Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SUVA241
2007-04-25 21:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Suva
Cable title:  

FIJI AND THE EU: A "POSITIVE OUTCOME"; QUESTIONS

Tags:  PREL PHUM EAID ASEC FJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0013
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1675
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0094
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0076
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 1248
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1444
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 0439
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0849
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000241 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID ASEC FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI AND THE EU: A "POSITIVE OUTCOME"; QUESTIONS
REMAIN

REF: SUVA 222

Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID ASEC FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI AND THE EU: A "POSITIVE OUTCOME"; QUESTIONS
REMAIN

REF: SUVA 222

Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The EU-Fiji negotiations in Brussels April 18-19 were
seen as reasonably successful by both sides. The EU figures
it has achieved a pragmatic set of requirements that Fiji
must meet to re-instate rule of law and human rights and to
build to new elections within two years. Fiji's interim
government probably figures it has created enough loopholes
that it can find wiggle room to delay things as necessary.
The EU says it will carefully observe developments and will
only release aid funds if progress across the board is
satisfactory. In light of the Brussels results, the EU plans
to release a first tranche of sugar assistance shortly.
Thorny issues remain, and we are skeptical. Still, if the
interim government does make good-faith efforts on the road
to important reforms, the USG should seriously consider
assisting election preparations with other donors in a
coordinated way. The EU has particularly inquired about
census expertise, finding a supervisor of elections, and
offering wise advice for somehow establishing a legitimate
way to make important governmental appointments during an
interim period when those in power are illegitimate. End
summary.

Pre-negotiations behind the scenes in Suva
--------------

2. (C) Fiji's interim government (IG) has characterized the
outcome of its April 18-19 consultations with the EU in
Brussels as generally "positive." Such discussions are
mandated under the EU's Cotonou Agreement when an aid
recipient suffers a coup. The EU rep in Suva, Roberto
Ridolfi, sees the result as somewhat hopeful, though he
acknowledges that much work remains to be done to translate
sometimes-vague commitments into concrete progress on a
return to democratic values. Ridolfi said most of the actual
negotiations with Fiji's interim government took place in
Suva in the two weeks prior to the Brussels meeting in a
"non-megaphone" environment. Ridolfi and reps from the UK
and French embassies met privately with Bainimarama and a
number of IG cabinet members, sometimes repeatedly.


Bainimarama's mind set and a human rights concern
-------------- ---

3. (C) Ridolfi and the UK Charge both commented to us that it
was obvious interim cabinet members are not a united front.
They all have personal agendas. The only unifying factor is
Bainimarama's will. The UK Charge said it was obvious that
Bainimarama and his Military Council are paramount. It was
also obvious that Bainimarama truly believes he can force
people to become non-racist and accept an RFMF-endorsed
government before elections occur. He is convinced, though,
that most Fiji citizens are already "on board," which is why
no dissent is now obvious. Still, Bainimarama told the
European diplomats, "if someone insults the President or the
RFMF, of course we must have them taken to the barracks and
have them beaten up."

Did the interim government underestimate the EU?
-------------- ---

4. (C) The UK Charge believes the IG completely
underestimated how well the EU could see through IG arguments
and how tough the EU would be. It was obvious that the IG
was looking to insert loopholes and fudge factors to muddy EU
efforts to enforce inconvenient aspects of any final
agreement. The IG team to Brussels led by interim Foreign
Minister Nailatikau also included interim Finance Minister
Chaudhry and interim Attorney General Sayed-Khaiyum. Ridolfi
noted that Chaudhry and Sayed-Khaiyum appeared to act "in
tandem," with Nailatikau operating separately. During the
discussions, Sayed-Khaiyum did much of the talking, and
Chaudhry was a non-factor. (Note: that is very unlike
Chaudhry.) At one point, after Sayed-Khaiyum had repeatedly
attempted to justify IG actions as "legal under the
Constitution," an EU Director General reportedly lost all
patience and instructed: "Don't try to say things are legal
when they simply are not."

Red lines secure, but compromises

SUVA 00000241 002 OF 003


--------------

5. (C) In the end, the EU compromised on a series of issues
but never crossed its "red lines." We are told the "red
lines" included: no more than 24 months to elections; an end
to the state of emergency; the rule of law; and adequate
protection for human rights. The EU obtained a 24-month time
frame to free and fair elections, counting from March 1,
2007, after initially asking for 18 months in the face of an
IG insistence on 36 or more months. It also received rather
general commitments to protect human rights and due process
of law. The EU dropped its proposal that Bainimarama and the
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) withdraw from
government roles. That was going to be a serious sticking
point, and the EU figured any "civilian" replacement for
Bainimarama as interim PM, or replacements for other military
officers in other key roles, would in reality be puppets.
Better to deal with the guys actually exercising power.

A package: commitment brings aid; EU decides
--------------

6. (C) Ridolfi said the final agreement is "a package." EU
aid money flows only if the entire package, "100%," is being
achieved. "There is no short cut" to allow a lesser flow.
Ridolfi told us defining details and setting interim
timelines is totally in the EU's hands. The IG can offer
excuses, but the EU has total freedom to judge. An example
is an IG commitment to remove Fiji's state of emergency in
May, "subject to" evaluation of the actual security threat.
The "subject to" language may appear soft, and indeed the IG
may attempt to claim a security threat continues; however,
the EU will insist on persuasive evidence before accepting
delay. In that regard, Ridolfi said the EU would welcome USG
help in judging whether, if a delay is sought, any IG
justification actually reflects the threat reality. (Note:
media in Suva have said the EU set a May 5 deadline for
removing the state of emergency. Ridolfi said the IG
commitment is to remove it "in May.")

