Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SUVA523
2007-11-06 15:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Suva
Cable title:  

FIJI: DEPOSED PM QARASE'S POLITICAL VISION

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR PHUM FJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9769
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0523/01 3101521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061521Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0163
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1858
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 1413
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1619
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 0559
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0967
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000523 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI: DEPOSED PM QARASE'S POLITICAL VISION

REF: A. SUVA 501


B. SUVA 518

C. SUVA 522

Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000523

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI: DEPOSED PM QARASE'S POLITICAL VISION

REF: A. SUVA 501


B. SUVA 518

C. SUVA 522

Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) During a lunch on Nov. 6, deposed PM Qarase sketched
two scenarios he is prepared to offer interim PM Bainimarama
in order to end Fiji's political impasse. Both would involve
reconvening Parliament, at least for a few days. Qarase
admitted that neither is likely to appeal to Bainimarama, who
is "one of a kind, a unique individual." Qarase said he
wants to hew as closely as possible to constitutional
processes; but he indicated a willingness, if necessary, to
consider Bainimarama's People's Charter and/or an amnesty
and/or changes to the race-influenced electoral system.
Qarase has recently raised with other COMs questions of
asylum and possible funding of a trip to Europe and the U.S.
With us, he asked if the Carter Center, or something like it,
might be available to help facilitate political negotiations
in Fiji. We expressed willingness to inquire about American
facilitators when the timing is right, while noting that both
sides need to be amenable if negotiations are to succeed. We
also urged Qarase to hold to the "rule of law" in any offers,
since the alternative is a very slippery slope. End summary.

Lunch with Qarase and Baba
--------------

2. (U) Deposed Fiji Prime Minister Lai Qarase and his SDL
Party colleague Tupeni Baba lunched with the Ambassador and
DCM on Nov. 6. Qarase had phoned last week requesting a
meeting. A quiet lunch seemed appropriate. (Note: Baba has
a varied political past. For years he was prominent in the
Fiji Labor Party. He became Deputy PM and Foreign Minister
in the Chaudhry Government in 1999, after Chaudhry allegedly
reneged on a commitment that Baba could be PM if Labor won.
The Chaudhry-Baba relationship chilled, and after the 2000
coup, Baba became an academic in New Zealand. He came back
to run in the 2006 elections under the SDL banner and lost,
but was appointed to the Senate. He now is a close advisor
of Qarase.)


Move to establish dialogue with Bainimarama
--------------

3. (C) Qarase's only luncheon agenda appeared to be to sketch
in bare-bones terms his negotiation strategy if interim PM
Bainimarama eventually shows willingness to talk. Prior to
last month's Pacific Islands Forum, Qarase wrote to
Bainimarama suggesting they discuss a way out of Fiji's
post-coup predicament. After the Forum, Parmesh Chand,
PermSec in the PM's office, wrote back expressing interest.
Qarase wrote again to follow up, but the only response from
the PM's office has been that ground rules would need to be
established first. When we noted Bainimarama recently told
the press Qarase had kept him waiting for seven years so
Qarase could now wait for a while, Qarase dryly described
Bainimarama as "one of a kind, a unique individual." Qarase
claimed to have always been ready to talk, but Bainimarama
was the problem. That included in early 2006 when then-VP
Madraiwiwi attempted to broker discussions between the two.
Bainimarama ended the arrangement after two sessions,
complaining it was a waste of his time.

Qarase has proposed options
--------------

4. (C) Still, Qarase sees a need to discuss political options
with Bainimarama. The SDL Party wants a solution that
adheres "as close as possible" to the Constitution. First
option would be for Bainimarama to permit the previous SDL
Government to return to power. Qarase noted that is not at
all likely. Second option is to agree on a scenario that
Parliament would reconvene for a week or so in late 2008,
during which it could pass critically important bills if
necessary. Then Qarase would dissolve Parliament and call
new elections. A caretaker government would sit in the
meantime. Qarase stated flatly that he would not accept the
caretaker role this time around. (He took that role in
2000.) Constitutionally mandated timing could be sequenced
to ensure the elections take place in March 2009. Qarase
didn't sound very hopeful that Bainimarama would find option
two attractive either.

All issues on the table
--------------

SUVA 00000523 002 OF 002



5. (C) Nonetheless, Qarase said, the SDL is willing to
discuss all sorts of issues (including approaches that don't
neatly fit within the current Constitution). He noted that
the Party has clearly rejected both "amnesty" and "the
People's Charter," but even those topics can be on the table
if discussing them could take Fiji toward a resolution of its
impasse. Similarly, the SDL is willing to consider
instituting a "common roll" electoral system, something
Bainimarama has advocated publicly in recent weeks. We
emphasized the importance of a constitutional approach, since
deviating from "rule of law" is a slippery slope.

Qarase with other diplomats: asylum? trips?
--------------

6. (C) In a recent conversation with the Australian High
Commissioner, Qarase asked about the prospect of some sort of
asylum at the Australian compound if things get really bad.
The response reportedly was to urge Qarase to develop other
contingency plans. (Note: Qarase told us he had heard Nov. 5
he was on the list of those to be arrested for allegedly
participating in an assassination plot; but a very reliable
source had later informed him that his name is no longer on
the list (ref C).) With the EU, Qarase sought funding for an
SDL delegation to visit Europe and the United States early in
the new year to educate Fiji's diaspora and, presumably,
raise funds. Trips to Australia and New Zealand are also on
the drawing board.

Query to USG: possible facilitator of talks?
--------------

7. (C) At our lunch, the only distinct query was whether an
American organization like the Carter Center might be
available to facilitate a Qarase-Bainimarama dialogue. We
proposed that the critical first step is for both sides to be
ready to talk seriously about a negotiated solution,
something we have yet to sense from Bainimarama, at least not
yet. If conditions ripen, we said we would gladly pursue a
request to make inquiries in the U.S., with the Carter Center
or others. We also noted the East West Center's continuing
willingness, when the time is right, to facilitate a
"talanoa" dialogue among Fiji leaders, as took place after
the 2000 coup.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) When Qarase met with EU COMs on Nov. 5, he reportedly
was extremely distracted by the "assassination plot" news.
By noon on Nov. 6, he had relaxed again. As best we could
tell, his primary intention was to probe for U.S. views
regarding his negotiation strategy with Bainimarama. Per
above, we urged staying on the high road, adhering to "rule
of law" standards. Past post-coup negotiations in Fiji that
offered up amnesties outside of legal processes ended up
encouraging the military leadership's "coup culture" with the
result that Fiji's political and economic stability have
suffered greatly.
DINGER