DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 029082

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
USDOJ FOR DIRECTOR INTERPOL-USNCB
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE, JOSE CARDENAS, AND GREG GATJANIS
FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT
PARIS PASS TO APP LYON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016
TAGS: IR AR LE PGOV PREL FBI PTER KJUS ASEC PRT
KTFN, KISL, KIRF, OAS, IT, UK, FR, GM
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG
ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH MARCH 13-15 INTERPOL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN LYON, FRANCE

Ref: A. BUENOS AIRES 46 B. 2006 BUENOS AIRES 2749 and
previous

Classified By: Under Secretary Nicholas Burns for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraphs
2, 3, 4, 5, and 12.

(U) SUMMARY
--------------


2. (C) Argentina has asked for USG assistance in
persuading Interpol to issue six Red Notices for five
current and former Iranian officials and one Lebanese
national thought by Argentina to be criminally
responsible for the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli
Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Ambassadors
for all action addresses, except Tel Aviv, are requested
to approach host governments at the highest level to
convey U.S. strong support in this matter. Ambassadors
also are requested to meet with their Argentine
counterparts to discuss AMIA and U.S. interests and
actions. The AMIA attack killed 85 and wounded more
than 150 individuals. Argentina originally requested
that Interpol issue Red Notices for eight Iranian present
and former officials and one notice against a Hizballah
terrorist leader. Iran has formally objected to the
eight Iranian notices and said that Argentina's request
is political. The Interpol Executive Council (EC) will
meet next week beginning on March 13 to consider a
compromise whereby Red Notices will issue for five
Iranian officials and the Hizballah terrorist leader but
will not issue for a former Iranian President, a former
Iranian Foreign Minister, and a former Iranian
Ambassador. Argentina supports this compromise as does
the USG. The GOA is concerned that the EC will decide
against Argentina without a strong U.S. lobbying effort
and we are prepared to pursue such an effort, as
discussed below. For guidance on the public posture to
be taken by Embassy if necessary, including if asked
guidance, please see paragraph 17.


3. (C) If after reviewing this cable, Embassy
determines that making the approach recommended here
would be counterproductive to U.S. and Argentine efforts
to obtain support for the Interpol compromise, Embassy
should report this to Washington and await further
guidance. Further, if Embassies Berlin, Rome, and Madrid
believe this approach would be counterproductive to U.S.
efforts on behalf of U.S. personnel who are the subject
of criminal proceedings, then Embassy should report this
to Washington.


4. (C) For Embassy Tel Aviv: Post is requested to
convey the USG's interest in AMIA. Post also should
inquire and report on any actions that the GOI is taking
at home or with other capitals with respect to the AMIA
matter before Interpol.

OBJECTIVES
--------------


5. (C) Post should determine the most appropriate
person at a senior level to deliver the demarche in order
to achieve the desired results of support for Argentina's
case at next week's Interpol Executive Committee meeting
in Lyon, France, March 13-16. Embassy should pursue the

STATE 00029082 002 OF 005


-- Thank host government for all past efforts to fight
international terrorism.

-- Remind or inform host government officials of the
AMIA arrest warrants, noting that the GOA's request for
Red Notices was made on the basis of a recently concluded
GOA investigation of the AMIA bombing,

-- Note that the AMIA bombing in 1994 was a heinous act
of premeditated murder against innocent civilians and
that Argentina is trying to bring to justice those its
prosecutors have concluded are responsible for the worst
act of terrorism to occur in South America.

-- Note that we understand the Interpol Secretariat will
recommend to the Interpol Executive Committee that
Interpol 1) not publish Red Notices for three former
Iranian officials (former President Rafsanjani, former
Foreign Minister Velayati, and former Ambassador to
Argentina Soleimanpour) and 2) support issuance of Red
Notices for the remaining six suspects, including the
Hizballah -IJO leader. (See details in Background.)

-- Note that in addition this recent Red Notice under
consideration, Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah
is the subject of two other Red Notices. He is wanted in
Argentina for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aries and by the United States for his role in the
1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 and related murders.

-- The USG supports this compromise position developed by
Interpol as appropriate under the circumstances. It will
help Argentina in its efforts to achieve justice in the
wake of a major terrorist attack on its territory against
innocent civilians. It is also consistent with Interpol
practice.

-- Note that USG understands the GOA has already reached
out to host government Foreign Ministry and government's
ambassadors in Buenos Aires in all action addressee
countries with representatives on the Interpol Executive
Committee. (Note: Argentina and Singapore do not have
diplomatic missions in each other's countries but the
Argentine Charge in Indonesia has met in Singapore with
GOS officials.) GOA may also contact host government's
Interpol Executive Committee member to provide further
information on the case as the Red Notice process
continues.

