GUIDANCE: NTM-I MISSION CONTINUES AND EXPANDS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 154483

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: NTM-I MISSION CONTINUES AND EXPANDS FOR
2007 PERIODIC MISSION REVIEW

REF: A. USNATO 585

B. USNATO 592

Classified By: David J. Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR/FO,
Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Washington is concerned with the NATO
Policy Coordination Group's (PCG) cover letter and its brief
overview of the Autumn 2007 Periodic Mission Review (PMR) of
the NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I). Washington
instructs USNATO to stress at all NATO NTM-I discussions and
meetings that the NTM-I should continue its mission and also
provide more training and courses based on Iraqi training
requirements and the PMR, which are in accordance with Stage
II of NATO OPLAN 10303 (NTM-I),and preserve all NTM-I
permanent billets in Iraq at this time. Washington views
that before NTM-I's mission in Ar Rustamiyah be discontinued,
NATO should be implementing a comprehensive plan regarding
future NTM-I training, based on the PMR recommendations. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) NTM-I is a critical training resource for Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). It is uniquely placed to offer a wide
range of training to junior, middle, and senior level
military and civilian leaders in ISF. Iraq's Prime Minister
Maliki has thanked NATO and the NTM-I commander for their
commitment and their outstanding level of training. A
conclusion of the entire NTM-I mission in 2008, as referenced
in the PCG's cover letter, would adversely affect the level
of military and civilian leadership throughout ISF, send a
negative message of NATO's support to the Iraqi government,
and counters the political objective and end-state of the
NTM-I OPLAN, which is the creation of fully functioning and
self-sustaining Iraqi security structures, accountable to the
democratic Iraqi Government. Mission may point out that this
end-state is not likely to be fulfilled in the scant months
before the PMR is done.


3. (C) According to SHAPE's PMR, "the GOI has signaled its
confidence in NATO by seeking further assistance in training
and mentoring of its Armed Forces, and in the acquisition of
military equipment through NATO's Training and Equipment
Coordination Group (NTECG). In this regard, NATO's presence
in Iraq is likely to remain attractive to the Government."
Washington agrees with this position and urges USNATO to
highlight this statement at the PCG meeting with the
understanding that NATO should be expanding cooperation in
Iraq -- including the steps envisioned by the NTM-I PMR
section on Additional Training Requirements -- not
terminating it as implied in the PMR covering texts.
Furthermore, the PCG document notes that "further formal
requests from the Government of Iraq for continued NATO
training support cannot be ruled out. Any adjustments to the
NATO footprint at Ar Rustamiyah would need to take this into
account." Washington also agrees with this statement and
believes that we should avoid any reductions to the NATO
footprint in Iraq at this time. While this stance does not
preclude the eventual departure of NTM-I permanent staff from
Ar Rustamiyah as the PMR envisages, it lays down the marker
that USG will not support closing the facility unless and
until there is a clear plan, well-resourced by Allies, to
respond to the full spectrum of GOI requests for NATO.


4. (C) Washington expects the Iraqi government to send a
letter as early as the week of November 5 to NATO requesting
additional training, which should be highlighted at the PCG
discussion on November 9 and provide sufficient evidence to
press Allies to respond. Absent a letter, USNATO can
reference a July 17, 2007 letter sent from the head of Iraq's
Navy, Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad Kadhum to Major General
Pompegnani, Deputy Commander of NTM-I, and meetings between
the head of Iraq's Air Force and the NTM-I Commander that
formally request additional training.


5. (C) The NTM-I mission at Ar Rustamiyah has been vital to
the successful training and mentoring of current and future
Iraqi military leaders. Washington does not want a reduction
in the NTM-I staff requirement to be seen as signaling any
change in the U.S. priority of maintaining a robust NTM-I
mission in Iraq.


6. (C) To date, no Allied members have been asked to support
mobile training teams (MTT) or training augmentation teams
(TAT),as referenced in the PCG paper and SHAPE's PMR.
Mission should begin raising with potential supporters the
need for Allies to continue to plan and provide the
political, personnel and financial resources necessary -- and
for leaders to indicate now their willingness to do so.
Otherwise, the combination of reducing the NTM-I footprint at
Ar Rustamiyah with no Allied buy-in to commit trainers to the
MTTs/TATs could create a vacuum of trainers to support the
training laid out in the PMR and address the 147 training
requirements for the Ministry of Defense, which in total
demand thousands of trainers. The NTM-I commander
acknowledges that NTM-I is a vital resource to address these
training requirements.


7. (C) In contrast to the PCG's recommendation to "task the
NMAs to provide advice in Spring 2008, including a status
update on gendarmerie-type training and further details on
potential additional training tasks," Washington would like
USNATO to work with other Allies, especially Italy and other
NTM-I contributors, to agree that at the next meeting on
NTM-I, the PCG paper and the NAC should task NMAs to pursue
and implement additional training tasks in response to Iraqi
requests and the tasks laid out in SHAPE's Autumn 2007 NTM-I
PMR, under Additional Training Requirements. Mission should
judge whether to explicitly cite, along with the UK and any
others who would, the PMR's statement that these tasks are
within current OPLAN Stage II and as such need no political
endorsement. In any case, creating maximum leeway to proceed
with these new tasks is a top priority for this PMR.


8. (C) Looking ahead, Washington understands that the NTM-I
OPLAN allows NATO to expand training support subject to
further political guidance under Stage III of Phase II. It
is our expectation that we would also support Stage III
training and continued State II training, if requested by the
Iraqis. Finally we are considering Mission's RFG in Ref B
and will provide more guidance on the idea of early 2008
success in gaining an expanded NTM-I as a deliverable at the
Bucharest Summit, perhaps in conjunction with a strategic
NATO-Iraq Partnership along the lines of NATO's strategic
partnership with Afghanistan.
RICE