Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE159779
2007-11-23 23:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION NONPAPER

Tags:  CR MARR PARM PL PREL RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHC #9779 3272315
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P 232304Z NOV 07
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TO RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0000
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159779 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: CR MARR PARM PL PREL RS
SUBJECT: U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION NONPAPER
TRANSMITTAL

REF: STATE 159179

Classified By: Acting U/S John C. Rood

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159779

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: CR MARR PARM PL PREL RS
SUBJECT: U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION NONPAPER
TRANSMITTAL

REF: STATE 159179

Classified By: Acting U/S John C. Rood


1. (U) Action requested paragraph 3.


2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The Non-Paper on the U.S. proposal to
Russia of missile defense cooperation and transparency and
confidence-building measures in paragraph 4 was delivered by
Embassy Moscow to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
November 21 (Ref A). In a telephone conversation between
Acting U/S John Rood and Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Pojar
on November 23, DFM Pojar requested a copy of the U.S.
Non-paper, and U/S Rood agreed. U/S Rood had previously
discussed the U.S. proposals with Polish U/S Witold
Waszczykowski on November 21.


3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassies Prague and Warsaw are
requested to expeditiously deliver the U.S. Non-Paper
contained in paragraph 4 to Czech MFA First Deputy Minister
Tomas Pojar and Polish MFA Under Secretary of State Witold
Waszczykowski. Embassies Warsaw and Prague are also requested
to provide the list in paragraph 5 of possible transparency
and confidence-building measures that Acting Under Secretary
Rood will offer DFM Kislyak at their meeting on November 26
in Washington, D.C.


4. (C/REL Poland and the Czech Republic) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S.
NON-PAPER:

U.S. Non-Paper
November 20, 2007
U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation

The United States remains interested in pursuing missile
defense cooperation with Russia. Such cooperation could be
an important element in a broader strategic partnership
between the United States and Russia aimed at addressing the
key security challenges facing both our nations in the 21st
century. This non-paper outlines and reaffirms our previous
proposals, including the proposals discussed during the
"2-plus-2" meeting in Moscow.

On April 17, 2007, the United States provided a non-paper
outlining a comprehensive proposal for bilateral cooperation
across the full spectrum of missile defense activities at
Strategic Security Dialogue talks in Moscow led by Acting
Under Secretary of State John Rood and Deputy Foreign

Minister Sergei Kislyak. The next week, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates also provided the U.S. proposal to Defense
Minister Serdyukov in Moscow. Our proposal is still on the
table. Such cooperation could include:

-- Joint research, development, and testing of missile
defense systems and components;
-- Joint modeling and simulation of missile defense
architectures;
-- Sharing of early-warning data, including completion of
the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow;
-- Co-location of U.S. and Russian radars and the sharing of
data from such sensors; and
-- Development of the ability of U.S. and Russian forces to
jointly operate missile defense systems in joint military
operations, such as peacekeeping.

During the U.S.-Russia experts meetings in September and
October, the United States elaborated and expanded upon our
April 17 offer for bilateral cooperation. Specifically, we
provided the following proposals:

-- A joint sensor cooperation effort, which would include
the Qabala radar in Azerbaijan, the Armavir radar in southern
Russia, a U.S. X-band radar in the region, and perhaps other
sensors to monitor the Iranian missile program. Such
cooperation would include the establishment of shared data
centers in Moscow and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This
proposal would expand upon President Putin,s offer and could
establish a foundation for deeper cooperation in the future.
-- A joint cooperative regional missile defense
architecture, which would include U.S., NATO, and Russian
missile defense systems.

The United States is interested in further exploring
President Putin's June 7 proposal, as elaborated on July 2 at
Kennebunkport, to jointly monitor the emerging ballistic
missile threats from the Middle East using the Russian-leased
early warning radar at Qabala, Azerbaijan, as well as the
early warning radar currently under construction at Armavir
in southern Russia. The U.S. found the Russian-hosted visit
to Qabala extremely useful in evaluating Qabala,s
capabilities to monitor the threat from Iran and the Middle
East generally. We re-affirm our interest in further talks
to explore the details of the Russian proposal and in
conducting a similar visit to the Armavir radar to evaluate
its potential contribution to a joint architecture. The
April 17 U.S. proposal, as well as the joint regional
architecture proposal, raise the possibility of co-locating a
forward-based X-band radar with a Russian early warning radar
to provide supplementary data not capable of being collected
by these two Russian radars.

