FIJI PM OFFICE PERMANENT SECRETARY MEETS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000223

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS: ASEC AMGT CASC PREL FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI PM OFFICE PERMANENT SECRETARY MEETS WITH
AMBASSADOR DINGER ON EMBASSY BARRIERS ISSUE

REF: A. SUVA 220


B. SUVA 212

Classified By: Ambassador Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) PM Office Permanent Secretary Parmesh Chand told the
Ambassador April 17 that interim PM Bainimarama issued the
directive to remove barriers in front of the Embassy because
he was very upset about U.S. comments against the interim
government. These included the video conference DAS Davies
held with reporters in March, the revocation of Bainimarama's
visa, and statements made by DAS Davies during his visit to
Fiji (which were after the first barriers notice). We
responded to Chand's litany and provided U.S. arguments why
the barriers need to stay in place. Chand asked how the
United States might reciprocate if the interim government
does not remove the barriers. Chand seemed to accept the
Ambassador's statement that the United States does not link
Embassy security issues with our political stance on the
interim regime. Chand said that he hopes the U.S. and Fiji
could find "a middle ground" to defuse the barrier issue.
Perhaps there is a need "to buy some time," he said. The
Ambassador raised the issue of visas for OBO employees to
work on the NEC. Chand sought clarification on the status of
the OBO people: USG employees or contractors? Chand said a
possible "compromise" might be to focus attention on the U.S.
commitment to construct the NEC, the long-term solution to
the Loftus Street problem. Chand said he would discuss these
issues with Bainimarama and contact the Ambassador again
shortly. End summary.

Ambassador Explains Why the Barriers are Needed
-------------- --

2. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by reviewing why the
United States believes the vehicle barriers are needed to
stop a potential terrorist attack and are a bargain for Fiji.
Even though there are no specific indications of
international terror activity in Fiji at the moment, there
have been indicators in the past, and experience tells us
that no location is immune. If the barriers are taken down,
the Embassy would be an easy target. Most victims of any
attack would be Fiji citizens. It is in the interest of both
the United States and Fiji to protect the Embassy. The
barriers are clearly the best way to do that. The Ambassador
noted that Fiji and the United States have worked together
since 1998 to ensure the security of the Embassy. The
current arrangement has worked well and should continue, at
least for the next two years until a new embassy compound
(NEC) can be completed. Per guidance from Washington, the
Ambassador said the USG will not remove the barriers itself,
will suspend visa operations during any removal operation,
will need assurances that Fiji authorities will ensure
sufficient security thereafter (an expensive proposition),
and will make a fresh assessment of the embassy's security
posture, impact on visa services, etc. (We are e-mailing the
talking points to EAP/ANP).

Interim PM's Anger At US Reached a Boiling Point
-------------- ---

3. (C) Chand said the decision by Bainimarama to order
removal of the barriers "happened at the spur of the moment."
He said U.S. actions over the past several weeks "haven't
helped Fiji at all, and the interim PM has become very
upset." In the current environment, Chand continued, the
U.S. should "exercise some sensitivity and caution in
presenting its views. The situation in Fiji is tense, and we
don't want people out there lecturing us."


4. (C) Chand specifically mentioned the video teleconference
DAS Davies held with Fiji journalists in March, the
cancellation of Bainimarama's visa, and comments made by DAS
Davies during his recent visit to Fiji. Echoing statements
Bainimarama made in his statement last week (ref B),Chand
said DAS Davies' comments in the DVC were "made from
thousands of miles away, without realizing the real situation
here." The letter to the interim PM requesting that he bring
his visa to the Embassy to be canceled showed a lack of
sensitivity to the leader of a foreign country and was a
violation of basic protocol. Finally, even though DAS Davies
held meetings with two senior interim government officials
(Foreign Minister Nailatikau and Finance Minister Chaudhry),
he "made a big song and dance about the interim PM not seeing
him."

U.S. Responses
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SUVA 00000223 002 OF 002



5. (C) The Ambassador responded that the U.S. has conveyed a
consistent message about the coup and the interim government.
DAS Davies held to that message, which emphasized agreement
with the Pacific Island Forum countries on the way forward,
in both his DVC and his visit to Suva. The cancellation of
Bainimarama's visa was done privately, as far as the USG was
concerned. It was the Commodore who publicized it, and he
publicly said he understood that the embassy merely offered
the option of bringing the visa in for cancellation, it was
not a requirement. As for comments about the lack of a
Bainimarama meeting, DAS Davies merely noted it was a "lost
opportunity," which it was. Chand acknowledged that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a diplomatic note requesting
removal of the barriers prior to Davies' visit, but insisted
the visit contributed to the generally tense atmosphere that
led to the Commander's decision to force removal of the
barriers.

Any Way to Make A Deal?
--------------

6. (C) Noting that the interim PM had already issued the
directive publicly to remove the barriers, Chand said the
only thing he could do would be to present the Ambassador's
views. Chand said Bainimarama had asked him to find out how
the U.S. might reciprocate if the interim government decided
not to remove the barriers. The Ambassador responded that
the U.S. political stance on the coup and the interim
government is totally separate from the security issues
facing the Embassy. A more appropriate question might be to
ask what the U.S. might do if the barriers are indeed
removed. The Ambassador inquired what specific U.S. steps
the interim PM was suggesting? Chand did not answer, but
said he understood that the political and security issues are
not linked.

A Middle Ground?
--------------

7. (C) Chand asked if there is any way, short of vehicle
barriers, to adequately protect the Embassy. Road bumps or a
ban on parking or stopping on Loftus Street? The Ambassador
replied that the vehicle barriers appear to be the only
reliable method to prevent a potential car bomb, since they
force vehicles to stop and be checked. Chand said he was
trying to think of a way out of the dilemma. "Maybe we need
to buy some time," he said. "Perhaps there is a middle
ground." The Ambassador expressed willingness to have
experts explore if alternatives to the barriers could be
effective, but he noted the embassy would likely have already
implemented such alternatives if they were obvious.

A Package Solution Involving the NEC?
--------------

8. (C) The Ambassador noted that the ultimate solution to
the problem of security at the Embassy is for the USG to
construct its own building with set-back. That construction
is ready to begin, but is being held up because the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs won't confer diplomatic status on the new
Embassy staff who will be overseeing the project. Chand said
that Finance Minister Chaudhry had raised the issue (after
his meeting with DAS Davies),but MFA had responded that the
U.S. was asking Fiji to confer diplomatic status on
contractors who were not employed by the Department of State.
The Ambassador offered to seek clarification on that right
away. (We are doing so via separate e-mail). Chand
suggested that, if the visa issue could be resolved,
construction of the NEC might offer a way out of the current
dilemma. The interim government, he said, might highlight
NEC construction as a solution to the Loftus Street problem
while both sides could state that the construction
illustrates continued U.S. involvement in Fiji. Chand
stressed he was speaking informally. He said he would
discuss these issues with Bainimarama and get back to the
Ambassador by the morning of April 18.

Comment
--------------

9. (C) Chand left no doubt that interim PM Bainimarama and
his military colleagues frequently react in knee-jerk fashion
to irritations. The U.S. strong stand against the coup and
the interim government's activities is such an irritation.
We provided the arguments for the vehicle barriers to stay in
place, and Chand appeared to understand them. He clearly
wants to find a "compromise" way out. Whether Bainimarama
will accept such a "compromise" is not at all clear. If we
can resolve the NEC visa flap and can advertise the
construction project as the "compromise" there may be a way
forward. We are not yet optimistic.
DINGER