DEMARCHE INSTRUCTION ON KOSOVO FINAL STATUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 166909

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE INSTRUCTION ON KOSOVO FINAL STATUS

Classified By: IO PDAS James B. Warlick for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d)


1. (SBU) This is an action request. The Department
requests that Embassies in current and new (2008)
non-European members of the UN Security Council Countries
(except Beijing) deliver the following demarche on Kosovo
at the highest appropriate level before December 17. This
message is info only for Beijing.


2. (C) The objectives of this demarche are to:

-- Convey our assessment that negotiations on Kosovo's
future status have exhausted their potential to produce an
agreement and should not continue;

-- Note that the United States and Europe want to work
with other members of the international community to
resolve urgently Kosovo's status and that we believe that
the plan of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, including
his recommendation of supervised independence for Kosovo,
is the best way forward;

-- Urge helpful messages at the December 19 UN Security
Council (UNSC) session on Kosovo and afterward, including
vocal support for the Ahtisaari recommendations;

-- Provide some background on the Kosovo issue to new UNSC
members.


3. (C) BACKGROUND (HISTORY): For the last fifteen years,
the UNSC has taken action to respond to the threats to
international peace and security connected to the violent
disintegration of Yugoslavia. The UNSC will soon consider
the last major unsettled issue related to the breakup of
Yugoslavia: the status of Kosovo. Following eight years
of UN administration through the UN Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) and two years of negotiations, the process to
determine Kosovo's status (i.e., whether it should become
independent or whether Serbia should retain sovereignty)
is about to conclude. In 1999, after the Kosovo war, UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 established UNMIK
to provide a transitional administration for Kosovo and to
establish and oversee the development of provisional
democratic self-governing institutions. UNMIK's
responsibilities under resolution 1244 included
facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo's
future status. The resolution did not rule out any
possible status outcomes. UN Secretary-General (SYG) Kofi
Annan appointed in November 2005, former Finnish President
Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy to lead the Kosovo
status process. Ahtisaari conducted fifteen months of
negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, focusing in
particular on arrangements to protect the rights of
Kosovo's minority Serb population.


4. (SBU) BACKGROUND (UNSC): Last spring, Ahtisaari
presented a set of proposals for Kosovo that included a
package of measures to protect Kosovo's minority
populations and a recommendation of "supervised
independence" for Kosovo. Pristina accepted the Ahtisaari
Plan; Belgrade rejected it. The EU, NATO, the UN SYG Ban
Ki-moon, and a majority of UNSC members supported the
plan, but Russia threatened to veto any UNSC resolution
endorsing it, saying Russia would only support a
mutually-acceptable outcome. Therefore, in August we
attempted one more round of negotiations led by a
U.S./EU/Russia Troika. At the outset of this process, the
United States, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and
Belgium said publicly that if this last round of talks
failed to produce an agreement, then the Ahtisaari Plan
would be the best way forward. In the course of its work,
the Troika helped the parties explore every reasonable
status outcome (independence, autonomy, confederation,
status-silent proposals),but the parties failed to reach
an agreement. The Troika's mandate concluded on December
10 with a report to the UN SYG from the Contact Group
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United States,
United Kingdom). The report gave a factual accounting of
the talks but made no recommendations. The U.S. and

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European members of the Troika subsequently stated that
further negotiations would not bring the sides any closer
to an agreement; Russia disagrees.


5. (C) BACKGROUND (PREFERRED OUTCOME): The United States
and almost all EU states have concluded that, in light of
its tragic history, particularly the atrocities committed
by the Milosevic regime in Kosovo in the 1990s, any
attempt to reintegrate Kosovo into Serbia would lead to
new violence and regional instability. During eight years
of UN administration, Kosovo has established institutions
of self-government; as a practical matter, Belgrade's rule
has long been severed, and the current UNMIK
administration cannot continue indefinitely. Considering
these factors, we believe that independence for Kosovo is
the only viable outcome. Under the Ahtisaari Plan, a
steering committee under the Contact Group would appoint
an International Civilian Representative to supervise
Kosovo's independence, particularly the implementation of
minority rights guarantees, to ensure that an independent
Kosovo remains stable. The NATO-led peacekeeping force,
KFOR, would remain to provide security, and an EU-led Rule
of Law mission would focus on the police/justice sector.


6. (C) BACKGROUND (NEXT STEPS): In the coming weeks, the
United States and other key Europeans will make clear that
further negotiations would not be useful and that Kosovo's
status needs to be resolved urgently. With the conclusion
of the Troika process, high-level EU consultations are
underway. Then, sometime in early 2008 the Kosovo Assembly
will likely make a "coordinated declaration of
independence" (CDI),which would be followed by
recognition by the United States and most European
countries. As a condition of recognition, we and our
European partners would insist that Kosovo commit to
implement fully the Ahtisaari Settlement (particularly its
provisions to protect minority rights) and welcome the new
international presences to supervise Kosovo.


