Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE156455
2007-11-14 22:40:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

COASI: US-EU DISCUSSION ON EAST ASIA, OCTOBER 22,

Tags:  PREL XB 
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VZCZCXRO6437
PP RUEHAG RUEHDT RUEHPB RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #6455/01 3182300
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 142240Z NOV 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 1018
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 156455 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2022
TAGS: PREL XB
SUBJECT: COASI: US-EU DISCUSSION ON EAST ASIA, OCTOBER 22,
2007

Classified By: Glyn T. Davies

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 156455

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2022
TAGS: PREL XB
SUBJECT: COASI: US-EU DISCUSSION ON EAST ASIA, OCTOBER 22,
2007

Classified By: Glyn T. Davies

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) European Union senior officials met with EAP
counterparts for biannual consultations on Asia on October
22, 2007, in Washington. A/S Hill opened with an overview of
the Six-Party Talks process, highlighting the roles of China,
Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Both sides shared views on
the current situations in Burma and Thailand, with the
Europeans giving a preview of their upcoming November 23
summit with ASEAN. The EU will also have a November 28
summit with China at which they hope to discuss human rights,
anti-corruption, good governance, environmental protection
and China,s rapid military build-up; but sense the PRC is
most interested in EU affirmation of a &one-China Policy.8
Discussions on relations with the Philippines and Indonesia
and both nations, important position in combating terrorism
rounded out the discussion on East Asia. SCA Acting A/S
James F. Moriarty joined for a broad discussion on Asian
regional cooperation and integration, including the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF),the East Asia Summit (EAS),and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

DPRK AND SIX-PARTY TALKS
--------------


2. (S) A/S Christopher R. Hill provided an overview of recent
progress in the Six-Party Talks. The DPRK has committed to
substantial disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and
to providing a complete declaration of its nuclear programs,
including clarification of the uranium enrichment issue by
the end of the year, Hill explained. In exchange, the Six
Parties are providing the DPRK with energy assistance in the
form of heavy fuel oil. The United States has also made
several bilateral commitments, Hill detailed, including with
regard to the DPRK's designation as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism and the application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act with respect to the DPRK. The terrorism list presents a
sensitive issue for Japan, and the U.S. therefore will handle
this issue very carefully. The United States has also
pressed the DPRK to make progress on this issue with the
Japanese. The United States is also seeking to improve
atmospherics with the DPRK, including by increasing cultural
exchanges, and Hill highlighted the possible New York

Philharmonic performance in the DPRK.


3. (S) Ambassador Pedro Moitinho de Almeida reported that the
EU was pleased with progress in the Six-Party Talks, as well
as developments with the inter-Korean summit. Council
Secretariat Asia Unit Head Tomasz Kozlowski explained that

SIPDIS
the EU's policy is to fully support the Six-Party process,
but said the EU's relations with the DPRK is limited
primarily to maintaining a communication channel. The United
States would welcome the EU's participation in energy or
humanitarian aid to the DPRK, and would like to coordinate
closely on any such assistance, Hill said. Moitinho reported
that the EU would discuss options for supporting the
Six-Party process at a meeting in November, including
possible humanitarian aid or a Troika visit to Pyongyang.
Kozlowski said the EU has given a small amount of
humanitarian aid to the DPRK, but is prepared to provide a
significant amount upon resolution of the nuclear issue. The
EU wants to play a more active role, Kozlowski explained, and
is working to determine how best to do that. EU Commission
Acting Director Geoffrey Barrett elaborated that the EU has
contributed $350 million in humanitarian assistance to the
DPRK over the last ten years. The EU is currently working to
develop a food security strategy to help the DPRK become more
self-sufficient, Barrett said, and the EU will soon hold its
third economic workshop in Pyongyang.


