Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE157672
2007-11-17 01:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

OSCE MADRID MINISTERIAL - DEMARCHE REQUEST

Tags:  OSCE PREL PGOV PHUM 
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INFO ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 157672 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: OSCE PREL PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: OSCE MADRID MINISTERIAL - DEMARCHE REQUEST

Classified By: PDAS Kurt Volker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------------------
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 157672

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: OSCE PREL PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: OSCE MADRID MINISTERIAL - DEMARCHE REQUEST

Classified By: PDAS Kurt Volker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------


1. (SBU) This is an action request. The OSCE Ministerial
will take place in Madrid 29-30 November. Posts are requested
to engage host country officials to garner support for U.S.
objectives at the Ministerial. Background information and
talking points are provided below. Info addressees are
welcome to use these demarche points as well if posts believe
doing so would be useful in their engagement on OSCE issues
with their host governments.

--------------
General Background
--------------


2. (C) As in previous years, this year's OSCE Ministerial has
the potential of being difficult and contentious, given
Russia's views on a number of key issues and on the OSCE's
future direction. We are concerned by several of Russia's
proposals to "reform" the OSCE, in general, and the Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),in
particular. Russia believes that ODIHR played a prominent
role in abetting the "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan. Moscow's proposals would undermine ODIHR's
independence and influence in the region; several of the CIS
states are allied with Russia on this approach.


3. (C) The OSCE is one of the key elements of USG efforts to
promote democracy and defend fundamental human rights across
the OSCE area. The OSCE also plays a critical role in
enhancing regional security, including in Kosovo. It is
therefore important for the United States and its allies to
protect the OSCE and ODIHR. Russia's efforts would have the
effect of crippling them and would call into question core
OSCE commitments in the realms of democracy, human rights and
fundamental freedoms.


4. The U.S. wants to assure the continued functioning of the
OSCE Mission in Kosovo, while, at the same time, seeking the
closure (or at least substantial reduction) of the mission in
Croatia and reductions in the other Balkans missions. We
support developing further programs in Central Asia. We also

want the OSCE to become engaged in developing projects on
border security management on Afghanistan's border with
Central Asia, while not undercutting OSCE's core missions in
participating States. Other areas of U.S. interest will be
securing ministerial decisions in the areas of human rights
and democracy, tolerance, counter-terrorism, and trafficking
in persons for labor exploitation. We also want to use the
Ministerial to highlight the continuing importance of the CFE
regime in the face of Russia's threat to suspend
participation.


5. (C) Despite our differences, Russia is working
cooperatively with us on several issues, including
negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh, border security in Central
Asia and Afghanistan, combating trafficking in persons,
combating sexual exploitation of children, and creating
public-private partnerships to combat terrorism.


6. (C) One of the most sensitive issues facing the
Ministerial will be the selection of the future chairs in
office of the organization for 2009, 2010, and 2011. Due to
ongoing and fluid negotiations, the final decisions likely
will be delayed until the ministerial itself.

--------------

STATE 00157672 002 OF 006


U.S. Agenda for Madrid
--------------


7. (U) Talking Points:

-- Despite many challenges, we are looking forward to what we
hope will be a successful ministerial.

-- The U.S. would like to see the adoption of several human
dimension decisions, including decisions on human rights
defenders, tolerance and nondiscrimination, combating
trafficking in persons for labor purposes, and combating
child sexual exploitation over the Internet.

-- We look forward to a positive decision to begin OSCE
engagement with Afghanistan, to enhance border security
there.

-- We believe there will be consensus on a statement on
continuing progress through the OSCE Minsk Group on peace
negotiations in Nagorno-Karabakh and on creating
public-private partnerships to combat terrorism, among
others.

-- Regarding Kosovo, we hope that the Ministerial will give
impetus to renewal of the OMIK mandate.

--------------
Central Asia and Afghanistan
--------------


8. (U) The OSCE should be prepared to devote more resources
to the Central Asian region in areas such as customs and
border security and play a role in stabilizing Afghanistan,
an OSCE partner state. In the past, the OSCE has sent a
support team to Afghanistan and has done some limited
training of Afghan officials. The United States supports
broadening this engagement, and is particularly interested in
helping to develop border security management projects along
Afghanistan's borders with its northern neighbors.

Talking points:

-- Since their independence in 1991, the OSCE has played a
vital role in advancing freedom and democracy in all five
Central Asian nations.

-- The OSCE has an opportunity in Central Asia to increase
its influence. Central Asian leaders have expressed interest
in working more closely with the OSCE on a range of issues.

-- OSCE work in policing, customs reform, and border security
is critical to improving the daily lives of Central Asians
and the security of Europe. It is important for OSCE
credibility that all member states provide technical experts,
seconded staff and support these security projects
financially through voluntary contributions.

