Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE165059
2007-12-10 13:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

NEXT STEPS ON BURMA: P3 PAPER

Tags:  PREL PHUM UNSC BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5059 3441337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101317Z DEC 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 165059 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON BURMA: P3 PAPER


Classified By: IO A/S Kristen Silverberg,
Reasons, 1.4 (d) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 165059

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON BURMA: P3 PAPER


Classified By: IO A/S Kristen Silverberg,
Reasons, 1.4 (d) and (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: The draft P3 proposal
outlining benchmarks for improvement of the situation in
Burma, and possible actions if there is no improvement,
is at para 3 below with USG-suggested edits. Another
paper is at para 4 below describing options in the event
that these benchmarks are not met. USUN is instructed
to provide the edited versions of the two papers to
the British and French missions and to request P3
discussions of them, including whether to provide
the benchmarks paper in para 3 to Special Advisor
Gambari as a way forward. USUN is instructed to
provide the two papers to the British and F of the
USG's position that if no progress is made by the
regime in meeting the three benchmarks cited by
January 4, the UNSC should consider further action.
The Department believes that increasing assistance
to Burma and facilitating its integration into the
world economy are appropriate only in response to
significant progress in implementing a transition
to a civilian, democratic government.


2. (U) FOLLOW-UP - Please send results of
discussions by front-channel cable, slugged for
IO/UNP - Paul Wickberg and EAP/MLS - Aaron Cope.


3. (U) Begin text:

P-3 DISCUSSION PAPER ON BURMA AND NEXT STEPS

This non-paper, which updates a P-3 paper from
early November, outlines steps the SPDC leadership
needs to take by early 2008 to be responsive to the
November 2007 UNSC statement and to UN Burma
Advisor Gambari,s efforts to facilitate a genuine
dialogue on a transition to a civilian, democratic
government. As before, we should communicate these
benchmarks first to the UN (Gambari) and then
possibly to others with influence on Burma, e.g.,
China and ASEAN states. A separate paper describes
options in the event that these benchmarks are not
met.

What Burmese authorities need to do
--------------

--Consistent with Aung San Suu Kyi,s public
statement calling for a "meaningful and time-bound"
dialogue with the SPDC leadership, there must be a
dialogue between the regime and democratic
representatives, to include the ethnic minorities,

that results in an orderly transition to an
inclusive, democratic, civilian-led government,
without threatening either the territorial
integrity of the state or the stability of the
region.

-- As an integral and immediate part of this
transition, there must be a demonstrable
improvement in the human rights situation. This
includess the unconditional release of all
political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, as
a necessary precondition for the transition
process. This does not mean external toppling of
the regime or dismantling of the army. As Aung San
Suu Kyi has acknowledged, the army is part of the
fabric of the nation. She and the opposition have
made clear their willingness to work with the SPDC
to achieve positive, stable and orderly change. The
military will need to be part of this process, but
eventually will need to leave the political stage,
submit to civilian authority, and see its role in
the economy greatly reduced.

The Process
--------------

Special Advisor Gambari made some progress during
his two visits following the crackdown in
September, but serious challenges to launching a
genuine dialogue on a "time-bound" basis remain.
It will be critical for Gambari and his good
offices mission to actively press the SPDC
leadership to commit to such a dialogue within the
December-January timeframe using the following
benchmarks as measures of progress and commitment
towards such a dialogue. While many other
benchmarks exist in the long-term, the three
benchmarks below are vital to advancing the
dialogue and demonstrating Burmese commitment
to its international obligations. The P-3 will
assess progress on these benchmarks prior to
January 4 to determine whether follow-up UNSC
action is needed thereafter.

-- a) The regime publicly agrees to a formal
dialogue, facilitated by the UN, to begin January 4
between the Burmese opposition and the regime;

-- b) Conditions of ASSK,s house arrest are eased,
and ASSK is granted immediate access to foreign
diplomats, NLD members, and other opposition and
ethnic leaders of her choosing to prepare for
talks;

-- c) Arrests of democracy and ethnic minority
activists engaged in peaceful activity cease
immediately.

