DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S MEETING WITH U/SYG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 154497

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: KPKO PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S MEETING WITH U/SYG
GUEHENNO

Classified by: Deputy Secretary Negroponte - For reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with UN
Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie
Guehenno on November 5 to discuss challenges to UNAMID
deployment. U/SYG Guehenno pressed the Deputy Secretary
for further U.S. assistance with acquiring the capabilities
necessary to make the mission successful, particularly
transport helicopters, tactical helicopters, and ground
transportation assets. Deputy Secretary Negroponte pressed
for immediate deployment of the HSP and pledged that the
USG will continue to look for ways to help ensure that the
UN has the help it needs from donor countries for
deployment of blue helmets to Darfur. END SUMMARY.

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The Importance of UNAMID
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2. (C) The meeting began with a brief discussion of several
UN peacekeeping success stories, including Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Haiti. U/SYG Guehenno noted that UN
troops have also had a positive impact in cases like the
Democratic Republic of Congo, where problems continue.
Guehenno expressed his view that UN engagement was critical
for that country and the Great Lakes region. The remaining
challenge, observed Guehenno, was in the greater Horn of
Africa (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan). Darfur was
the biggest challenge at the moment; failure for UNAMID
would undermine hard-won progress in reestablishing
confidence in UN peacekeeping.

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The Need for a Mobile Force
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3. (C) U/SYG Guehenno raised his continued nervousness
about the quality of troops and the ambitious task laid out
for UNAMID. Even if Sudanese President Bashir agreed to
the Secretary General's September 19 letter and the
accompanying list of troop contributors, the prospective
UNAMID force will be weak. Without additional non-African
units, UNAMID will not prove significantly more capable at
force projection than AMIS. To make up for the weakness of
the force, Guehenno said it was essential to create a
highly mobile rapid reaction force that had the equipment
necessary to respond forcefully. This led to a discussion
of the key capabilities UNAMID lacks, namely 18
utility/transport helicopters, ground transportation
assets, and 6 tactical helicopters (e.g. Apaches or MI-
24s.) When Deputy Secretary Negroponte asked about the
candidates for delivering these capabilities, Guehenno
mentioned South Africa, Nigeria, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Ukraine, Argentina, and Brazil. Guehenno stated
that only South Africa and Nigeria have a direct interest
in the conflict, even if all Member States have a stake in
the success of UN peacekeeping. U/SYG Guehenno stated that
gunships will likely prove a critical UNAMID component,
both practically and symbolically. He alluded to MONUC's
success in Congo, where attack helicopters enabled the
force to be effective despite terrain far more difficult
than Darfur's. Gunships would send a clear message to
potential spoilers in the case of another attack like the
one on Haskanita camp.

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TCCs and the Chinese Role
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4. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte suggested that the
Chinese could perhaps contribute additional assets.
U/SYG Guehenno noted that it would be complicated to use
Chinese helicopters given the perceived close relationship
between Beijing and Khartoum. On the other hand, Chinese
help in persuading Khartoum to accept non-African TCC's is
critical. U/SYG Guehenno pointed out that, as Sudan is not
a failed state, the mission cannot be forced on them.
Troop contributors will not send troops without Sudanese

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government approval knowing that Khartoum can sabotage
their deployment in a myriad of ways.

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A Final Plea...and a DSRSG?
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5. (C) Guehenno appealed to the Deputy for help in getting
donors to provide the capabilities needed to make the
deployment a success. For all of the difficulties, the
Sudanese will listen to the U.S. An American as the SRSG
or as deputy would have been optimal, Guehenno opined. He
noted that there were many influential voices who believed
that only the U.S. could convince Khartoum of what is at
stake politically, especially given the upcoming 2011
secession referendum in southern Sudan. Deputy Secretary
Negroponte noted that Khartoum must be aware of the fact
that continued GoS intransigence on Darfur will only feed
the Government of Southern Sudan's desire to break away
when the vote comes. Guehenno replied that Khartoum
remains tactically brilliant, but strategically foolish.


6. (SBU) Participants:

U.S.
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Deputy Secretary John Negroponte
D Gustavo Delgado
IO/PSC Doug Wake
IO/PSC Greg Pollock

UN
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Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno
Nicholas Birnback (Aide)
Will Davis (UN Information Center)
RICE