-- Explain to host government that the U.S. supports
Argentina's request for international support for the
Interpol approach. Express our strong hope that host
government will support the approach that has been
developed at Interpol at the upcoming Executive Committee
meeting in Lyon.

Only if asked about immunity issues or other potential
Iranian defenses:

-- Note that our support is focused on the context of
this specific case, drawing upon the following points as
needed: (1) the individuals with the strongest bases for
immunity are excluded, (2) Iran has not justified or
explained the basis of any immunity for any of the
officials, including the remaining lower level officials,
(3) the attack on AMIA was a vicious terrorist act that
specifically targeted innocent civilians for which the
six individuals have been charged and (4) the approach is
consistent with Interpol practice.

REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


STATE 00029082 003 OF 005


6. (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by
cable to WHA/BSC - Drew Blakeney and NEA/IR - Sean Misko
no later than March 9, 2007. Please caption cables
"SIPDIS" and include the IR and PTER tags. We appreciate
posts' assistance with this important demarche.

BACKGROUND
--------------


7. (U) On July 18, 1994, Argentina suffered its worst
terrorist attack, when the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
Association (AMIA) was bombed, killing 85 and wounding
more than 150. The attack came two years after a
terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires,
which left 29 dead and destroyed the building. The U.S.
has supported an investigation against the individuals
involved for over 12 years.


8. (U) On October 25, 2006, an Argentine special
prosecutor issued a formal investigative report on the
terrorist bombing of AMIA. On November 9, 2006 Argentine
federal judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral issued arrest
warrants against Iran's former President and current
chairman of the Expediency Council Ali Akbar Rafsanjani,
former Foreign Minister and current Khamenei advisor Ali
Akbar Velayati, former Minister of Intelligence and
current Assembly of Experts member Ali Fallahijan, former
IRGC Commander and current Expediency Council member
Mohsen Rezai, former Qods Force leader and current Deputy
Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, former Ambassador of Iran
(Buenos Aires) Hadi Soleimanpour, former Iranian Embassy
(Buenos Aires) Cultural Attache Mohsen Rabbani, and
former third secretary of the Iranian Embassy Ahmed Reza
Asghari (a.k.a. Mohsen Randjbaran). The report named
Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah as well. (FYI
- In addition to being wanted in connection with the AMIA
bombing, Mughniyah also is the subject of an Interpol Red
Notice (requested by GOA) for the 1992 bombing of the
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Further, on December
27, 2006, Interpol issued a Red Notice, at USNCB's
request, for Mughniyah for his role in the 1985 hijacking
of TWA flight 847. The Red Notice is based on
Mughniyah's federal indictment in U.S. District Court
District of Columbia for conspiracy to commit aircraft
piracy and take hostages, murder, hostage taking, and
aircraft piracy.)


9. (U) On November 16, 2006 the GOA sent applications
for the issuance of Red Notices to the International
Criminal Police Organization ("Interpol") seeking the
assistance of the other 185 Interpol member countries in
bringing the charged individuals to justice. The GOI
challenged the Argentine application for Red Notices as
politically motivated and also threatened to level tit-
for-tat indictments of Argentine officials involved in
the AMIA case. Interpol agreed to hold issuance of Red
Notices in abeyance until each side could explain its
position. GOA and Iranian government officials met in
Lyon, France, on January 22, to present their
perspectives on the case. After hearing GOA and GOI
presentations, the Interpol Secretariat deferred action
on the AMIA Red Notice applications to the Interpol
Executive Committee which will meet March 13-16, in Lyon.


10. (SBU) The Interpol General Counsel has since
recommended not issuing Red Notices for three defendants.
The notices against Rafsanjani and Velayati are not being
issued in light of the head of state immunity. The
notice against Soleimanpour is not being issued because
an earlier denial by the UK of a GOA extradition request
for him demonstrated that there was insufficient
evidence. Proceeding with a Red Notice under such
circumstances would unnecessarily put Interpol into a
political conflict with its members. The GOA has
informed us that it is prepared to concur in these

STATE 00029082 004 OF 005



11. (C) The Argentine government has conducted a
investigation and has concluded the AMIA bombing was a
premeditated attack funded by the Iranian regime and
executed by Hizballah. The AMIA bombing killed 85 and
wounded more than 150 innocent civilians; it was the
deadliest terror attack in the hemisphere until September
11, 2001. An Argentine trial and conviction of the
individuals sought would establish the Iranian regime's
and Hizballah's role in this attack and underscore
Tehran's flagrant violation of international law and
callous disregard for the lives of innocent civilians.
The issuance of Interpol Red Notices for the 6
individuals (five Iranians and Mugniyah) noted above
would advance U.S. counter terrorism policy objectives by
supporting Argentina in its effort to prosecute those who
it believes were responsible for this act of terror;
spotlighting Iran's role as the leading state sponsor of
international terrorism; increasing the costs to Tehran
for its continued support of terrorism; and further
exposing Hizballah's illegitimate, extremist agenda and
role in carrying out terrorist attacks around the world.