4. (S) Hill explained that the United States is prepared to
begin a peace process on the Korean Peninsula among the
directly related parties following substantial disablement
and the DPRK's provision of a complete declaration, likely
early next year. But, Hill emphasized, the United States
cannot conclude peace treaty negotiations until the DPRK has
denuclearized. The United States also hopes to create a
regional security architecture in Northeast Asia, which would
begin with the Six Parties. Moitinho reported that the
Russians had provided a read-out of the NEAPSM process at the
recent Troika meeting with them. As a regional organization,
Moitinho said the EU was encouraged by discussions of a
possible Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, and

STATE 00156455 002 OF 006


would be prepared to discuss suitable models at the
appropriate time. Hill emphasized the important role of the
Chinese in the Six-Party process, and the value of
encouraging the Chinese to be more engaged in multilateral
diplomacy. Hill noted concerns about China's treatment of
North Korean refugees, and requested that the EU work with
the United States to press the Chinese and to help find
durable solutions for this refugee population. Moitinho said
that the EU could approach the Chinese on this issue.

JAPAN
--------------


5. (C) Hill observed that the new Japanese government is very
pragmatic, and is interested in improving relations with its
neighbors. The United States wants to help the Fukuda
government succeed in building more stable relationships in
Northeast Asia. Moitinho agreed with Hill's assessment, and
said the EU has encouraged Japan to work toward progress on
the abduction issue. Japan Desk Director Jim Zumwalt said
the United States currently faces two major issues with
Japan: coordinating with Japan in the Six-Party process and
maintaining Japanese support for Operation Enduring Freedom.
Zumwalt explained Japan's important role in supplying tankers
to refuel ships in the Indian Ocean, but said legislation
reauthorizing Japan's support may not be passed until
sometime next year. Zumwalt requested EU countries'
assistance in pressing Japan, as this is a multilateral
issue. Moitinho said that the EU Troika is meeting with
Japan next week, and while this was an issue between EU
member states and Japan, the Troika may also be able to make
this point. (Note: An EU colleague subsequently requested
talking points on the refueling issue, which EAP/J provided.
End Note.)

ROK
---


6. (C) Turning to upcoming elections in the ROK, Hill said
the United States wanted to be very careful to stay out of
South Korean politics. De Almedia hoped that the winner of
the election would continue the current path of working
closely with the Six-Party process.


7. (C) On the KORUS FTA, A/S Hill said the U.S. might have a
difficult time getting the agreement through Congress, but is
committed to getting it approved. Noting that the EU is
currently negotiating an FTA with the ROK, Hill surmised that
it is useful to hold countries to standards that do not come
naturally to them. Barrett said that the EU was still
considering whether to include Kaesong in the EU-ROK FTA.
Hill stressed that Kaesong was not included in the KORUS FTA.

Burma
--------------


8. (C) Moitinho emphasized the EU's strong support for UN
Special Envoy Gambari and his mission, and more broadly for a
multilateral approach to addressing Burma. He said the EU is
looking to Gambari to make concrete proposals for the way
forward, but is skeptical that the junta can be persuaded to
make concessions absent more pressure from Burma's neighbors.
The EU is considering appointing a Special Envoy for Burma
to work full time on coordinating member states' internal
positions and as an informal partner for Gambari. Moitinho
stressed that the role of the Envoy would be limited, he
would not travel to Burma, and there would be no overlap with
Gambari's duties.


9. (C) Moitinho and Kozlowski conveyed that the EU is
undertaking a second round of demarches to China, India, and
ASEAN governments. Moitinho said the EU was gratified by
Beijing's statement that Gambari's trip to Burma be more than
a courtesy visit and by some Indian criticism of the regime.
However, he noted that the EU expects more from India in
particular given how often and loudly India touts its title
as the world's largest democracy, and the EU is pressing
India to be more forward-leaning. The EU was pleased with
ASEAN's September 27 statement on Burma, and in response to
Southeast Asia DAS Scot Marciel,s query about participation
of the Burmese (and at what level) at the upcoming EU-ASEAN
summit to mark 30 years of ASEAN-EU relations, said it was
using preparatory meetings October 23 with the Singaporeans
for the November 22 summit to stress how important ASEAN's
action on Burma is to the organization's credibility. The EU
does not want to hold its relations with ASEAN hostage to the
Burma issue, but it is making clear to its ASEAN partners
that it cannot accept business as usual. Moitinho suggested
that a small international contact group on Burma would be
preferable to one of 20 or more countries, and the EU would
support such a group if Gambari proposed one. Moitinho also

STATE 00156455 003 OF 006


noted that the EU believed some engagement with the Burmese
could be useful, and along these lines said that the troika
is likely to meet with Burmese officials on the margins of
the next ASEAN Regional Forum ARF as well as the upcoming
ASEM meeting in Beijing.