7. (C) BACKGROUND (UNSC ROLE): The UNSC will discuss the
Troika's report December 19. Serbia and Russia are
already advocating further negotiations. We and key
members of the UNSC will work to avoid prolonged or
unproductive discussion of this issue in the UNSC. We
anticipate no vote in the Security Council on a subsequent
resolution, so no opportunity for a Russian veto.
Ideally, we would like to isolate Russia in this session
and demonstrate that the Ahtisaari recommendations
continue to enjoy the support of a majority of UNSC
members. Broad support will help us secure cooperation
from UN SYG Ban Ki-moon, with whom we are working
closely to ensure a smooth transition to independence and
the new international presences.


8. (SBU) POINTS FOR NON-EUROPEAN UNSC CAPITALS: Posts are
encouraged to draw upon the points below in private
conversations with host government officials (points for
public use available reftel):

-- After two years of status talks between Belgrade and
Pristina -- first under the auspices of UN Special Envoy
Martti Ahtisaari, then under the U.S./EU/Russia Troika --
no mutually-acceptable outcome has been found. No stone
has been left unturned in the quest for a negotiated
agreement.

-- The U.S. and European negotiators in the Troika have
made clear that further negotiations would be pointless.

-- Kosovo's status needs urgently to be resolved. The
people of Kosovo have lived for eight years under UN
administration, effectively cut off from international
lending possibilities and foreign investment and
marginalized from international fora.

-- UN SYG Ban and all members of the Contact Group agree
that the status quo is unsustainable in Kosovo. Kosovo's
political and economic development will be held back so
long as there is uncertainty about Kosovo's future status.

-- Last spring the European Union, NATO, the United
States, the UN Secretary General and the majority of the
UN Security Council supported a resolution to implement
the Ahtisaari Plan as the best way to promote long-term

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stability in the region. One member of the UNSC threatened
a veto, and we did not go forward with a vote.

-- Based on concerns of this member, we agreed to 120 days
of further negotiations and formed a Troika
(U.S./EU/Russia) to conduct these talks on behalf of the
Contact Group and with the endorsement of the UN
Secretary-General.

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-- Belgrade continued to propose variations of its
autonomy plan for Kosovo. Pristina insisted on some form
of independence but proposed significant cooperation
mechanisms with Belgrade on areas of mutual concern such
as minority rights and protection of Serb cultural sites.

-- When we launched the Troika process last summer, the
United States and EU members of the UNSC made clear that
if the parties could not reach agreement, we remained
committed to the proposal of UN Special Envoy Martti
Ahtisaari, including his package of measures to protect
Kosovo's minorities and his recommendation of supervised
independence, as the best way forward.

-- The United States reaffirms today that the Ahtisaari
Plan is the best way to promote stability in the region
and to resolve this last outstanding issue related to the
break-up of Yugoslavia. We want to work with our partners
to implement this plan.

-- The Ahtisaari Plan provides broad protections for
minorities and provisions that will promote a democratic
and multi-ethnic Kosovo. It envisions a major role for
the international community in overseeing implementation
of these provisions and providing support needed for
Kosovo's democratic and economic development.

-- President Ahtisaari's recommendation of supervised
independence for Kosovo is realistic and the only viable
outcome of this tragic situation:

A) The tragic events of 1990s (breakup of
Yugoslavia, ethnic cleansing, oppression) have created a
situation where Serbia cannot govern Kosovo;

B) Keeping Kosovo and Serbia together would lead
to dysfunctional governance, fuel extremism and threaten
international peace and security.

C) The UNSC, through Resolution 1244, has excluded
Serbia from exercising governmental authority in Kosovo
since 1999 and, after years of separate institutional
development, it is not practical to reintegrate them;

-- A swift resolution of Kosovo's status offers the best
hope for stability in the region and further democratic
development in Kosovo and Serbia.

-- After eight years of limbo, the people of Kosovo
urgently need clarity about their future.

-- Further delays would create new risks to regional
stability and threaten to jeopardize progress the United
Nations has achieved in Kosovo.

-- The UNSC plans to review the situation on December 19.

-- UNSC endorsement of the Ahtisaari Plan would be the
best basis for moving forward. However, based on the
Russian position to date, such action is unlikely.

-- We want, however, to ensure that the Ahtisaari
recommendations enjoy the widest international support
possible.

-- At the December 19 UNSC session, we encourage you to
voice your support for the Ahtisaari Plan and note
the need for a swift resolution of this issue.
RICE