IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS - TONGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SUVA 000512

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/I-PM AND EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2032
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL CVIS IZ TN
SUBJECT: IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS - TONGA

REF: STATE 150164

Classified By: Ambassador Larry M. Dinger per 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Responding to reftel queries, Embassy Suva's view is
that, under current circumstances in Tonga, by far the
easiest mechanism to retain the Tonga Defense Service (TDS)
as part of MNFI is through reftel scenario four - Tonga

commits forces under U.S. command. This is essentially the
means by which Tonga contributed troops in 2004 and has again
in 2007. Following are our preliminary answers to the
questions raised in reftel, paragraphs 3 and 4:

--Which scenario will require only an executive decision?

Under scenario four, the procedure essentially used in 2004
and 2007, the TDS military deployments to MNFI have only
required Defense Board approval. The Defense Board includes
the King, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and
the Commander TDS.

--Which will require legislative approval or ratification?

Without consulting Tonga attorneys, we cannot judge if any of
scenarios one through three would require legislative
ratification. If legislative ratification would be required,
under the current Tonga political system the King's view
rules. He, via his Cabinet and representatives of the Tonga
Nobles, can override any objections within the Parliament.
Reform to a more democratic system is taking place, though
major changes to reduce the King's power and dramatically
increase the power of elected MPs now appear delayed until

2010.

--Are you aware of similar actions taken by Tonga, or are
there scenarios which would be novel?

Scenario four would not be novel; all others would be. Tonga
was among the first countries to join MNFI - it decided to
commit troops to Iraq before UNSCR 1546. When UNSCR 1546 was
agreed in June 2004, Tonga's contingent was already training
in Kuwait for entry to Iraq.

--What is the estimated time frame?

Under scenario four, a deployment currently could be approved
by the Defense Board in as few as two months. The 2007
deployment took much longer, in part because the Prime
Minister was concerned about public perceptions and in part
because of domestic political developments (death of the late
King; a convulsive political riot). Presuming Tonga's
political reforms continue, government sensitivities to the
public mood will only increase.

--Are you confident in these assessments, or would you need
to engage Foreign Ministry lawyers in order to give an
authoritative answer?

We are confident about our legal assessment of scenario four
under Tonga's government as it currently exists. Per above,
we cannot judge the other scenarios, and we reiterate that
political reforms now under way appear destined to alter the
power structure. Those reforms could certainly change the
dynamic of the Defense Board, affecting even scenario four.

-- Concerning domestic politics, would a UNSCR of some kind
be necessary? If so, would it need to authorize military
action (Chapter VII) or would a generic (non-Chapter VII)
call to support Iraq suffice?

We believe Tonga's participation in MNFI to date has been
based much more on the King's role and the Tonga military's
strong ties to the U.S. military than to any UNSCRs. Still,
a UNSCR, especially a Chapter VII UNSCR, would certainly be
helpful. Prior to the current deployment, Tonga's Prime
Minister raised serious concerns about sending another
contingent to Iraq. His primary concern was political
fall-out if there are casualties. The lack of a Chapter VII
UNSCR would further reduce the comfort level of Tonga's
politicians and could impact Tonga's long-term commitment to
MNFI. Also, as noted above, it appears the political reform
process will significantly increase the role of elected
parliamentarians, reducing our confidence level about future
deployments.


2. (C) Finally, the Tonga Government has conveyed a
diplomatic note indicating that U.S.-Tonga relations will
suffer if the U.S. does not rapidly find a way to provide
visa services to Tonga citizens in Tonga. See Suva 435 and
State 136893. The Tonga diplomatic note and subsequent
conversations made clear that the current six-month TDS
deployment to MNFI and a follow-on six-month deployment in
2008 are not affected by the threat, but any subsequent
deployment requests would be seriously endangered.
DINGER