10. (C) Moitinho highlighted new EU "smart sanctions"
(targeted at the regime vice the broader economy): a ban on
imports from Burma's mining and logging sectors, and a ban on
exports to Burma of machinery for and investment in those
same industries. Visa bans for junta leaders and their
families also remain in effect. However, Moitinho opined
that EU sanctions are unlikely to be effective and serve
mostly to show political support for the democracy cause.
Burma-EU trade amounts to only 260 million euros per year and
most of that is comprised of textile imports, which will be
unaffected by sanctions. DAS Marciel raised pressure from
NGOs for more financial sanctions on the regime by the U.S.
and EU that would freeze assets and accounts of regime
leaders and block dollar and euro denominated transactions.
Marciel suggested that the U.S. and EU should have technical
level talks to explore such action; the EU was amenable.


11. (C) DAS Marciel emphasized the importance of using
public diplomacy to sustain public attention to the situation
in Burma, especially in countries in the region. He affirmed
strong U.S. support for Gambari and agreed with Moitinho
about the importance of pressing ASEAN governments to address
Burma with ASEAN's credibility in mind. DAS Marciel also
flagged the importance of a unified message from the
international community pressing for genuine dialogue between
the regime and the opposition.

Thailand
--------------


12. (C) The EU viewed the August constitutional referendum
as a positive step toward the restoration of elected
government in Thailand, but is concerned about national
elections in the wake of the Thai Government's rejection of
the EU's proposal for a formal, memorandum of
understanding-based EU election monitoring mission.
Kozlowksy said the 2006 coup cannot be compared with previous
ones, since the continued vitality of political activity in
northern Thailand has prevented "Bangkok elites" from
restoring their political dominance since the coup. Barrett
added that European investors are concerned about the state
of Thailand's economy. Moitinho conveyed that EU delegations
to the region on Burma business would be exempt from
restrictions on contact with Thai interim government leaders,
and that the EU continues to press the Thais to lift martial
law before the elections.


13. (C) Barrett asked if the U.S. had plans to send election
monitors to Thailand. DAS Marciel responded that there may
be congressional delegations and that our embassy will
certainly observe the polls, but said that the Administration
is more focused on providing support for Thai monitoring
efforts. Barrett also asked for our take on the southern
insurgency. DAS Marciel noted that increased security sweeps
have not yet made a lasting difference in the level of
violence, and emphasized that while the U.S. pays close
attention to the insurgency, we avoid actual involvement for
fear of inflaming the conflict.

China
--------------


14. (C) The EU representatives said they were encouraged by
China,s increased engagement in international affairs, but
they added that the EU continued to feel the need to raise
topics such as human rights, anti-corruption, good
governance, environmental protection and China,s rapid
military build-up as part of the bilateral agenda. As the EU
and PRC worked out respective policy papers containing goals
for bilateral dialogue, the PRC seemed most interested in
eliciting a statement from the EU that Europe accepted the
PRC,s &one China principle.8


15. (C) The EU representatives previewed the November 28
EU-China summit. They noted China,s recent positive
contributions in the international sphere, including as
facilitator of the Six-Party Talks. They described an effort
to establish dialogue on Africa, related to development, aid
and debt forgiveness. Davies asked how the EU perceived
China,s involvement in the matter of Iran,s nuclear
program; the EU reps said they believed that Beijing had not
acted sufficiently in concert with the rest of the
international community in expressing concern over Tehran,s
ambitions. Davies asked whether the EU planned to end its
arms embargo on China. The EU reps explained that the

STATE 00156455 004 OF 006


membership had not reached a consensus, and that China had
ceased to demand that the embargo be lifted, in part because
Beijing seemed to have determined that pressure was futile,
and in part because its current focus was on convincing the
EU to issue a joint statement with the PRC on the one China
principle.


16. (C) The EU representatives described plans to open an EU
Centre focused on commerce in Hong Kong, which they said had
met with resistance from Beijing, whose officials seemed to
feel that it called into question China,s &one country, two
systems8 approach to Hong Kong.