-- The OSCE's most important assets in Central Asia are its
institutions and field offices in all five Central Asian
capitals. The United States strongly supports OSCE field
work, which is critical to promoting OSCE commitments and
resists calls to weaken the mandate of OSCE institutions and
field offices.

-- Russian efforts undermining the role of ODIHR have
particularly negative consequences in Central Asia.

-- Afghanistan has appealed to the OSCE for assistance.

-- The United States supports a draft decision expressing the
OSCE's commitment to Afghanistan.

-- The OSCE could add value especially in the area of border
security and management and customs training for border

STATE 00157672 003 OF 006


guards and customs officials.

-- The OSCE should undertake work on a modest scale,
concentrating on Afghanistan's northern boundaries that
directly border OSCE participating States.

-- Any OSCE involvement in Afghanistan's border management
and security will require intensified cooperation with
Central Asian states.

-- The Central Asian region needs focused projects, increased
attention and support to meet the Central Asian governments'
repeated requests for technical assistance on border
security, counterterrorism and trafficking interdiction.

-- There should be a robust mix, with increases in of all
three OSCE dimensions (Security, Economy and Environment, and
Human) in order to have maximum effectiveness.

--------------
Balkan Challenges
--------------


9. (U) The single most important challenge for the OSCE in
the Balkans will be to maintain the Mission in Kosovo (OMiK).
Nearly 20% of total OSCE resources are devoted to its
efforts in Kosovo. Russia and Serbia have threatened to
close the mission in the event of a unilateral declaration of
independence. This would be a significant loss for Kosovo,
and could put additional pressure on the other missions in
the region. The U.S. supports maintaining the mission in
Kosovo, no matter the outcome of the negotiations between
Belgrade and Pristina. In the other Balkan countries, the
United States believes that the missions could be downsized,
and, in the case of Croatia, closed.

Talking points:

-- Russia and Serbia have said they will force closure of the
OSCE Mission in Kosovo in the event of a unilateral
declaration of independence by Kosovo.

-- We believe it would be a mistake to close the mission.

-- OMiK is the single most important guarantor of minority
rights in Kosovo. Closing the mission will weaken the
security of Serbian minority communities in Kosovo.

-- Regardless of the outcome of the current talks, the
international community will expect OMiK to assist in the
monitoring necessary for successful implementation of a
settlement. No other international organization is prepared
to replace the mission's extensive field presence if OMiK is
shut down.

-- The United States supports an early decision to extend the
mission mandate in Kosovo so that the mandate does not become
the victim of political posturing.

-- The general political situation in the Balkans has
improved to the extent that we believe it is time to seek
cuts in the other OSCE missions of the region.

-- The mission to Croatia in particular is one of the OSCE's
success stories. It is time to close or substantially
minimize the mission now. It is no longer needed.

-- There are other mechanisms to follow the few outstanding
issues (refugee returns and war crimes trial monitoring) of
the Croatian mission's mandate. We are willing to discuss
such mechanisms.

---
CFE
---

STATE 00157672 004 OF 006



10. (U) Russia has issued a Presidential decree that is
receiving wide support in the Duma to suspend on December 12
its implementation of the CFE Treaty. Although Russia left
open the possibility of not suspending its CFE implementation
on December 12 should steps be taken to resolve its concerns,
comments made by various Russian officials, including FM
Lavrov, all point to suspension on December 12, while leaving
the door open to continued efforts after that date to resolve
Russian concerns.

Talking points:

-- The U.S. and our Allies see the CFE Treaty regime as a
cornerstone of European security.

-- The Russian announcement that it would suspend its
participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe continues to be a source of concern to us and our
Allies. It is of interest not only to other Treaty
signatories, but OSCE participating States overall.

-- CFE is the most successful arms control regime of its
kind, providing unprecedented transparency regarding States
Parties' military forces. This is a regime that benefits all
the members of the OSCE.

-- The United States has held several rounds of discussions
with our Russian counterparts in an effort to seek a
creative, practical approach that will help preserve this
vital agreement. To move ahead, we must work together to
make progress on the issues of concern to both sides. NATO
countries are ready to move ahead swiftly on ratification of
the Adapted CFE Treaty in the context of an agreement with
Russia that addresses key concerns of all Treaty parties,
including Georgia and Moldova.

-- The package plan we have proposed has the support of NATO
Allies and other CFE States Parties, and we plan to continue
to engage Russia in discussions to achieve positive results.
Russian suspension can only complicate our efforts to reach
agreement.

-- We want to work with Russia on their stated concerns about
CFE in a way that preserves the CFE Treaty as adapted and
initialed in 1999 in Istanbul, and allows it to be ratified
by all States Parties, but we also remain committed to seeing
Russia fulfill remaining Istanbul commitments regarding its
forces in Moldova and Georgia.

-- We hope ultimately to find a way forward that ensures the
long-term integrity of the CFE Treaty.

