for the military's efforts to maintain peace and stability
(Ref A). Media covered the story.

PM's Office Also Comes Calling
--------------

4. (C) Kuo said he recently received a call from the
interim PM's office in regard to the USD$1.25 million per
year in "grass roots" funding Taiwan has channeled through
the PM's Office in the past. Kuo said such funding is above
board, and that Taiwan has always received an accounting from
the PM's office about projects funded. He admitted, however,
that Taiwan "hasn't looked too closely" at how the money is
spent. (Comment: The PRC Ambassador to Fiji told the
Ambassador earlier this year that this fund has long been a
vehicle whereby Taiwan bought quasi-diplomatic status for the
Taiwan office in Fiji (ref B). The fund appears to us to be
a slush fund for the PM and should, by all rights, be a
target of the Commodore's ballyhooed "clean up campaign."
End comment.)


5. (C) Kuo said Taipei has not yet responded to the request
from the interim PM's office and has put the first quarter
2007 payment to the fund on hold. Using Ref C points, we
strongly urged Taiwan to terminate this "grass roots" funding
program, to say no to the request for military assistance,
and not to take any other steps to underwrite the illegal
interim government. Kuo promised to pass the message back to
Taipei.


SUVA 00000057 002 OF 002


Taiwan Willing to Engage with Interim Regime
--------------

6. (C) Kuo said he has quietly talked to one interim
minister, Bernadette Rounds-Ganilau, about Taiwan engagement
with the interim regime. Rounds-Ganilau told him to bide his
time, because the interim government is much more focused on
building ties to the PRC. Kuo said Taipei would look for
diplomatic openings, such as a visit to Taipei from an
interim minister. He noted that Rounds-Ganilau would be a
good candidate as Minister of Labor, Tourism and the
Environment, since Taiwan will be hosting an environmental
conference at mid-year. Kuo noted that while Taiwan had a
good relationship with PM Qarase, Qarase had not allowed any
of his ministers to travel to Taiwan, for fear of provoking
the PRC.

Comment: The Interim Government and China
--------------

7. (C) Representatives of the PRC Embassy in Fiji told us
again today that, aside from inquiring about the status of
projects agreed to in the past, the interim government of
Fiji, including the military, has not made any requests for
new assistance (see also Ref D). Given the multiple attempts
to engage with Taiwan on assistance, it seems likely that the
interim government has made, or soon will make, similar
approaches to the PRC.








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DINGER