17. (C) On the recently-adjourned Communist Party Congress,
the representatives said that they thought President Hu,s
moderate tone on Taiwan was a positive development, but they
made clear that they recognized that this was by design, with
audiences in the international community and the Taiwan
electorate, as well as presidential candidates, in mind.
They said they believed there were too many near-term
obstacles and distractions, including the Taiwan elections
and Beijing Olympics, for the prospect of China-Taiwan
dialogue to be realistic for the time being.

Taiwan
--------------


18. (C) On cross-Strait issues, the EU representatives said
they wanted to coordinate policy with the U.S. They informed
Davies that they intended to release a statement expressing
concern about the ruling DPP,s referendum on UN membership
for &Taiwan.8 They said they planned to issue the
statement on October 24, the day President Chen had declared
&Taiwan-UN Day.8 They noted that the PRC had been annoyed
at the EU,s slowness to voice concern over the DPP
referendum. They described private demarches to both Taiwan
and the PRC, in the former case to warn against provocations
and in the latter to ask that Beijing temper its reactions to
domestic politicking on Taiwan in an election year.


19. (C) With regard to Taiwan,s participation in
international organizations, the representatives said they
wanted to work with the U.S. to find ways to standardize
Taiwan,s involvement in organizations not requiring
statehood. They said that they would probably want to wait
to launch an initiative until after Taiwan elections, so as
not to appear to reward Chen Shui-bian. They noted that they
were especially concerned about Taiwan,s lack of access to
the WHO and international health-related processes.

Philippines
--------------


20. (C) DAS Marciel observed that the U.S. saw the
Philippines as a long-time ally and friend, which was making
a tremendous effort in its battle with terrorism. While the
Philippines was enjoying an economic upturn, it struggles
with serious problems in governance, infrastructure, and
economic reform. The U.S. also has particular concerns
regarding the issue of extra-judicial killings (EJKs). DAS
Marciel said it was important to continue to push the
Philippines government to make progress on this issue, as
well as to offer it technical assistance in addressing it.
Amb. Moitinho said the EU had the same assessment, and that
an EU mission to the Philippines had just presented its
report to the member states. RELEX Head of Unit Kozlowski
said the EU was not going to engage in investigating EJKs,
but would offer forensic assistance to the Philippines
government.

Indonesia
--------------


21. (C) Amb. Moitinho noted that the EU was pleased with
developments in Indonesia and wanted to be fully supportive
of efforts to improve good governance and rule of law. The
EU, he said, wanted Indonesia to be a moderating influence on
other Muslim majority countries and the regional Muslim
movement. Reporting that the EU was developing a strong
relationship with Indonesia, Moitinho said that there would
be a Political Director,s meeting in Jakarta on November 8,
and that the EU and Indonesia were close to entering into a
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA, the
EU,s first such agreement in the region, would include
clauses on nonproliferation, human rights, and other key
issues. Relex H Acting Director Geoffrey Barrett added that
Indonesia had threatened to scrap the Agreement over a recent
EU recommendation to restrict Indonesian air travel due to
safety concerns.


22. (C) DAS Marciel agreed that Indonesia has developed in a

STATE 00156455 005 OF 006


positive way and has made extraordinary gains in civil
society and democracy; however, the country still faces
tremendous governance challenges. DAS Marciel said that
although the USG was following closely the role of Islam in
Indonesian society, it was reluctant to become involved in
domestic debates over religion. Indonesia continued to make
progress in fighting terrorists, noting that the USG was
providing police training and other support.

Regional Architecture
--------------


23. (C) At lunch hosted by A/S Hill and SCA Acting A/S James

F. Moriarty, both sides offered their views on the various
regional organizations in East and South Asia. A/S Hill
observed that the U.S. supports APEC as a forum for
discussion, but is aware of its limitations. He noted our
support for ASEAN, and said that Burma had given the
organization a real issue to address. In addition to our
support for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),we are also
&keeping an open mind8 with regard to the East Asia Summit
(EAS). EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall said that the U.S. sees a
difference between pan-Asian integration and Transpacific
linkages. In Washington, APEC is considered the premier
Transpacific organization, and the President participates in
the annual summits. However, APEC is not necessarily seen in
Asian capitals as a vehicle for regional integration. The EAS
lacks a clear purpose, and we are continuing to study it from
the outside. The U.S. goal is to see both become more
action-oriented. There is presently no consensus within the
USG concerning possible U.S. accession to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC); a pre-requisite to our joining the EAS.