--------------
Ministerial Declaration and
Separatist Conflicts
--------------


11. (U) The issue of Russia's failure to meet its Istanbul
Commitments (to remove Russian troops from Moldova and
Georgia) has thwarted adoption of a Ministerial Declaration
the last four OSCE Ministerials. The same issue has blocked
agreement in most attempts to negotiate regional statements
on Georgia and Moldova. We are working with Russia on a way
forward on CFE, so it may be possible this year to negotiate
a Ministerial Declaration and regional statements. We
believe that it will be an important sign of our commitment
to this organization to press ahead with these negotiations
in good faith.

Talking points:

-- There has not been a Ministerial Declaration for four
years. Russia's non-compliance with its Istanbul commitments
has blocked consensus in each case.

STATE 00157672 005 OF 006


-- This situation has also blocked agreement on regional
statements (except in 2005, where we agreed on a Georgia
statement).

-- The United States believes that the chances for success
this year will be greater if our ongoing discussions with
Russia on CFE reach fruition.

-- All participating States should work to negotiate a
Ministerial Declaration in Madrid.

-- Even if no statement can ultimately be agreed, we see the
process of negotiating a Declaration (and regional
statements) as important in itself, as it helps the
participating states recommit to the core values of the
organization, and also puts national positions clearly on the
table.

--------------
Russian Proposals
--------------


12. (U) Russia has over the last few years has put forward a
series of proposals in name of reforming and strengthening
the OSCE. Most of Russia's proposed reforms, however, would
have the effect of weakening the OSCE and, especially, ODIHR.
This year Russia has tabled draft decisions on election
monitoring and NGO participation in OSCE events, both of
which try to roll back gains made in these areas in the past
15 years. Russia has also argued that the OSCE needs a
charter, and is making support for a charter a condition of
its approving a draft convention granting the OSCE legal
personality and privileges and immunities which enjoys
widespread support.

Talking points: (Note: The Department leaves it to Embassy
Moscow to decide whether to deliver an adapted version of
these points.)

-- The U.S. hopes that this year's OSCE Ministerial can be an
effective one in preserving and promoting OSCE's key
institutions and values, in particular as regards ODIHR and
the promotion of democracy across the OSCE area.

-- For example, we are looking forward to working with Russia
in several areas during this ministerial. We believe Russia
will join consensus on a statement on continuing progress
through the OSCE Minsk Group on peace negotiations in
Nagorno-Karabakh, on border security in Central Asia and
Afghanistan, combating trafficking in persons and combating
sexual exploitation of children and creating public-private
partnerships to combat terrorism, among others.

-- Following on to the successful Public-Private-Partnership
(PPP) Conference in May, we can support continued
counterterrorism cooperation with Russia via an OSCE
expert-level PPP dialogue aimed at enhancing critical
infrastructure protection in 2008.

-- However, Russia has made several "reform" proposals that
we feel will weaken, not strengthen, the OSCE. These
proposals are an attack on the core values and commitments of
the OSCE.

-- Russia's proposed reform of ODIHR's election monitoring
practices would seriously hamper ODIHR's ability to conduct
objective and useful monitoring. ODIHR is widely known as
the gold standard in election monitoring. We do not need to
fix what is not broken.

-- Likewise, Russia's intention to table proposals to
regulate the participation of NGOs in OSCE meetings is
concerning. The OSCE has longstanding, appropriate
procedures for NGO access and participation that should be

STATE 00157672 006 OF 006


preserved.

-- The lengthy discussion on reform in the OSCE came to a
conclusion in 2006. We need to move forward to more
substantive issues.

-- The OSCE does not need a charter to address the
functioning or the principles of the organization. The
structures and rules of the OSCE have been developed over the
past 15 years, work well and are fully understood by
participating states.

-- Whatever value a charter might have had when the OSCE was
formed, it is entirely unnecessary at this point. Opening
negotiations on a charter would simply give an opportunity
for those who desire to revisit ) and unravel ) the OSCE
"acquis" (the accumulation of decisions and statements made
by consensus in the OSCE over the years).

-- Adoption of any charter at this time would be inherently
problematic. It would be impossible to fully and accurately
capture the acquis in a single, short document, and the
legally-binding nature of a charter would necessarily
downgrade the status of the body of politically-binding
commitments comprising the acquis.

-- Although we did not think such a convention was necessary,
the U.S. already has significantly modified its position by
agreeing to the wish of many other participating States to
negotiate a convention text on privileges and immunities
which would create a legal personality for the OSCE, and
would adequately protect the OSCE and its personnel.

-- When we agreed to this approach, we and others made clear
we were not prepared to discuss a charter. The Brussels
ministerial agreed on a mandate confined to the package of
legal personality, legal capacity and privileges and
immunities which participating states have considered
desirable since 1993; only Russia argued for a charter.
Russia is now, however, holding up final agreement on this
convention while it insists that the other participating
states agree to a charter.
RICE