12. (C) In supporting Argentine efforts, an important
USG interest is in ensuring that we do so in a way that
does not undermine our efforts to defend U.S. officials
from foreign prosecutions relating to official conduct.
These risks are minimized in this case because of its
specific context, including the fact that the individuals
with the strongest bases for immunity are excluded, Iran
has not justified or explained the basis of any immunity
for any of its officials, including the remaining lower
level ones, the approach is consistent with Interpol
practice, and it does not prevent Iran from raising
immunity or other defenses bilaterally in the context of
a specific extradition request. It is therefore
important that our support for Interpol's compromise
approach be tied to this specific case. If, and only if,
host governments raise questions or concerns about
immunity issues or other potential Iranian defenses, post
should note that our support is focused on the context of
this specific case, note some of the specific factors
enumerated above, and request further guidance as
necessary.


13. (U) Either country taking issue with a decision of
the Executive Committee may petition the Interpol General
Assembly, meeting in Morocco in November 2007, for a
final and decisive vote on the issue.


14. (U) A Red Notice is an international "wanted"
notice that provides information on the identification of
fugitives charged with or convicted of serious crimes.
Red Notices are issued by Interpol in Lyon at the request
of one of the 186 Interpol member countries. The country
initiating the notice commits to seeking the provisional
arrest and extradition of the fugitive in question should
he or she be located. Prior to issuance, the Interpol
General Secretariat (IPSG) reviews each proposed Red
Notice to ensure compliance with the Interpol
Constitution. In particular, the General Secretariat
reviews the Red Notice application to ensure compliance
with Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution, which
prohibits Interpol from engaging in activities of "a
political, military, religious, or racial character."


15. (U) Additional historical background: Interpol
issued Red Notices in November 2003 for 12 individuals
implicated in the AMIA case, but the GOI complained of
investigative irregularities by the Argentine judge
involved in the earlier investigation of the bombing and
the issuance of the warrants upon which the Red Notices
were based. Based on the GOI's complaint, the Interpol
Executive Committee cancelled the Red Notices in

STATE 00029082 005 OF 005

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG
ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH MARCH 13-15 INTERP
September 2005. On September 21, 2005, the GOA
petitioned the Interpol General Assembly then meeting in
Berlin to reinstate the Red Notices, but the General
Assembly voted overwhelmingly to support the Executive
Committee's decision to cancel the notices. A new
prosecutor and judge have been leading a new
investigation over the past two years. Based on their
more complete and professional investigation, they have
issued new indictments and arrest warrants now under
consideration by Interpol.

POINTS OF CONTACT
--------------


16. (U) Please contact the following individuals by
email for any further background information or talking
points on any aspect of the demarche to meet our
objectives: WHA - Drew Blakeney/Caroline Croft, NEA/IR -
Sean Misko/Tim Standaert, S/CT - Arnold Sierra/Patrick
Worman, L/LEI - Emily Daughtry.

PUBLIC POSTURE
--------------


17. (SBU) Approaches to host governments should be non-
public through appropriate diplomatic channels. It is
important that Argentina remain in the lead of this
effort and that our role be perceived as a supportive
rather than leading one. If asked by press or others
about USG position, posts can, on the record:

-- Acknowledge that USG strongly supports Argentina's
efforts to permit Red Notices to be delivered for certain
present and former Iranian officials in this AMIA case.

-- We support the Jewish Community of Buenos Aires.

-- In February, both AG Gonzales and U/S Burns assured
AMIA leaders that we would support justice in this case.

-- The attack on AMIA was a vicious act of terrorism.
Argentina has conducted a comprehensive investigation and
believes that present and former Iranian officials were
behind this act of murder. We support their efforts to
see that those responsible for this terrorist act are
brought to Justice.

-- Posts should not/not get into a public discussion of
any immunity or related issues that might be raised.

(If necessary, other questions can be referred back to
Washington for consideration.)
RICE