Dialogue Precepts
--------------

o To be meaningful, a dialogue must have the
support of the democratic and ethnic minority
groups.

o Participants in the dialogue should be able to
address issues including but not limited to the
following:

- Preserving the unity and territorial integrity
of Burma;
- Establishing a process for a transition to a
civilian, democratic government;
- Improving respect for human rights;
- Meeting the economic and social needs of the Burmese
people; and
- Reorganizing and reforming the Burmese military.

End text of P3 benchmarks paper.



4. (U) Begin text:

P-3 DISCUSSION PAPER ON POSSIBLE MEASURES IN
RESPONSE TO LACK OF PROGRESS IN BURMA
--------------

If the Burmese regime continues to resist taking
concrete steps to begin a dialogue toward a
transition to democracy in Burma, the Security
Council will have to consider additional measures
to review Burma,s commitment to its UNSC
obligations and bolster the UN good offices
mandate.

Any proposals for action in the Council will need
to be judged against our assessment of the regime,s
cooperation with Gambari, or lack thereof, between
now and early January, including crucially whether
it initiates a dialogue and allows Aung San Suu Kyi
to consult freely with her colleagues, and whether
key parties in the dialogue, including Aung San Suu
Kyi, express satisfaction with the process.

If the regime makes significant progress, we could
envisage a UNSC reaction welcoming that progress
and looking forward to further steps, e.g., a first
session of the dialogue. However, the UNSC
reaction should also call for the release of all
political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi,
and for direct dialogue to continue, including
agreement on timelines for transition to an interim
central government of national unity.

It is premature to consider relaxation of pressure
or to engage in any substantive discussion about
possible assistance packages until the regime has
clearly demonstrated a serious intention to engage
in an inclusive dialogue and that process is well
underway.

If the regime does not make significant progress,
P-3 members should urge Special Advisor Gambari
and/or Secretary General Ban to acknowledge
publicly that the regime has failed to fulfill its
obligations to the Security Council and to launch a
dialogue in a reasonable timeframe. P-3 members
might also discuss circulating a draft PRST or UN
Security Council resolution on Burma.

DRAFT UNSCR OR PRST ELEMENTS
--------------

-- To express discontent with the failure to make
concessions/cooperate with the UN Secretary
General,s good offices mission,

-- To spell out the benchmarks of forward momentum
that the UNSC expects,

-- To give a time-frame by which we would expect
specific benchmarks to be achieved,

-- To make clear that in the event that tangible
progress is not forthcoming within this time-frame,
the UNSC will be obliged to introduce measures.

Options for Measures in a UNSC Resolution:

(Note: Measures should be proportionate and
commensurate with the pressure required to persuade
Burma to take the concrete actions we seek. These
measures should be capable of being suspended once
the regime starts to make real progress on a
national reconciliation process and reversible in
the event that the process reaches a positive

conclusion.)

Chapter VII measures:

-- Embargo on arms and related material

-- Prohibition on technical training or assistance
related to the supply of arms and related material

-- Assets freeze on named members of the Burmese
regime and/or their family members

-- Travel ban on named members of the Burmese
regime

-- A Sanctions Committee established to investigate
and report to the UNSC any violations of the above

-- A Group of Experts established to support the
Committee in monitoring implementation of the
measures.

Other measures:

-- Encouraging/mandating UN Special Advisers and
Special Rapporteur to visit/report;

-- Establishing a Commission of Inquiry into human
rights abuses and serious crimes;

-- Calling upon all states and international
financial institutions not to enter into new
commitments for grants, financial assistance and
concessional loans to the Burmese regime except for
humanitarian purposes;

-- Calling upon all States to cease all forms of
government support for trade and investment with
and to Burma.

STRATEGY WITH UN PARTNERS:
--------------

The P3 should discuss possible measures and agree
among themselves on priorities and the most
effective responses to the progress or the lack
thereof toward a transition in Burma. We should
discuss with Gambari and other UNSC members the
need for progress by early January, making it clear
that should there be no progress, the next step is
to seek further Council action.

End of text.
RICE