EU already sees a degree of difference
--------------

7. (C) The EU is already seeing a degree of difference in the
IG's approach to issues. Now that the Brussels agreement
requires the IG to follow constitutional processes in
appointing a new Vice President, Bainimarama's earlier
suggestion, after the Great Council of Chiefs rejected the
President's nominee, that the new VP would be named by
presidential decree seems to have been shelved. When we
noted that, instead, there now are indications the IG will
attempt to pack the Great Council of Chiefs with new,
malleable members and achieve its choice of VP in that
constitutionally shaky way, Ridolfi acknowledged that some
issues will be complex and the IG may try to wedge itself
into loopholes. He insisted, though, that the EU will be
observant and alone will judge results.

Turning on the money flow
--------------

8. (C) Ridolfi said decisions about the money flow are for
Brussels. If it appears the IG is performing appropriately
across all benchmarks, the tap will open. If not, it will
stop. At this point, given a "positive outcome" from the
Brussels meeting and a desire to encourage cooperation,
Ridolfi expects to announce shortly the release of F$9
million (US$5.5 million) in aid as a "confidence building"
measure. Another F$44 million (US$28 million) is in the
works, with another F$120 million (US$73 million) in the
pipeline. (Comment: we acknowledged it is the EU's money,
but suggested that, at most, an initial dribble rather than a
gusher would be appropriate, given that actual results thus
far are quite modest and Bainimarama responds much more
usefully to sticks than to carrots.)

How to deal with the "appointments" issue?
--------------

9. (C) Ridolfi observed that the governmental appointments
process is very complicated in this interim period. The EU
realizes that the IG has no legal power to make appointments,
yet "constitutional" appointments do need to be made,
including to important organizations like the Judicial
Services Commission. Some sort of "proxy parliament" is
needed, not dominated by the IG yet acceptable to
Bainimarama, "who holds power after all." Ridolfi is

SUVA 00000241 003 OF 003


wondering if an adaptation of a "People's Charter" concept
might work: a group of distinguished leaders from a variety
of Fiji organizations, perhaps co-chaired by Bainimarama and
the former VP, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, with the mandate to make
legitimate appointments and oversee any civic- and
voter-education drives in the lead-up to elections. When we
expressed skepticism that any such body would really be free
enough of RFMF influence to truly be considered "legitimate,"
Ridolfi acknowledged the point but reiterated that the EU,
needing to be "both cynical and practical," is looking for an
answer. He asked, "Does the U.S. have a creative idea on
this?"

U.S. help for a census and other electoral efforts?
-------------- --------------

10. (C) As regards the elections process, Ridolfi is just as
confident as we are that a free and fair election could be
accomplished in well under 24 months. Clearly, though, the
IG wants to stretch things out, to give time to re-educate
the Fiji public to think in "non-racist," progressive terms,
and lay a positive track record for itself. Ridolfi argued
it is in the international community's interest to provide
assistance to facilitate a credible and timely election
process. He noted a need to tap resources beyond those of
Australia and New Zealand. He was aware that a U.S. census
expert (Michael Levin) has provided technical assistance to
Fiji in the past, and he wondered if the U.S. could provide
such assistance now. We noted the USG's step-by-step
approach about any re-engagement, but did observe that we
have not hindered Levin's consultations with Fiji's census
bureau. We agreed to check on possibilities. Ridolfi also
said a supervisor of elections will be needed for a two-year
appointment. Nobody within Fiji has both the credentials and
the willingness to serve in that role. Would the U.S. know
of an appropriate candidate? We offered to check.

Comment
--------------

11. (C) The EU believes it achieved a reasonable outcome from
the Brussels meeting, a "pragmatic approach," recognizing the
power realities on the ground, that may motivate Bainimarama
and his interim government to reform their act and move to
elections within two years. Bainimarama's own red lines (to
maintain control, to protect his skin, to transform the
Fijian mind set) would seem not to be compatible with such
near-term reforms. Thus, we retain a healthy dose of
skepticism about the prospects. Ridolfi, himself, claims to
be skeptical as well, though he is accenting "pragmatism" for
now and clearly wants to see the aid flow resume. An element
that will affect the EU's approach is the Pacific Islands
Forum working group that is about to hire a team of elections
specialists to evaluate just how long really is needed to
achieve an acceptable election and is to report back in six
weeks.


12. (C) To the extent the IG does undertake concrete steps to
begin to meet the EU's and PIF's expectations, which would
most likely begin to meet USG expectations, too, it would be
appropriate for USG election-oriented assistance and advice
to flow with that of others. Discussion is already under way
among donors about the need to coordinate such efforts. For
now, does Washington have any advice we can provide the EU
regarding the questions raised in para's 9 and 10: a way to
legitimize appointments? near-term census assistance? a savvy
candidate from somewhere for supervisor of elections?
DINGER