24. (C) Concerning integration of South and Central Asia, SCA
AA/S Moriarty said said Afghanistan could serve as a bridge
between the two regions. India is moving towards a global
presence, though the main obstacle it encounters is the pace
of its internal reforms. SCA/PDAS Mann said that Central
Asia,s dependence on Russian infrastructure for its energy
exports allowed Moscow to assert control over the region. The
U.S. supported alternate pipelines as a means to bolster the
sovereignty and options of Central Asian countries.


25. (C) Amb. Moitinho suggested that perhaps the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization could evolve into something useful.
RELEX Head of Unit Kozlowski said ASEAN was in transition,
and that the Burma issue will either strengthen it or do it
grave harm. Concerning the EAS versus the ASEAN plus three
(China, Japan, Korea) mechanism, he said it is not clear how
things will proceed, and that he believes that the Asians are
waiting for the U.S. to make a move. Kozlowski noted that
The EU-ASEAN meeting in Nuremburg during the German EU
Presidency earlier this year was the first time that there
was a real political discussion on all issues between the two
sides.


26. (C) With regard to using a possible North East Asia
sub-security architecture as the basis for an expanded
regional organization, A/S Hill said the U.S. was only
looking at the countries within the region owing to the lack
of other institutions. He thought that development of a
North East Asian political and security identity would take
considerable time. As for wider regional integration with
ASEAN &in the driver,s seat,8 Burma will reveal ASEAN,s
limitations. RELEX Director Barrett said that the ARF
Friends of the Chair might be useful, and that it was
essential that ARF discussed proliferation issues.


27. (C) On South Asia RELEX Head of Unit Helen Campbell said
the EU was working to build customs capacity through the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
SCA/RSA Director Spilsbury said the U.S. viewed trade
facilitation as a critical component of the regional economic
integration initiative. Campbell also noted that the EU was
interested in coordinating efforts with the U.S. in the lead
up to the next Regional Economic Cooperation Conference
(RECC) on Afghanistan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
continues to evolve; notably, the organization,s Bishkek
summit did not repeat the Astana declaration, which called
for a timetable for the withdrawal of coalition forces from
the region. EAP/RSP Director Hall said that the U.S. was
encouraged that a human rights body would be established by
the ASEAN Charter, although the crucial terms of reference
for it have yet to be settled. The ARF Friends of the Chair
might be useful on Burma, but it might also prove too
difficult.


28. (U) European Participants
PRESIDENCY (Portugal)
Ambassador Pedro Moitinho de Almeida, Special Representative
of the Presidency for the Political Dialogue with Third

STATE 00156455 006 OF 006


Countries
Mr. Luis Brito e Camara, Head of Division, Asia and Oceania
Directorate
Mr. Francisco Saraiva, First Secretary (Asia, Human Rights)
and Head of the Consular Section, Embassy of Portugal in
Washington

INCOMING PRESIDENCY (Slovenia)
Ms. Miriam Teresa Mozgan, Minister Counselor, Deputy Chief of
Mission, Embassy of Slovenia in Washington
Mr. Tadej Furlan, Second Secretary, Embassy of Slovenia in
Washington

COUNCIL SECRETARIAT
Mr. Tomasz Kozlowski, Head of Unit of the Asia Task Force in
the General Secretariat,s Policy Unit
Mr. Tim Eestermans, Asia Task Force

COMMISSION
Mr. Geoffrey Barrett, Acting Director Relex H
Ms. Helen Campbell, Head of Unit, Relex H4 (Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives)
Mr. Franz Jessen, Head of Unit, Relex H2 (China, Hong Kong,
Macao and Taiwan, Mongolia)
Dr. Laszlo Deak Political Counselor in the Delegation of
the EU Commission to the USA
RICE