The U.S. delegation's presentation in Moscow on October 10 --
entitled "Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture" --
outlines steps for integrating U.S., NATO, and Russian
missile defense interceptors, sensors, and for the first
time, command and control functions. It constitutes an
integral part of our proposal for cooperation.

The joint missile defense architectures that we are proposing
are based on a "building block" approach for different levels
of participation by Russia in a regional system that the U.S.
and Russia would design together with Europe. Our goal in
making this proposal is to maximize the defense of NATO, the
United States, and Russia against ballistic missiles from
Iran or other dangerous regimes which may acquire such
weapons in the future, and to do so in a real strategic
partnership. Through bilateral missile defense cooperation,
Russian officials and experts would gain an in-depth
understanding of the U.S. missile defense system, including
its capabilities as well as its direction and pace.
Furthermore, as the United States and Russia move forward in
our efforts to develop a joint architecture, it would become
clear that such capabilities could not possibly threaten
Russian security.

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

We have stressed that the greatest confidence-building
measure we could offer Russia is a partnership with the
United States and NATO Allies to develop and operate a joint
regional missile defense architecture. Such a strategic
partnership would provide Russia with insight into U.S.
missile defense efforts and influence over the future
direction of our joint missile defense efforts.

In addition, at the 12-13 October "2-plus-2" meeting, the
U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense indicated the
willingness of the United States to pursue measures
associated with such cooperation to build confidence and
promote transparency. Thus, within the context of agreement
to pursue a joint regional missile defense architecture, the
United States would be willing to put in place new
transparency and confidence-building measures to provide
greater confidence to Russia that the limited U.S. missile
defense capabilities deployed in Europe are not directed at
Russia and will not undermine its security. At the
"2-plus-2" meeting, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense
discussed measures such as:

-- Offering assurances that U.S. European-based assets are
not directed against Russia;
-- Exchanging radar data and providing situational awareness
about the status of U.S. -- and Russian -- missile defense
capabilities and operations; and
-- Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at
missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia,
and potential visits to missile defense sites in the Czech
Republic and Poland, subject to the consent of, and
consistent with the conditions established by, each of those
nations. In the event that host countries refuse such
visits, we could work on some form of technical monitoring.

Additionally, at the "2-plus-2" Ministerial in Moscow, the
U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense discussed another
possible confidence-building measure which would take into
account developments in the Iranian longer-range ballistic
missile threat in decision-making about bringing the
interceptor site in Poland and the radar site in the Czech
Republic to full operational/on-alert status. We believe
that this addresses key Russian concerns regarding our
missile defense site and we would be happy to further discuss
specifics during our next experts-level meeting. At that
time, the U.S. delegation would also welcome receiving
Russia,s ideas or proposals including for transparency and
confidence-building measures.

END TEXT OF U.S. NON-PAPER.


5. (C/REL Poland and the Czech Republic) BEGIN TEXT OF LIST:

The United States is prepared to offer the following
transparency and confidence-building measures, if the Russian
Federation participates with us in a joint regional missile
defense architecture:

-- Regular exchanges of information on MD policy, program,
technical, funding, threat assessments in a U.S.-Russia
Transparency Working Group.
-- U.S. Assurance not to construct in Europe more than 10
silo-launchers for 10 long-range GBIs without prior
notification and discussions.
-- U.S. Assurance of no major modifications of interceptor
silo-launchers without prior discussions.
-- U.S. Assurance to take into account developments in
Iranian missile programs in decisionmaking to bring the
interceptor site in Poland and the radar in Czech Republic to
full operational status.
-- U.S. Assurance not to conduct interceptor flight-tests
from silo-launchers in Poland.
-- Sharing of "real-time" radar tracking data via centers in
Moscow and Brussels.
-- Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at
missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia.
-- Potential visits to MD facilities in Poland and/or the
Czech Republic (subject to each Host Nation's agreement and
conditions). Reciprocal visits to Russia by NATO personnel
could also be conducted.
-- U.S. to provide Russia with rapid alerts via the
Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link ("Hotline") of
any long-range ground-based missile defense interceptor
launches.

END TEXT OF LIST.
RICE